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Abstract 
I study how a group of agents with incomplete information about their conflicting preferences 
make a collective decision by means of voting.   
I present a model of representative democracy with citizen candidates in which the set of 
agents who runs for office is endogenously determined. I show that if the electorate is large 
enough and agents are not able to perfectly anticipate the electoral outcome, elections are always 
contested, and an equilibrium with two candidates exists.  
In the last two chapters of this dissertation, I introduce a model of voting bloc formation in 
which groups of agents choose to coalesce to vote together in an assembly. Looking first at one 
coalition, then at two coalitions, and finally at an arbitrary number of coalitions emerging in a 
fully endogenous model of voting bloc formation, I analyze the incentives to join a voting bloc, 
the stability of different voting blocs and how the incentives and stable outcomes change with the 
size of the blocs, the internal voting rule that each bloc uses and the heterogeneity in the 
preferences of the agents. This model provides a new explanation of the formation of political 
parties in legislatures.  
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A rational agent making an individual decision chooses her preferred outcome among all the feasible
alternatives. A group of agents making a collective decision faces a more complicated problem, be-
cause the group preference may be difficult to determine if there is a conflic of individual preferences
inside the group.
Social choice theory studies how a group of agents aggregate preferences to make a collective
choice. In a democracy, the aggregation of preferences to make a collective decision is often made
by means of voting. In a direct democracy, the members of the group vote over the different
alternatives and a constitutionally given voting rule aggregates the votes to choose an outcome. In
an indirect democracy, agents do not vote directly over the alternatives. Rather, agents vote to
elect a representative, who is then endowed with the powers to make a decision on behalf of the
whole group. Either directly or indirectly, agents express their preference through their votes, and
a voting rule translates the votes into a collective choice. For instance, in referenda citizens of a
society directly choose policy outcomes, while in regular elections they first elect politicians who
then represent the citizens and choose policy.
I study the aggregation of preferences by a group of agents who face some uncertainty about the
distribution of preferences inside the group and must make a collective decision to choose a policy
outcome. I study the aggregation of preferences either indirectly by means of elections, or directly
by means of voting over the set of alternatives.
2In chapter 2 I study a representative democracy where citizens determine policy outcomes in-
directly by first electing a representative. Every member of the society chooses whether or not to
become a candidate -to run for election- and once the set of candidates is determined, every member
of the society casts a vote for one of the self-declared candidates. The candidate who receives the
most votes wins the election and chooses the policy outcome for the society. This modeling approach
in which every citizen makes a strategic decision on whether or not to become a candidate is part
of the “citizen candidate” literature of representative democracy sparked by the seminal work by
Besley and Coate [9] and Osborne and Slivinski [44]. I improve on previous results by incorporating
uncertainty into the theory. Existing models assumed that in equilibrium every agent is perfectly
able to anticipate the result of the election; consequently, there could not be a two-candidate elec-
tion in which one of the candidate loses because if so, the would-be loser, anticipating defeat, would
choose not to run for election given that running is costly. Once we recognizing that there is an
element of uncertainty in every election and that no candidate is able to perfectly predict the exact
tally of votes, the theory yields better predictions. In particular, I show that if the number of voters
is large enough and there is an intrinsic benefit of being elected, there are no uncontested elections
and at least two candidates run for office. Furthermore, equilibria with exactly two candidates al-
ways exist. To sharpen this prediction, I introduce a refined equilibrium concept that relaxes the
assumption that all agents make a strategic decision when they cast their vote, considering instead
that some agents may vote sincerely for their most preferred candidate. Selecting equilibria that are
robust regardless of whether any set of agents behaves sincerely or strategically at the voting stage,
I find that if the policy space is one dimensional, in a two-candidate election both candidates must
be moderates with one of them on each side of the ideological left-to-right spectrum.
I study the aggregation of preferences by means of voting in a direct democracy in chapter 3
and chapter 4. Given a set of alternatives and a voting rule, every agent in the society casts a vote
for one of the policy alternatives. The aggregation of these votes according to the voting rule of
the society determines the collective choice of a particular policy for the society. For instance, two
3salient rules are simple majority and unanimity. Under simple majority, the society adopts a given
policy if more than a half of the agents vote in favor of it, otherwise a status quo or default policy
remains in place. Under unanimity, the society adopts a given policy only if every vote favors it,
otherwise, if at least one agent votes against it, the policy proposal is rejected and the status quo
remains in place. Agents have incentives to behave strategically regardless of the voting rule in place,
coordinating their actions with those of other agents. While the coordination of voting strategies
remains difficult in a large election, the model applies to voting in committees or assemblies where
agents know each other, communicate with each other and have an opportunity to coordinate with
each other forming coalitions and dividing the assembly into cohesive subsets.
In legislative bodies such as lower or upper houses of representatives, senates, parliaments or
national assemblies, legislators typically coalesce into cohesive political parties that discipline the
voting behavior of their members. Other applications range from the formation of alliances of
countries in international voting bodies, such as the European Union or the Arab League in the UN
General Assembly, to the formation of factions that vote together in faculty meetings in an academic
department. In all these applications, individual agents are able to communicate and coordinate
with others. Specifically, agents can coalesce to form voting blocs.
A voting bloc is a set of agents who commit to vote together, aggregating their internal preferences
into a common policy position that the whole bloc votes for, rolling internal dissent according to a
voting rule internal to the bloc. I study the strategic incentives and the advantages of forming a
voting bloc.
In chapter 3 I consider an exogenously given coalition of agents who can form a voting bloc if
every coalition member agrees to the formation of the bloc. Assuming that the goal of each agent
is to maximize the probability that the final policy outcome coincides with the preference of the
agent, forming a voting bloc generates a net aggregate surplus of utility for the members of the
coalition. However, since every member must agree in order for the bloc to form, it must be that
every member individually benefits. I show under which conditions the coalition can form a voting
4bloc that benefits every member. I show how the selection of the voting rule internal to the bloc and
used to determine the bloc’s vote in the assembly given the preferences of its members affects the
incentives of each agent to join the bloc or not. Specifically, I show that under some parameters, the
voting bloc must choose a supermajority internal voting rule and not simple majority in order to
benefit every one of its members. I find that even if every member of the coalition must agree in order
to form a voting bloc -that is, each member of the coalition has veto powers over the constitutional
decision to form a voting bloc- the formation of a bloc hinges on a single well-defined agent who
is the least likely to benefit from the aggregation of votes in the bloc. With this result in mind, I
investigate the possibility of allowing this agent to opt out of the voting bloc: Suppose that every
member of the coalition must agree to the formation of a voting bloc that excludes the one agent
least likely to benefit from joining the bloc. Note that the excluded agent must also agree to the
formation of the bloc, in the same spirit as the United Kingdom or Denmark agreed, by the Treaty
of Maastricht (1992), to the formation of the European Monetary Union that excluded them and
brought the euro into existence. I find that in some circumstances, forming a voting bloc excluding
one agent is beneficial for every member of the coalition, including the excluded one, even in some
cases when the coalition cannot reach consensus to form a voting bloc with all its members. Overall,
chapter 3 shows that forming a voting bloc results in a net gain for the members of a coalition
who agree to form it, and studies some possible ways to select the internal voting rule to aggregate
preferences within the bloc in such a way that every agent in the coalition participates in the gains
brought by the voting bloc.
In chapter 4 I extend and generalize the theory to properly consider a fully endogenous model
of voting bloc formation. Chapter 3 detailed the strategic incentives to form a voting bloc in an
exogenously given coalition, given the behavior of all other agents in the assembly. This is a partial
equilibrium analysis that neglects the possibility that other groups of agents outside the coalition
under consideration can also form their own voting blocs. The generalized model in chapter 4 extends
the analysis to study the strategic interactions between multiple voting blocs that compete with each
5other in their quest to influence the collectively chosen policy outcome. This model provides a novel
interpretation of the process of the formation of political parties inside a legislature where agents
coalesce solely for ideological reasons to attain the policy outcomes they prefer in an ideological
space, absent any distributive or electoral component in their strategies. As such, it is a new insight
into the formation of political parties.
The first step toward fully endogenizing the model of voting bloc formation is to consider that
there exists two political parties in the assembly, each of which can form a voting bloc. I consider
the case where consensus is necessary to form a voting bloc, and the case where the constitutional
rules of the party are such that a subset of the party can form its own voting bloc over the opposition
of some members who cannot veto the project. In this latter case I look for conditions under which
every member would choose to join the voting bloc and there would be no party member who chose
to be left out. I show that many results in chapter 3 generalize to the case with two competing
parties: Forming a voting bloc generates a benefit and under some parameters the voting bloc must
choose a supermajority internal rule to attract every member to the bloc. While in chapter 3 I
note that allowing one agent to opt-out and be excluded sometimes makes the formation of a bloc
possible, now I find the converse result to be also true: Under different parameters, agents would
individually choose to stay out of the bloc, but if the bloc changes its formation rules so that the
participation of every party member is required in order to form the bloc, every party member would
join and the bloc would form. Considering both results together I conclude that while allowing a
reluctant agent to stay out of the bloc may in some cases benefit everybody, allowing agents to
freely enter or exit may often result in free riding and the loss of the aggregate gain that the party
members derive from forming a bloc.
The culmination of the theory in this thesis provides a fully endogenous model of party formation.
Agents are able to coalesce freely in the assembly, and the resulting coalitions partition the assembly
into voting blocs. In an application to a legislative assembly, political parties are thus explained
as the stable partition of the legislative assembly into voting blocs. This partition, along with the
6internal voting rules of each agent, determines the voting bloc structure of the assembly. I show that
stable voting bloc structures exist for several definitions of stability, including Nash stability, where
each agent is free to exit the bloc she belongs to and join any other bloc at wish. I show that Nash
stable voting blocs must be of size less than minimal winning. To illustrate the model at work, and
provide sharper predictions, I look at a small assembly, of fixed size nine, and I introduce a new
stability concept that captures coalitional deviations in which at most one bloc splits and at most
one new bloc forms. I call this notion “Split stable.” I show that the only Nash and Split stable
voting bloc structures in a stylized small assembly consist of two small voting blocs, one at each
side of the ideological spectrum, while the median member of the assembly remains independent. I
also look at voting data from the United States Supreme Court and, taking the voting records from
1995 to 2004 as indicative of the true preferences of the justices, I conclude that in an assembly with
such preferences in which agents strategically formed voting blocs with the purpose of maximizing
the probability that their preferred policy is implemented, the only stable voting bloc structure that
results would be for two blocs to form, one composed of any three of the four liberal justices, the
other one with the three most conservative justices.
The model of voting bloc formation provides an explanation for the formation of political parties,
a prediction about the parties that would form in a small assembly, and a method for evaluating the
merits of different rules for a coalition of agents who must select an internal rule to aggregate their
preferences before they commit to vote together in a bloc.
7Chapter 2
Citizen Candidates under
Uncertainty
abstract: In this chapter I make two contributions to the growing literature on “citizen
candidate” models of representative democracy. First, I add uncertainty about the total
vote count. I show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the
election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding
office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate.
Second, I introduce a new concept of equilibrium, which I term “sincere-strategic,” and I
show that with this refinement, the two equilibrium candidates will not be too extreme,
one will lean to the left and the other one to the right.1
2.1 Introduction
In a representative democracy, citizens elect representatives who in turn, choose policies for the
society. Traditional models divide the members of the society into two classes: voters, whose only
political role is to vote, and politicians or political parties (often just two of them), who compete
in the election. Citizen candidate models of the electoral process, on the other hand, explain how
politicians emerge from the class of voters. In these models, some citizens become politicians by
1Part of this chapter appears as an independent paper in Eguia [22].
8choosing to run as candidates in an election. The number and policy preferences of the candidates
who run in equilibrium are determined by three factors: the policy preferences of every citizen, the
benefits of holding office, and the cost of running for election.
The standard citizen candidate models suffer from a simplistic assumption that leads to unre-
alistic predictions. The assumption is that candidates can perfectly anticipate the outcome of the
election and forecast exactly how many votes each candidate will receive. This assumption leads
to the prediction that two candidates will run against each other only if they have the exact same
number of supporters in the electorate. In models with a finite electorate, this implies that typically
there will be a two-candidate equilibrium only if the number of citizens is even, because if it is odd,
one of the candidates will generally have at least one more supporter than the other.
I solve this problem and assure political competition in the model by introducing uncertainty in
the electoral outcome, and then showing that in a society with a large electorate, equilibria with one
candidate do not exist, while equilibria with two candidates always exist. I model the uncertainty as
in Myerson [43]: Citizens choose which candidate to support, but each citizen has a small probability
of failing to convert her intention to support a candidate into an actual valid, counted vote for the
candidate -perhaps the voter is unable to make it to the polling station, or she misuses the voting
equipment and casts an invalid ballot. This individual probability of being unable to cast a valid
vote generates an aggregate uncertainty about the total vote count.
The aggregate uncertainty about the electoral outcome crucially affects elections with a large
electorate. Candidates decide to run based on the support they have in the electorate at the time
they make the decision to run. However, elections are not deterministic: the aggregate uncertainty
makes the outcome stochastic, and a candidate who initially had less support may ultimately collect
more votes and win the election. If the most popular candidate enters the race, another citizen with
slightly less support will also run, in the hope of an upset victory. As a result, in a society with
a large enough electorate, one-candidate equilibria do not exist, whereas two-candidate equilibria
always exist, regardless of the exact number of citizens. These predictions are similar to those in
9Osborne and Slivinski’s [44] model of citizen candidates, but Osborne and Slivinski work only with
an infinite number of sincere voters, who have rather restricted preferences. My model, by contrast,
allows for any finite number of citizens, who vote strategically and may have quite general forms of
preferences.
The uncertainty I introduce in my model has a large effect unless the electorate is very small.
In the case of a very small electorate the predictions of my model are similar to those of Besley and
Coate [9]: The existence of equilibria with one or two candidates depends on whether the number
of citizens is odd or even.
There are two other papers incorporating uncertainty to a model of citizen candidates: In Riv-
iere’s paper [50], a group of citizens learn their policy preference only after candidacies are announced,
so the location of the median is uncertain at the time of the announcement. My model differs from
Riviere’s both in the assumptions I use and the results I obtain. In words of the author, Riviere’s
assumptions are “very restrictive” and in her citizen candidate model, two-candidate equilibria are
“very rare.”2 I relax and generalize most of Riviere’s assumptions to show that under mild conditions,
equilibria with two candidates exist.
In a short note, Roemer [51] tackles the problem of indeterminacy of equilibria in Besley and
Coate’s model, advocating a particular refinement (Party-Unanimity Nash Equilibrium or PUNE)
that yields a smaller but non empty set of equilibria. Uncertainty is only a side issue in this note,
and Roemer assumes that each candidate wins with a probability equal to the candidate’s share
of votes. His main conclusion is that “the citizen candidate equilibrium concept is not sufficiently
restrictive.”
I address the multiplicity of equilibria by proposing a more restrictive equilibrium concept. This
refined equilibrium, which I term sincere-strategic, relaxes the assumption that citizens are strategic
in their voting behavior, allowing for citizens to choose which candidate to support either sincerely
2Riviere also considers a game in which like-minded citizens can share the cost of running, forming a political
party. In this setting, equilibria with two parties are no longer rare, but for some values of the cost of running, only
equilibria with one or three candidates exist.
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or strategically. I show that under this sincere-strategic equilibrium concept, all candidates must
receive a similar share of electoral support and that if there are only two, one will lean left and the
other one will lean right, but they will not be too extreme.
The rest of the chapter is as follows: In section 2.2 I present the model of citizen candidates
with uncertainty. In section 2.3 I characterize equilibria with one and two candidates, in pure and
mixed strategies. In section 2.4 I introduce the refined sincere-strategic equilibrium, and I apply
this concept to equilibria with two candidates and multiple candidates. I summarize the findings of
the chapter in section 2.5. An appendix contains technical matters omitted from the text.
2.2 The Model
Let N be a society formed by N citizens labeled i ∈ N ={1, ..., N}, with N ≥ 3. This society must
elect a representative, who will receive a benefit b from being elected and will also get to choose a
policy in a unidimensional policy space [0, 1]. The implemented policy I denote by p. Citizens have
different preferences over the chosen policy; let vi(p) be a bounded function measuring the utility
that citizen i derives from policy p ∈ [0, 1].
Each agent in the society can run as a candidate in the election, but doing so entails a cost c,
which is small compared to the rewards from holding office. Formally, I assume that b > 2c > 0.
Let Ii = 1 if i runs as a candidate and zero otherwise, and let Wi = 1 if i runs as a candidate
and wins the election and zero otherwise.
Then the utility of agent i is:
U(p, Ii,Wi) = vi(p) + bWi − cIi.
The game has four stages:
In the first stage or entry stage, each citizen simultaneously decides whether or not to enter the
race and become a candidate. If no candidate enters the race, then the game ends and a default
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policy p0 is implemented. If only one candidate enters the race, she is automatically elected, she
implements her ideal policy, and the game ends.
If at least two candidates compete for office, in stage two or support stage, each citizen decides
to support one of the candidates. Citizens who are indifferent toward all the candidates choose
randomly which candidate to support.
In stage three, each citizen i who supports candidate j casts a valid vote for j with probability
(1− µ). With probability µ ∈ [0, 1), citizen i is unable to cast a valid vote for any candidate, so i0s
support is lost. This probability µ is the same for each citizen and it is uncorrelated among citizens.
The intuition is that citizen i supports j and intends to vote for j, but with probability µ, some
random factor prevents citizen i from casting a valid vote; perhaps i cannot make it to the polls, or
i votes but somehow the ballot is cast incorrectly and is later declared invalid and does not add to
the total vote count.
Once all valid votes are counted, a winner is chosen by plurality rule: the candidate who has most
valid votes (not necessarily the one with most intended support) wins, provided that she obtains at
least two valid votes. If no candidate obtains more than one valid vote, the game returns to the
beginning of stage three and citizens are called to vote again for the candidates they had decided to
support in stage two.3 In case of a tie for victory between two or more candidates with at least two
votes, the winner is randomly determined among all candidates with most votes.
Finally, in stage four, the winner implements her ideal policy.
Citizens know the ideal policy of each candidate and they correctly anticipate that the winner
will implement her ideal policy; candidates cannot commit at the entry stage to implement any other
policy if they win the election. Empirical evidence such as Lee, Moretti and Butler [37] indicates that,
indeed, voters merely elect the policy they prefer among those offered by the competing candidates,
3This mild assumption prevents a candidate winning with her own vote only and no support in the rest of the
electorate, and it is technically convenient. However, if every citizen ran as a candidate and supported herself, no
candidate would ever get two votes. We assume that in this unlikely scenario the game ends with a negative utility
payoff that makes every agent worse off than in any other outcome.
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without being able to influence how the winning candidate chooses policy once in office.
The uncertainty about the vote count in stage three captures the idea that candidates cannot
anticipate the outcome of the election, because they do not have enough information about the
voting population. The candidates cannot anticipate whose vote will count and whose will not, so
even though they anticipate the support intentions of the whole electorate, they are still uncertain
about the electoral outcome.
There are other ways to incorporate uncertainty to the model. Roemer [51] lets each candidate
win with probability equal to the candidate’s share of votes. This assumption may seem crude
but keeps his model simple and tractable. A more elegant approach would be to model turnout,
assuming that the probability that a citizen votes increases with the expected benefit for the citizen
from voting. With costless voting, every rational citizen who is not indifferent about every candidate
should vote, but according to Quantal Response theories (see McKelvey and Palfrey [41]) citizens
with little to gain or lose are more likely to make the mistake of abstaining than those with a higher
stake in the outcome of the election. I do not model turnout decisions: The parameter µ is merely
a simple way to capture the uncertainty faced by the candidates, who in reality, as in the model, do
not know the exact distribution of preferences of the voting population.
The strategy of each citizen i has two components: an entry strategy, determining whether to run
as a candidate or not, and a support strategy, which determines for any possible set of candidates
which one will citizen i support.
Let Ii ∈ {0, 1} denote citizen i’s pure entry strategy, where Ii = 1 denotes entry, and let
I = (I1, ..., IN ) be the pure entry strategy profile of all the citizens. The set of candidates resulting
from the entry strategy I is C ⊆ N . Let γi ∈ [0, 1] be the mixed entry strategy by citizen i, indicating
the probability that i enters the race, and let γ be the entry strategy profile of all citizens.
Let si : 2N −→ N denote the pure support strategy used by citizen i, which determines for
each possible set of candidates, which one citizen i will support. For a given set of candidates C,
si(C) denotes the candidate supported by citizen i. Let s = (s1, ..., sN ) be the pure support strategy
13
profile of every citizen in the society. Let σi be the mixed support strategy profile of citizen i, and let
σ be the mixed support strategy profile of every citizen. Let the subscript −i denote “every citizen
in N except for i.”
The equilibrium concept I use is Undominated Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, ruling out
weakly dominated strategies. An equilibrium is defined by an entry strategy profile γ∗ and a support
strategy profile σ∗ such that:
(i) Given any set of candidates C ⊆ N of size at least two, σ∗(C) is an Undominated Nash
equilibrium of the support stage subgame.
(ii) Given σ∗, the entry strategy profile γ∗ is a Nash equilibrium at the entry stage of the game.
When citizens use pure entry strategies, I let C∗ denote the set of candidates who run in the
equilibrium {γ∗, σ∗}.
I assume that each agent i has a unique favorite policy pi = argmax
p∈[0,1]
vi(p) and I label and order
individuals according to their favorite policy, so that for all i, j ∈ N , i < j implies pi ≤ pj . Given this
ordering of citizens, I assume that the preference profile satisfies the Strict Single-Crossing property:
Definition 1 A preference profile satisfies the Strict Single-Crossing property if for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]
and all i, j ∈ N such that y > x and j > i, vi(y) ≥ vi(x) =⇒ vj(y) > vj(x).
This property implies that if a left-leaning citizen d prefers the right-most of two policies, then
every citizen who is more right-leaning than d also prefers the right-most policy. Given two policies,
one more liberal, one more conservative, there cannot be any overlapping so that “conservative”
citizens support the liberal policy and some more “liberal” citizens support the conservative policy:
With strictly single-crossing preferences, given any two policy positions p0 < p00, there exists a cut-off
point bp(p0, p00) such that every citizen with an ideal policy below bp(p0, p00) prefers p0 to p00 and every
citizen with an ideal policy above bp(p0, p00) prefers p00.
Borrowing the terminology of the Poole and Rosenthal [46] Nominate Scores model, single-
crossing preferences imply “perfect voting”: The voting behavior of a citizen-voter faced with a
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binary choice should be perfectly explained by the position of the citizen in the unidimensional
low-to-high scale. Poole [45] notes that in practice, more than 90% of the votes in US Congress can
be explained by the position of a legislator in a one-dimensional policy space, although this evidence
is merely suggestive when we are studying large elections.
I introduce the following notation:
Let m denote the median voter if N is odd, and let ml and mh denote the two medians if N is
even. Labelling citizens by the relative position of their ideal policy from lowest to highest, m is
the citizen in position N+12 if such fraction is an integer; otherwise ml and mh are respectively the
citizens in positions N2 and
N+2
2 .
Let Si(C, σ) denote the support for candidate i, that is, the number of citizens whose support
strategy is to support candidate i, given that the set of candidates is C and the joint support strategy
profile is σ. If all citizens use a pure support strategy, Si(C, σ) = #{j : sj(C) = i}. If citizens use
mixed support strategies, Si is a random variable that can take different values depending on the
support actions taken by the agents who mix. Let then E[Si] denote the expected value of Si.
Let Vi denote the number of valid votes for i. The difference Si − Vi corresponds to the number
of citizens who support i but are unable to cast a valid vote for i and can be interpreted as the
number of “lost votes” for i.
In any two-candidate race with C = {i, j}, let
Lij = (Si − Sj)− (Vi − Vj) = (Si − Vi)− (Sj − Vj)
denote the “shift” from candidate i to candidate j in the difference of voting totals for the two can-
didates, compared to the original difference in support for the two candidates prior to the distortion
introduced by the loss of votes. In short, Lij is equal to the number of votes lost by i minus the
number of votes lost by j, which we can interpret as a “net loss” of votes for i.
Lij is a discrete random variable, whose distribution depends on the support for each candidate
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and the uncertainty parameter µ: Let fij(l) be its probability mass function and let Fij(l) be its
distribution function, so fij(l) is the probability that Lij = l and Fij(l) =
lP
k=−N
fij(k).
In any race with two candidates C = {i, j} with ideal policies pi < pj , let bpij denote the cut-off
point such that every citizen with an ideal policy less than bpij prefers candidate i, every citizen with
an ideal policy above bpij prefers candidate j, and only citizens with an ideal policy equal to bpij are
indifferent between i and j.
2.3 Existence of Equilibria
Let us first present the benchmark case in which there no uncertainty about the vote count (µ = 0)
and the candidates can anticipate the outcome of the election. This benchmark corresponds to the
Besley and Coate [9] model with the additional assumptions of strict single-crossing preferences in
a unidimensional policy space, and b > 2c.
A single-candidate equilibrium exists if and only if N is odd, whereas two candidate equilibria
generically do not exist if N is odd and they exist if N is even. Equilibria with multiple candidates
are also possible.
These differences depending on the exact number of citizens are plausible in an election with a
small electorate, such as a vote in a committee. However, in any election with a very large electorate,
there will be some uncertainty about the number of votes each candidate will get and the results of
the model should not depend on whether the size of the electorate is odd or even.
In the rest of the chapter, I capture the uncertainty assuming that µ > 0 and I show that if the
electorate is sufficiently large, whether N is odd or even is irrelevant for the existence of equilibria
with one or two candidates in elections with a large reward for holding office.
If citizens use mixed entry strategies, the number of candidates who run may vary in different
outcomes of the same equilibrium. I categorize equilibria according to the number of citizens who
enter the race with positive probability. If citizens use only pure strategies at the entry stage, I say
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the equilibrium is pure.
Definition 2 An n-candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the number of citizens who run
with positive probability is n.
Definition 3 An equilibrium is “pure” if every citizen uses a pure entry strategy.
2.3.1 Single-Candidate Equilibrium
In this subsection, I characterize existence of single-candidate equilibria, and I show that they do
not exist in a society with a sufficiently large electorate. In a unidimensional space, a unique median
is a Condorcet winner and will have more support (and more expected vote share) than the other
competitor in any two-candidate race.
Nevertheless, the uncertainty about the vote totals gives any other candidate challenging the
median some positive probability of winning the election, and in equilibrium the median can only
run alone if the probability of victory for any candidate running against her is too low.
Lemma 1 There exists a one-candidate equilibrium if and only if N is odd, the median is unique,
and for any citizen j ∈ N\m,
(b+ vj(pj)− vj(pm)) Pr[Wj = 1|C = {m, j}] ≤ c.
This equilibrium is unique and pure, and m is the single candidate.
This and all other proofs are in an appendix at the end of the chapter. The intuition is that the
median(s) would enter and run against any other citizen who was running alone, so only a unique
median can run unopposed, and even the median can run unopposed only if any challenger would
have a small enough probability of victory.
A candidate trailing by a small number of supporters almost certainly loses if the electorate is
also small, but as the electorate gets larger, the number of lost votes will increase and a candidate
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trailing by the same small number of supporters will have a better chance of victory. For instance,
in an electorate with 5 citizens, a 3−2 split of support will give the weaker candidate a very small
chance of victory. However, in an electorate with millions of citizens, a split of support in which the
stronger candidate has only one more supporter is a virtual tie, and both candidates have an almost
equal probability of victory.
Given a fixed parameter of uncertainty µ, consider a sequence of societies of increasing size.
Consider also a corresponding sequence composed of a pair of candidates in each society such that
the difference in support for the two candidates in each pair is constant along the sequence. For
example, in society NN of size N construct the pair with the median mN and the next citizen,
(m + 1)N ; regardless of the distribution of preferences in each society, for every element of this
sequence of pairs the median has one more supporter than the candidate in position m + 1. The
probability of victory converges to a half for both candidates as the size of the society increases. I
use this result for the first theorem on existence of a single-candidate equilibrium in large societies.
Theorem 2 Given µ > 0, there exists some n such that if N > n, there is no single-candidate
equilibrium.
Suppose the benefit of holding office is three times the cost of running. Then any candidate
with a one-third chance of victory will be willing to run. The probability of victory for a weaker
candidate with one less supporter than the median is more than a third if N ≥ 103 for µ = 0.05; or if
N ≥ 1087 for µ = 0.005. Since void ballots exceed 0.5% in most elections, these numerical examples
show that the theorem applies for relatively small electorates. A higher degree of uncertainty about
counting an individual vote has the same effect as increasing the size of the population: In either
case it becomes harder for the agents to anticipate the exact outcome of the election and a challenger
will have greater incentives to run against the median.
In an election with a small electorate the median can run unopposed because any other candidate
would have only a very slim chance of beating the median. The median must be unique to run
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unopposed, so it is crucial that the electorate is odd. However, as the electorate gets larger, the
uncertainty about the vote count gives other candidates challenging the median a better chance of
winning, and for a sufficiently large society the probability of victory for citizens with an ideal point
close to the median is high enough so that they will run and not let the median win unopposed,
not even a unique, Condorcet winner median. Note that this result does not at all depend on the
distribution of preferences in the population: As long as the society is large enough, some other
citizen will challenge the median.
As a result, in any equilibrium at least two citizens will enter with positive probability. If citizens
use mixed entry strategies, it could be that in a particular outcome only one candidate stands for
election, but the positive probability of entry by other citizens must be part of the equilibrium.
2.3.2 Two-Candidate Equilibria
Two-candidate equilibria are a common feature of plurality elections, yet they are generically non-
existent in citizen candidate models without uncertainty if the number of citizens is finite and odd. I
show that introducing uncertainty in the model guarantees the existence of two-candidate equilibria
if the size of the society is sufficiently large.
To obtain this result, I add a mild restriction on the preference profile; I require that each citizen
has a distinct ideal policy. The formal condition is that for any i, j ∈ N , pi 6= pj .
Intuitively, this assumption is necessary to avoid entry by multiple candidates with the same
policy. As an illustrative extreme case, suppose all citizens but one share a common ideal policy,
and suppose that the cost of running is negligible compared to the benefit of holding office. Then
all the citizens with the same ideal policy run against each other. No equilibria with less than all of
them running is possible. However, if the rest of the electorate is able to discriminate among any
pair of candidates, then in a large enough electorate, equilibria with two candidates exist.
Theorem 3 Given µ > 0, there exists some n such that if every citizen has a distinct ideal policy
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and N > n, a pure two-candidate equilibrium exists.
The proof is constructive. If there is a unique median, in the absence of uncertainty (or with little
uncertainty in small electorates), two-candidate equilibria did not exist unless the median citizen is
indifferent between the two candidates, an event that generically does not occur.
However, as the electorate grows, a positive uncertainty raises the probability that a candidate
trailing by one supporter wins the election. If there are large benefits of holding office, the same
intuition that made single-candidate equilibria impossible guarantees the existence of two-candidate
equilibria for large electorates. As the electorate grows, the probability that a weaker candidate
trailing by a given number of supporters wins the election converges to one-half, and b > 2c guar-
antees that such a weaker candidate will want to run, and that equilibria with two candidates exist
in large societies, whether the number of citizens is even or odd.
Two-candidate equilibria with mixed entry strategies may also exist,4 but only the weaker can-
didate will mix: The stronger candidate has a probability of victory which is over one half, so she
prefers to enter. Furthermore, if there is a two-candidate equilibrium in which candidate i enters for
sure and candidate j mixes between running and not running in her entry decision, there is also a
pure equilibrium in which both i and j enter with probability one.
Proposition 4 If there exists a two-candidate equilibrium in which i and j run with positive prob-
ability, then there exists a pure two-candidate equilibrium in which i and j run.
Only a weaker candidate with not so good odds of victory may be indifferent about running or
not. The weaker candidate may only mix if she is indifferent about running. If she is indifferent,
it is also a best response for her to run with probability one. The stronger candidate wants to run
regardless of the probability of entry by the weaker one. If both candidates have the same support,
both enter with probability one.
4Previous literature has paid only scant attention to equilibria with mixed entry. In a novel experimental paper,
Cadigan [13] provides an example.
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Since considering mixed entry does not expand the set of pairs of citizens who may run in a
two-candidate race, I focus on equilibria which are pure at the entry stage. In the constructive proof
of theorem 3, the median(s) or a citizen very close to the median are the two candidates who enter
for sure in equilibrium. However, there exist other equilibria involving citizens far from the median:
Two very extreme candidates i and j can run in equilibrium, insofar as the cutting point bpij between
those who support i and those who support j is very close to the median, (or to the medians if N
is even).
Let i and j be the any two citizens, such that pi < pj . Let q(x) be the minimum number of
supporters that i must have in order for i to win with probability no less than x, given that every
other citizen will support j. That is, q(x) is the minimum k such that:
Pr[Wi = 1|Si = k, Sj = N − k] ≥ x.
In the following proposition I use the function q to specify the number of supporters each candidate
must have in order to sustain a two-candidate equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose each citizen has a distinct ideal policy. For any i, j ∈ N such that pi < pj ,
let
D = q
µ
c
b+ vi(pi)− vi(pj)
¶
and R = q
µ
1− c
b+ vj(pj)− vj(pi)
¶
, D,R ∈ N .
If bpij ∈ (pD, pR), there exists a pure two-candidate equilibrium in which i and j run.
There is a two-candidate equilibrium if both candidates get a similar number of supporters and
thus they both have a sufficiently high probability of victory. In order for the electorate to split in
roughly equal halves, the cutting point bpij between those who support i and those who support j
must be close to the median. Proposition 5 shows it suffices that the cutting point lies in between
the ideal policies of citizens D and R, where the function q(x) specifies the identity of D and R,
which depends on the identity of i and j.
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A very slight weakening of the sufficient condition in proposition 5 is already a necessary con-
dition: If i and j run in a pure two-candidate equilibrium, then bpij ∈ [pD, pR+1). Only equilibria
in which one of the candidates is indifferent about running or not need not satisfy the sufficient
condition.
Since b > 2c, each candidate is willing to run for a probability of victory less than a half and
it follows that D is weakly to the left of the median m if N odd, or of the low median ml if N is
even. Similarly, H is weakly to the right of m or mh. Suppose N is even. Then if ml and mh have
different ideal policies, bpml,mh ∈ (pml , pmh) ⊆ (pD, pR) and there exist a two-candidate equilibrium
with pure entry strategies in which ml and mh run against each other.
Corollary 6 Suppose each citizen has a distinct ideal policy. If the number of citizens is even, a
pure two-candidate equilibrium exists.
In an equilibrium without uncertainty, the two candidates must have equal support. With
uncertainty, they must have similar, not necessarily equal support. In larger societies, the margin
by which the weaker candidate trails in support may be bigger in absolute terms, but the fraction of
the population that supports each candidate must converge to a half in a two-candidate equilibrium
as the electorate gets larger. If the weaker candidate lags heavily in support, she would abandon
the race.
The cutting point bpij must be close to the median in order for the candidates to have similar
support. But the candidates themselves need not be close to the median. There is no convergence
result in terms of the policy that will ultimately be implemented, but only in terms of the “undecided
voter,” the citizen who is indifferent between the two candidates. This citizen (if it exists) ought
to be close to the median, splitting the electorate into two halves of roughly the same size, so that
both candidacies are competitive.
The two candidates can be two moderates, or two extremists (one from each extreme), or anything
in between so long as they split society into two groups of similar size.
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2.4 Sincere-Strategic Equilibria
To address the multiplicity of two-candidate equilibria found in the previous section, I select equi-
libria according to their robustness to the assumption on the citizens’ support behavior. I introduce
a new concept of equilibrium, which allows for both strategic and sincere support behavior.
Definition 4 A sincere-strategic equilibrium is a pair {γ∗, σ∗} such that:
(i) The support strategy profile σ∗ is an Undominated Nash Equilibrium of the support stage for
any set of candidates C ⊆ N .
(ii) The entry strategy profile γ∗ is a Nash Equilibrium at the entry stage given any subset E ⊆ N
such that at the support stage every citizen i ∈ E follows the strategy σ∗i and every citizen j /∈ E
follows a sincere support strategy.
In a sincere-strategic equilibrium, γ∗ must be the equilibrium strategy of the entry stage regard-
less of whether every citizen acts strategically or sincerely in the support stage. Furthermore, γ∗
must also be the equilibrium strategy of the entry stage if any subset of agents deviate from the
strategic equilibrium and choose whom to support sincerely.
Published estimates of the incidence of strategic voting behavior in the US and the UK (two
countries that elect a single representative per district) range between 5% and 17%, as reported
by Alvarez and Nagler [3]. A sincere-strategic equilibrium is a Strategic equilibrium that is robust
at the entry stage to deviations by any coalition of agents toward sincerity at the support stage.
While it is difficult for citizens to coordinate strategically, it is easier to hypothesize how they might
be convinced as a group to vote sincerely: An appeal by a candidate simply to the “honesty” of
the citizens, to “vote according to your heart” might convince a large number of voters to deviate
from the equilibrium strategic behavior more readily than a complicated appeal to coordinate on a
sophisticated deviation. The refined equilibrium concept requires the equilibrium to be robust to
successful appeals to sincerity.
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It is trivial to note that every single-candidate equilibrium is a sincere-strategic equilibrium.
In a single-candidate equilibrium, citizens automatically elect the only candidate and if a second
candidate entered the race, with two candidates strategic support is equivalent to sincere support.
Therefore, whether citizens choose whom to support sincerely or strategically does not alter the
entry decision of any citizen when there is a single candidate who runs with positive probability.
However, if there are two candidates running, citizens who act sincerely may support an entrant
who would have been shunned if all citizens acted strategically.
In particular, note that a two-candidate equilibrium with two extreme candidates cannot be
a sincere-strategic equilibrium, because a moderate entrant could gather a significant amount of
support, enough to have a high enough probability of victory. Thus some convergence is necessary
for a sincere-strategic equilibrium.
Nevertheless, full convergence is not possible. Two adjacent candidates would also fail to stand
in a two-candidate sincere-strategic equilibrium, because another adjacent candidate, just a little
bit more extreme than either of the original two can enter and outflanking one of the candidates,
get the support of almost a half of the electorate. For example, if ml and mh were running, then
mh + 1 can run, and under sincere support behavior, get the support of N2 − 1 citizens, leaving ml
with N2 supporters and mh with just his own support.
Remark 7 Sincere-strategic equilibria with two candidates consist of a left-leaning candidate and a
right-leaning candidate, satisfying three conditions:
(i) They are both separate from the median,
(ii) they are not too far from each other,
(iii) and they split society into two groups with roughly the same number of supporters.
The candidates have to be separate from the median to make an extreme third candidacy inviable:
If a third candidate entered to the left of the left-leaning candidate, the right-leaning candidate would
win if enough leftist citizens were sincere and the left vote is split, or else the entrant would have no
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support and would not affect the election (if citizens are strategic).
They cannot be too far from each other (too extreme) or else a moderate third candidate would
enter in between them and the entrant would sweep the election if citizens chose support sincerely.
The two candidates have to split society into two roughly equal groups of support to be both
viable candidates with a good chance of winning the election.
The following example illustrates these three features of sincere-strategic equilibria.
Example 1 Let there be 100 citizens, with ideal policies pi = i100 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 100}. Let the
policy preferences be:
vi(p) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−0.1(pi − p) if p ≤ pi.
−0.101(p− pi) if p > pi
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
,
so every citizen i prefers the candidate who is closest to i and in case of equal distance, the candidate
with the lower ideal policy. Let uncertainty µ = 0.025 and let b = 10c = 10.
Then, in any two candidate sincere-strategic equilibrium with C = {i, j}:
Either (i, j) ∈ {(47, 53), (48, 53)} or i ∈ {17, 18, ..., 47}, j ∈ {54, 55, ..., 83}, (i+j)2 ∈ [49, 51.5], and
|i− j| ≤ 64.
I provide the calculations in the appendix to the chapter.
Next I show a set of sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure sincere-strategic
equilibrium with two candidates in a large electorate. These conditions include Euclidean preferences
with two mild but technical restrictions on the distribution of ideal policies, which has to be somewhat
evenly spread and not too clumped to one side of the median, and a simpler but more restrictive
assumption on the cost of running as a candidate, which I require to be high enough to deter entry
by candidates with no chance of winning.
Let η be the maximum amount of support by which a candidate i could be trailing in a two-
candidate race and still be motivated to run solely for the expected benefit of holding office. Formally,
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let
η =
¯¯¯¯
min{l : b
2
fij(l) + bFij(l − 1) > c}
¯¯¯¯
and let Eη be the smallest convex interval containing the ideal policies of at least η citizens.
Definition 5 The distribution of ideal policies is “nonclumped” if any convex interval E ⊆ [0, 1] of
weakly greater length than Eη contains the ideal policy of at least one agent.
An informal interpretation of “nonclumped” preferences is that ideal policies are somewhat spread
all over the policy space, and there are no big empty gaps coexisting with thin intervals where a lot
of ideal policies lie in a cluster.
I also require the distribution of ideal policies to be balanced near the median, and not too
lopsided with a lot of ideal policies within a small distance to one side of the median, and very few
within the same distance to the other side of the median.
Let dxe denote the smallest integer equal or larger than x. I use this notation in the following
definition.
Definition 6 For any ϕ ∈ [0, 1], the distribution of ideal preferences is “ϕ − balanced” if pm is
weakly closer to pm−dϕ8Ne and pm+dϕ8Ne than to either pd 38ϕNe or pN+1−d 38ϕNe.
5
Preferences are ϕ− balanced if, moving away from the median simultaneously in both directions,
before we find the ideal policies of 4−3ϕ8 N agents in the direction more dense with ideal policies, we
must have also found the ideal policies of at least ϕ8N agents in the direction more sparse in ideal
policies. The definition is increasingly milder as ϕ becomes smaller. Informally, for very small ϕ,
preferences are ϕ− balanced if moving away from the median we find at least a few ideal policies in
the direction less dense with ideal policies before we find almost all the ideal policies that lie to the
side of the median more dense in ideal policies. For example, let N = 1001. Then preferences are
5For an even N , we adapt the definition as follows:
The distribution of ideal preferences is “ϕ − balanced” if pml+pmh
2
is weakly closer to pmh−dϕ8Ne than to
pN+1−d 38ϕNe and
pml+pmh
2
is also weakly closer to pml+dϕ8Ne than to pd 38ϕNe.
26
1%− balanced if p499 and p503 are both closer to the median ideal policy p501 than either p4 or p998.
At the extremes, if pm is equidistant to p 3
8N
and p 5
8N
, then preferences are 1− balanced; whereas,
if pm is closer to pN than to pm−1, then preferences are 0− balanced.
Euclidean preferences are defined by the Euclidean distance between the ideal policy of the agent
and the implemented policy: vi(p) = |p− pi|.
Finally, let c = max
i,j,h∈N
|vi(pj)− vi(ph)|. The following proposition details the existence result.
Proposition 8 Given any µ, ϕ > 0, there exists some n such that if preferences are Euclidean,
nonclumped and ϕ− balanced, each citizen has a distinct ideal policy, c > c and N > n, then a pure
sincere-strategic Equilibrium with two candidates exists.
The proof in the appendix is constructive: It finds two citizens who are willing to run against
each other, it shows that no third agent has a chance of victory if citizens choose support sincerely,
and it uses the assumption of a high cost of running to rule out entry by candidates with no chance
of victory.
2.4.1 Sincere-Strategic Equilibria with 3 or More Candidates
Equilibria with multiple candidates, and sincere-strategic equilibria with multiple candidates are
possible in the model. In this subsection I show that under some restrictions, the sincere-strategic
refinement eliminates all equilibria in which weak candidates run with little support.
Models without uncertainty can distinguish between “winning candidates” (those who win with
positive probability) and “spoilers” (those who run just to affect the outcome indirectly, but with
no probability of actually winning). With uncertainty, every candidate with at least one supporter
has some positive probability of victory, albeit possibly a very small one. Nevertheless, we can still
describe some candidates as spoilers: Those who trail in support and run mostly to influence who
wins when they lose.
Formally, I define competitive candidates as those who have enough of an incentive to run based
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just on their probability of winning, without taking into account the effect that their candidacy
would have on the electoral outcome if they lose. Competitiveness is defined relative to a specific
joint strategy of all citizens at the support stage; thus a candidate can be competitive for some
profile of support and not competitive given a different support profile.
Definition 7 Given a joint support strategy profile σ, a candidate i ∈ C is competitive if
{b+ vi(pi)−
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]}Pr[Wi = 1|C] > c,
and a spoiler otherwise.
Competitive candidates run to win. Spoiler candidates run motivated by the advantages that
running for a defeat entails for them. Equilibria with three competitive candidates, which do not
exist under mild assumptions in Besley and Coate’s [9] model, exist in this model with uncertainty
(an example is available from the author). Equilibria with four candidates may have one or two
competitive candidates, as in Besley and Coate [9], or three or four, as in Osborne and Slivinski
[44]. However, with the refinement of the sincere-strategic equilibrium, in all equilibria in which
citizens use pure strategies at the entry stage, spoilers must all be in between two competitive
candidates. Therefore, pure equilibria with a single competitive candidate and several spoilers will
not be sincere-strategic.
Lemma 9 In any pure sincere-strategic equilibrium with multiple candidates , if i ∈ C∗ is a spoiler,
then there exist j, h ∈ C∗ such that pi ∈ (pj , ph).
Corollary 10 In any pure sincere-strategic equilibrium with two or more candidates, there exist at
least two competitive candidates.
Entry by spoiler candidates who deprive stronger candidates from crucial support can effectively
affect the outcome of an election. However, the entry decision by a candidate who draws no support
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from the electorate is intuitively irrelevant to the outcome of an election. If a candidate with no
support drops out of the race, the most intuitive reaction by all other citizens is to keep their support
decisions unaltered.
I say that a support strategy profile is consistent if whenever a candidate who receives zero
support drops out of the race, the support for all the other candidates remains unaltered.
Definition 8 A support strategy profile σ is consistent if for any C and i ∈ C, Si(C, σ) = 0 =⇒
σj(C) = σj(C\i) for all j ∈ N .
Next I show that if preferences are Euclidean, support strategies are consistent, and the electorate
is large enough, then in equilibrium all candidates must have a similar expected share of support. For
a fixed µ, I consider a sequence of societies of increasing size N and I show that the result holds for
all societies larger than some size n. To prove this I add a technical assumption on the distribution
of ideal policies to guarantee that no agent is indifferent between two distinct ideal policies.
Let Q ⊂ [0, 1] be a set composed of finitely many points such that for any x, y ∈ Q, x+y2 /∈ Q.
Given a positive uncertainty µ and a set Q composed of finitely many staggered points, if pref-
erences are Euclidean, the ideal policy of every agent lies in the set Q, and the electorate is large
enough, then in any pure sincere-strategic equilibrium with consistent strategy profiles all candidates
receive a similar expected share of support. Proposition 11 states this result formally.
Proposition 11 Given µ > 0 and Q, for any / > 0 there exists a positive integer n such that if
preferences are Euclidean, pi ∈ Q for all i ∈ N , and N > n, then in any pure sincere-strategic
equilibrium with consistent strategy profiles
¯¯¯¯
E[Si]
N
− E[Sj ]
N
¯¯¯¯
< / for all i, j ∈ C∗.
The intuition for the proof is as follows: If the electorate is large enough, a candidate whose
expected share of support is less than that of the strongest candidates will lose with probability
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approaching one. Then, by lemma 9 and corollary 10, it must be that this weak candidate is a
spoiler, between two competitive candidates. But then, given two competitive candidates and a
trailing weak candidate, votes for the spoiler are wasted votes, and only citizens who are indifferent
among the top two candidates will support the spoiler. Indifference between two candidates with
distinct ideal policies is ruled out by assumption and as a result the spoiler will get no support, then
the spoiler not only cannot win, but with zero support she cannot even influence the election if the
support strategy profile is consistent. Then, she prefers to drop out.
A complete characterization of multi-candidate equilibria is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.5 Conclusion
I have introduced a model of representative democracy with endogenous candidates and uncertainty
about the total vote count. I predict that the median is able to run a successful, unopposed campaign
only if the number of citizens is small and odd. If the electorate is large, the exact number of citizens
is irrelevant; no citizen can run unopposed and a two-candidate equilibrium exists.
I have characterized equilibria with one and two candidates in pure and mixed strategies. I have
found that only candidates who run in some pure equilibrium may also run in a mixed equilibrium.
I have introduced a refined equilibrium concept, sincere-strategic equilibrium, which requires the
equilibrium of the entry stage of the game to be robust to coalitional deviations towards sincerity
by any subset of agents at the support stage, when citizen choose which candidate to support in the
election. I show that in a sincere-strategic equilibrium with two candidates, the candidates cannot
be too extreme, but one will lean to the left and the other one to the right; thus, policies do not
converge to the median. I showed a set of sufficient conditions for this equilibrium to exist.
If the strategies used by the agents satisfy a consistency requirement, the refined equilibrium
concept rules out all multi-candidate equilibria in which some candidates run with little support.
If equilibria with three or more candidates exist, then all candidates must have a similar share of
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support.
I now compare my results with those of the two most prominent models of representative democ-
racy with endogenous candidates: Osborne and Slivinski’s [44] and Besley and Coate’s [9].
Besley and Coate [9] consider a finite number of strategic citizens. Candidates perfectly anticipate
the outcome of the election, which depends crucially on the exact (odd or even) number of citizens:
Assuming that the benefit of holding office is large, single-candidate equilibria exist if the median
is unique (or if there exist a Condorcet winner if the policy space is not unidimensional) and two
candidate equilibria exist if the number of citizens is even. This model best fits an election with a very
small electorate and with such an electorate, my model yields similar results. The key difference
between my model and Besley and Coate’s [9] is that with uncertainty about the vote count, a
candidate trailing by a small margin in terms of expected votes has a high enough probability of
victory and therefore this weaker candidate will choose to run.
My result for large electorate reinforces the findings of Osborne and Slivinski [44], who reach a
similar prediction under a number of simplifying assumptions (sincere voting, a continuum of voters,
Euclidean preferences). Their model is bound to fit large electorates better than small ones, for it
relies on the existence of an infinite number of voters.
My model with a finite number of voters thus builds a bridge between the two main models of
representative democracy with endogenous candidates, agreeing with each of the two models where
it is most appropriate -with Besley and Coate [9] for small electorates, with Osborne and Slivinski
[44] for large ones. I blend their different predictions into a single, unifying framework that captures
the insights of large electorates where complete information is implausible as well as those of smaller
electorates where the outcome is easier for all agents to foresee.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, I prove the necessary condition. Suppose N is even and citizen h ≥ mh runs unop-
posed. In equilibrium, support strategies for any race with two candidates are sincere. Then, if ml
enters the race and pml 6= ph, Sml ≥ Sh and the probability that ml wins is at least one-half, while if
pml = ph, every citizen mixes support with equal probability and ml wins with probability one-half.
Thus, b > 2c implies that ml in any case would prefer to run, and h running alone cannot be an
equilibrium. Suppose d ≤ ml runs unopposed. Then, by an analogous logic, mh would prefer to run,
and it cannot be an equilibrium that d runs unopposed. Therefore, there cannot be a one-candidate
equilibrium if N is even.
Suppose N is odd and the median is not unique and suppose citizen h ∈ N runs unopposed.
Then, if any of the medians runs against h, the median wins with probability no less than a half, so
the median prefers to run, and it cannot be an equilibrium in which h runs unopposed.
Suppose the median is unique and runs unopposed. If ∃ j ∈ N\m such that
(b+ vj(pj)− vj(pm)) Pr[Wj = 1|C = {m, j}] > c,
then j would run against m.
Second, I prove the sufficient condition. If a unique median m runs and
(b+ vj(pj)− vj(pm)) Pr[Wj = 1|C = {m, j}] ≤ c ∀j ∈ N\m,
then no citizen j has an incentive to run against m, and since b > c, m prefers to run and the entry
condition of the equilibrium is satisfied. To complete the equilibrium, I only need to construct a
support equilibrium σ∗ for each possible support subgame reached after any off-equilibrium outcome
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of the entry game. Since the number of players is finite and their strategy set is also finite (there
are only a finite number of candidates to choose from), such an equilibrium exists for each subgame,
possibly in mixed support strategies.
To show uniqueness, it suffices to note that m would prefer to run against any other citizen
h ∈ N who was running alone. The equilibrium is pure because since b > c, m strictly prefers to
run than to drop out, given that no other citizen enters the race.
2.6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The only single-candidate equilibrium is that in which a unique median is running (lemma
1). Consider a sequence of societies {NN}∞N=3 of size N odd, all of them with µN = µ and satisfying
all the assumptions in the model. Now suppose in each society NN the median and the citizen
immediately to her right run, so CN = {mN , (m + 1)N}, where the subindex denotes the society
to which a citizen or a set of candidates belongs. Then in the equilibrium of the support subgame
every citizen chooses support sincerely and SmN − S(m+1)N = 1. If mN loses at least three votes
more than (m+1)N , V(m+1)N −VmN ≥ 2 and (m+1)N wins the election. The probability that mN
loses at least three votes more than (m+ 1)N is:
1− Fm,m+1(2).
Let bi[n, p; k] be the probability that a binomial distribution with parameters (n, p) takes a value of
k. Then
fm,m+1(l) =
NX
k=0
bi
∙
N + 1
2
, µ; k + l
¸
bi
∙
N − 1
2
, µ; k
¸
.
As N → ∞, fm,m+1(l) converges to zero for any given integer l, in particular for fm,m+1(2),
fm,m+1(1) and fm,m+1(0), so Fm,m+1(2) − Fm,m+1(−1) converges to zero. Since SmN > S(m+1)N ,
the probability that the mN loses less votes than (m+ 1)N is less than a half, so Fm,m+1(−1) < 12
for all N. But Fm,m+1(2) > 12 for all N, thus it must be Fm,m+1(2) converges to
1
2 . Then, the proba-
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bility that mN loses at least three more votes than (m+1)N converges to 12 and the probability that
(m+1)N wins also converges to a half. Given b > 2c, this implies that if N is large enough, (m+1)N
wants to run against mN , and mN cannot be the only citizen running with positive probability in
equilibrium.
2.6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. If N is odd, I construct a pure equilibrium in which γ∗ is such that I∗m = I
∗
m+1 = 1,
I∗j = 0 for all j ∈ N \{m,m+ 1}, and σ∗ is such that for any C = {m,m+ 1, h} with h ∈ {∅ ∪N
\{m,m+ 1}}, si(C) = m for any i ≤ m and si(C) = m+ 1 for any i > m.
Given σ∗, no citizen would support a third candidate and therefore no third candidate wants to
enter. Consider again a sequence of societies {NN}∞N=3 indexed by their size, and for each society
NN select the pair {mN , (m+ 1)N}. Since SmN − S(m+1)N = 1 for all N , it follows that as N →∞
the probability of victory converges to one half for both mN and (m+ 1)N . Since b > 2c, mN and
(m+ 1)N want to run against each other if the electorate is N is large enough. Therefore, γ∗ is an
equilibrium of the entry stage given σ∗.
Dropping the subindex, for any society N , the support strategy σ∗ is such that citizens choose
support sincerely among m and m+1, and that no citizen would support a third entrant. If an agent
deviates from this support strategy to support a third candidate h, then Sh = 1; since victory in
an election requires two votes, the probability of victory for h is zero, same as before the deviation.
Since m and m + 1 have a different ideal policy, it is then an undominated best response of each
citizen not to support the entrant, and to choose support sincerely for either m or m+1, as dictated
by σ∗. For any other set of candidates off the equilibrium path, the subgame at the support stage
is finite and an equilibrium of the subgame exists.
If N is even, then ml and mh would run against each other in equilibrium regardless of the size
of the society, for they each have a one-half probability of victory. With a support strategy that
assigns no support to an entrant, no third candidate will enter, by the same arguments as in the
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odd case.
2.6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose there exists a two-candidate equilibrium {γ∗, σ∗} in which γ∗i , γ∗j > 0. Without
loss of generality, suppose that given σ∗, the probability that i wins given that C = {i, j} is at least
one half. Then, b > 2c implies that at the entry stage, running is the only best response of i. Thus,
it must be that γ∗i = 1. Suppose pi = pj . Then the probability of victory is at least one-half for both
i and j and it must be that γ∗j = 1 too and {γ∗, σ∗} is a pure equilibrium.
Suppose instead that pi 6= pj . Let γ0 = {γ0j , γ∗−j}, with γ0j = 1 and let σ0 be such that for any C
containing {i, j} and any h ∈ N ,
s0h(C) = argmax
k∈{i,j}
vh(pk),
and for any other set of candidates not including i and j, σ0 defines an equilibrium of the support
subgame. I want to show that {γ0, σ0} is an equilibrium. First, note σ0 defines an equilibrium of
any support subgame in which {i, j} ∈ C because pi 6= pj and no candidate with a single supporter
can win the election (see proof of theorem 3). Second, note that σ0(C) = σ∗(C) for C = {i, j}. By
assumption, given σ∗ and γ∗−j , γ
∗
j > 0 was a best response for j at the entry stage. It must then be
that γ0j = 1 is also a best response given σ
∗ and γ∗−j , and given σ
0 and γ0−j . I assumed that given σ
∗,
the probability that i wins given that C = {i, j} is at least one half. Thus, given σ0 and γ0−i, it is
still a best response for i to run with probability one. Therefore, a pure strategy of always entering
by i and j, and no entry by any other candidate is an equilibrium of the entry stage given σ0 and
{γ0, σ0} is a pure two-candidate equilibrium in which C∗ = {i, j}.
2.6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Sufficient Condition: If bpij > pD, at least D citizens support i. Then i has a probability of
victory no less than cb+vi(pi)−vi(pj) and i wants to run. If bpij < pR, candidate i has a probability
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of victory less than 1 − cb+vj(pj)−vj(pi) , and citizen j wants to run. If both i and j want run, and
given that they have different ideal policies, there exist an undominated support strategy that would
assign no support to any third entrant, and then no third citizen would want to deviate and enter.
I also prove the necessary condition enunciated in the text:
Proof. If bpij < pD, then at most D− 1 citizens support i, and at least N −L+ 1 support j. Then,
the probability of victory for citizen i is less than cb+vi(pi)−vi(pj) and i prefers to let j run alone and
win. If bpij ≥ pR+1, at least R citizens support i and R + 1 at least mixes (or supports i too), and
at most N −R− 1 support j, with citizen R+ 1 at most mixing. Then, the probability that i wins
is more than 1− cb+vj(pj)−vj(pi) , and citizen j does not want to run.
2.6.6 Calculations for Example 1
Citizens will want to run if their chance of victory is better than 10% just out of motivation to hold
office, and depending on who else is running, they may want to run for a chance of victory slightly
less than 10%, out of policy considerations. No citizen wishes to run for a probability of victory less
than 9%.
If the two top candidates split support 49−51, 48−50, or 47−49, the weaker candidate has more
than 10.5% probability of victory, thus she is willing to run, but with a split of 48−51 or worse
(trailing by three or more supporters), the weaker candidate has a probability of victory below 5%
and she would not want to run. With just two candidates i and j, citizens split support 49−51 if
i+ j adds up to 98, 99 (in which case i gets support from citizens 1 to 49), 102 and 103 (in which
case citizens 50 and 51 support i as well). Citizens split support 50−50 if i + j adds up to 100 or
101.
Thus in order for i and j to be willing to run against each other, it must be 98 ≤ i+ j ≤ 103.
However, if j is 50, or 51, then a third candidate h = 52 could enter and get 49 supporters (if
citizens happen to be sincere), enough to make h competitive. If j = 52 and i = 49, 50 or 51, then
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d = 48 could enter and get at least 48 supporters under sincere support, leaving i with 1 or 2, and
j with no more than 50. Then d would enter. If j = 52 and i < 49, then h = 53 could enter and get
48 supporters, leaving i with no more than 50 and j with 2 or 3. Then h would run.
Therefore, it cannot be that j is less than 53. And if j = 53, then i cannot be less than 47,
or else h = 54 with 47 supporters would enter and face i with no more than 49 (j would keep the
support of citizens 50, 51 and 52).
Similarly, if i is 49 or 50, then d = 48 could enter and get 48 votes, enough to be competitive
against the (no more than 50) votes of j.
If i = 48 and j = 53, then outflanking is no longer viable for a third candidate: If d = 47 enters,
then d gets 47 votes and j gets 50.
So besides adding up to 98, 99, 100, 101, 102 or 103, it must be that either i, j /∈ {48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53}
or (i, j) ∈ {(47, 53), (48, 53)}.
Finally, i and j cannot be too far apart, or else a moderate citizen will enter:
If j − i is more than 64, then either ml = 50 or mh = 51 could enter and get no less than 33
supporters and leave the other two candidates with 33 and 34 supporters (or 34 and 33). In such a
tight three-way race, the probability that the weakest candidate wins the election is over 10%.
2.6.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. For a sufficiently large N, I construct an equilibrium in which I∗i = I
∗
j = 1 and I
∗
h = 0 for all
h ∈ N\{i, j}, and σ∗ is such that for any set of candidates that includes i and j, all citizens support
either i or j, and for any other set of candidates (off the equilibrium path) an arbitrary equilibrium
of the subgame is played.
Without loss of generality suppose that pm is closer to pm+dϕ8Ne than to pm−dϕ8Ne. Then let
i = m−
§ϕ
8N
¨
.
Now construct the interval X = [pm + pm−d η2 e − pm−dϕ8Ne, pm + pm+d η2 e − pm−dϕ8Ne]. Since
this interval is of length pm+d η2 e − pm−d η2 e, it is weakly larger than Eη, and since preferences
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are Non-Clumped, X contains the ideal policy of at least one agent. If pm+dϕ8Ne ∈ X, then let
j = m+
§ϕ
8N
¨
. If pm+dϕ8Ne /∈ X, then let j be the left-most agent with an ideal policy in X. Since
pm+dϕ8Ne − pm < pm − pm−dϕ8Ne, it follows that if pm+dϕ8Ne /∈ X, then pj > pm+dϕ8Ne. In either
case, pj ≥ pm+dϕ8Ne and
bpij ∈ "pm + pm−d η2 e
2
,
pm + pm+d η2 e
2
#
⊂
³
pm−d η2 e, pm+d η2 e
´
,
and thus, the difference in support for the two candidates is no more than η. Then i and j, by
definition of η, want to run against each other.
Now we show that no other agent would want to enter the race.
With a support strategy σ∗ that assigns no support to a third entrant, a candidate d with pd < pi
would get at most m−
§ϕ
8N
¨
−1 votes if all citizens disregard σ∗ and vote sincerely, whereas j would
get no less than m−
§η
2
¨
+ 1. The ratio of their respective support SdSj is no larger than
(1−ϕ4 )
2 N
N−η
2
=
(4− ϕ)N
4(N − η) =
1− 14ϕ
1− ηN
.
Consider a sequence of societies of increasing size and the corresponding sequence of pairs of candi-
dates iN and jN and third entrants dN , where the subindex now identifies them as members of the
society of size N. As N → ∞, ηN goes to infinity, but
ηN
N converges to zero. Therefore, the upper
bound on the ratio of the share of supporters of dN over the share of supporters of jN converges
to 1 − 14ϕ < 1. Given a fixed ratio of support between two candidates, the probability that the
candidate with the lesser share of support wins converges to zero. So a candidate dN to the left of
iN will not win if N is sufficiently large. Then, c > c∗ guarantees that sure losers do not run.
Similarly for a candidate that tried to outflank j instead.
Now, a centrist candidate between iN and jN will collect at most the support of all citizens
between piN and pjN , that is, 2
§ϕ
8N
¨
if jN = pmN+dϕ8Ne or
§ϕ
8N
¨
and all the votes of citizens with
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ideal policies in (pmN , pmN + pmN−d ηN2 e − pmN−dϕ8Ne] otherwise. But
(pmN , pmN + pmN−d ηN2 e − pmN−dϕ8Ne] ⊂ [pmN , 2pmN − pmN−dϕ8Ne],
and since preferences are ϕ− balanced,
2pmN − pmN−dϕ8Ne = pmN + (pmN − pmN−dϕ8Ne) < pmN + pN+1−d 3ϕ8 Ne − pmN = pN+1−d 3ϕ8 Ne.
Thus, there are no more than N+12 −
§
3
8ϕN
¨
agents with an ideal policy in (pmN , pmN +pmN−d ηN2 e−
pmN−dϕ8Ne]. Then, the centrist entrant gathers a total number of supports which is less than
N+1
2 − 2
§ϕ
8N
¨
. Since i gathers at least N2 −
§ϕ
8N
¨
supporters, their ratio of support is no larger
than 1−
ϕ
2
1−ϕ4
= 4−2ϕ4−ϕ < 1, so the probability that the centrist entrant wins converges to zero with the
size of the electorate. For a sufficiently big society, c > c∗ guarantees that the entrant does not run.
For an even N, the proof is almost identical, with i = ml −
§ϕ
8N
¨
,
X =
h
2pmh−d η2 e − pml−dϕ8Ne, 2pml+d η2 e − pml−dϕ8Ne
i
and j equal to mh +
§ϕ
8N
¨
if pmh+dϕ8Ne ∈ X, and j equal to the left-most citizen with an ideal
policy in X otherwise.
2.6.8 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose i is a spoiler and i is the left-most candidate and let the second
left-most candidate be j. If every citizen chooses support sincerely and i drops out of the race, all
the support for i switches to support for j. The probability that i wins the election is now zero,
the probability that j wins increases, and the probability that any of the other candidates wins
is reduced. Since vi(pj) ≥ vi(pk) for any candidate k /∈ {i, j}, it follows
P
k∈C\i
vi(pk)
Pr[Wk=1|C]
Pr[Wi=0|C] ≤
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P
h∈C\i
vi(ph) Pr[Wh = 1|C\i].
Since i is a spoiler,
{b+ vi(pi)−
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]}Pr[Wi = 1|C] < c.
Thus:
Pr[Wi = 1|C]{b+ vi(pi)−
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]}
+Pr[Wi = 0|C]{
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk)
Pr[Wk = 1|C]
Pr[Wi = 0|C] −
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]} < c,
which, rearranging terms, implies
bPr[Wi = 1|C] +
X
k∈C
vi(pk){Pr[Wk = 1|C]− Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]} < c.
Therefore, i is better off not running as a candidate.
2.6.9 Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. For two candidates: If i, j ∈ C have different support, it must be they have different ideal
policies. Then, given Euclidean preferences and given that pi, pj ∈ Q but pi+pj2 /∈ Q, every citizen
supports either i or j (no mixed support strategies). Suppose SiN −
Sj
N ≥ /. Then Si ≥
1+/
2 N and
Sj ≤ 1−/2 N. Note that Vk follows a binomial distribution Bi[Sk, 1 − µ] for k = i, j. By the Weak
Law of Large Numbers, ViSi and
Vj
Sj
converge to 1 − µ. Therefore, ViVj converges to
Si
Sj
, which is by
assumption more than one. Therefore, with probability converging to one as N approaches infinity,
i receives more valid votes and wins the election. For a sufficiently low probability of victory, j
prefers not to run as candidate.
For three candidates: Let C = {i, j, h}, where E[Si] ≥ E[Sj ] ≥ E[Sh].
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Suppose E[Si]N −
E[Sh]
N ≥ /. By the Central Limit Theorem, the distribution of
Vi
N converges to the
point (1− µ)E[Si]N , similarly
Vh
N converges to (1− µ)
E[Sh]
N and the probability that h wins converges
to zero. Thus for a large enough N, h has to be a spoiler. By lemma 9, it must then be that
ph ∈ (pi, pj) where both i and j are competitive candidates. In order for j to be competitive, j must
win with some positive probability. Again by the CLT, the distribution of VjN converges to the point
(1 − µ)E[Sj ]N . Thus, in order for j to win with enough probability,
E[Si]
N −
E[Sj ]
N must converge to
zero as N approaches infinity. I next show that the probability that given that two candidates tie
for victory one of the two is h converges to zero. Let δ be an arbitrarily small, positive number such
that δ < /2 . Let ∆ = [1− δ, 1 + δ].
The probability that h ties for victory or wins by one vote is:
Pr[
Vh
Vi
∈ ∆] Pr[Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}|VhVi ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh > Vj |Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}]
+Pr[
Vh
Vj
∈ ∆] Pr[Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}|VhVj ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh > Vi|Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}].
The probability that i and j tie for victory is:
Pr[
Vj
Vi
∈ ∆] Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆] Pr[Vj > Vh|Vj = Vh].
Let Λ1 = Pr[VhVi ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh > Vj |Vh−Vi ∈ {0, 1}], let Λ2 = Pr[VhVj ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh > Vi|Vh−Vj ∈ {0, 1}],
let Λ3 = Pr[
Vj
Vi
∈ ∆] Pr[Vj > Vh|Vj = Vh]. Using this notational shortcut, the ratio of the probability
that h ties for victory over the probability that i and j tie for victory is:
Λ1 Pr[Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}|VhVi ∈ ∆] + Λ2 Pr[Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}|VhVj ∈ ∆]
Λ3 Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆]
.
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Since Λ1 and Λ2 converge to zero and Λ3 converges to one as N approaches infinity, and
Pr[Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}|VhVi ∈ ∆]
Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆]
and
Pr[Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}|VhVj ∈ ∆]
Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆]
are bounded, the previous ratio converges to zero. Therefore, given that a single vote is decisive,
the probability that it is decisive to determine whether i or j wins converges to one, and for a large
enough N, supporting h is wasted support. If all citizens choose support strategically, only citizens
whose ideal policy is at a very small distance from bpij will support h. Let δ be such that any citizen
with an ideal policy at a distance more than δ from bpij would strategically support i or j, not h.
As N approaches infinity, this distance δ converges to zero, and the ideal policy of an strategic h
supporter has to converge to bpij . Let q0 and q” be the two points in Q closest to pi+pj2 such that
q0 < pi+pj2 < q”. If N is large enough, [bpij − δ, bpij + δ] ∈ (q0, q”) and no citizen, not even h herself
will support h. Then, h cannot win and since the strategy profile is consistent, nor can h affect the
election, and h prefers to drop out than to run with no supporters.
For more than three candidates: First note that there cannot be an equilibrium in which two or
more candidates have a common ideal policy and one other candidate does not, because if so strategic
citizens would concentrate their support in only one of the candidates with the same policy, and the
others would drop out if they had no supporters. Second, suppose that there are two competitive
candidates with distinct ideal policies. If the electorate is sufficiently large, any candidate trailing to
the strongest candidate by more than / in share of support has a probability of victory sufficiently
close to zero to be a spoiler, whose ideal policy must be between that of two competitive candidates
(lemma 9). The probability that a single vote for the spoiler affects the election given that a single
vote is pivotal converges to zero. Therefore, by the same arguments as with three candidates,
only citizens who are indifferent or close to indifferent about the two competitive candidates would
support the spoiler. If the electorate is sufficiently large, there are no citizens with an ideal policy
so close to the midpoint of the ideal policies of the competitive candidates, and then the spoiler who
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receives no votes drops out of the race. Suppose there are three or more competitive candidates
and a weak candidate trailing by more than / in support share. With Euclidean policies, no citizen
can be simultaneously indifferent about three distinct policies. If the size of the electorate is large
enough, the probability that a vote for the weakest candidate is decisive given that a vote is decisive is
arbitrarily close to zero. Then, no citizen will support the weakest candidate, and this candidate will
drop out, again by the inability to affect the election with no support derived from the assumption
of consistency in the support strategy profile.
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Chapter 3
United We Vote
abstract: This chapter studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtain by
forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. I identify the
necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the
voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the
bloc. I also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of
the bloc, and I find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences
within the coalition.1
3.1 Introduction
Despite the advantages of collaboration, alliances are often broken, groups are dissolved, coalitions
split, or they fail to be formed in the first place. Any union of heterogeneous agents may fail to
act for the benefit of some of its members. Individual freedom of action is partially curtailed by
joining a group and committing to follow its rules. This creates an incentive to abandon the group
and proceed alone in a different course of action. There is a trade-off between the potential gains of
group action and the sacrifice of individual freedom involved in group formation.
In this chapter I examine this trade-off in the context of political competition between agents
1This chapter is based on the material in Eguia [23].
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who can communicate to form a coalition. I model a set of agents who face a vote over a choice
of alternatives. I assume that a specific subset of the whole electorate can coalesce to coordinate
the voting behavior of its members. Agents coalesce to increase the probability that their preferred
outcome is chosen. For example, each country has a vote in the UN General Assembly. The European
Union’s 25 members could decide to coordinate their foreign policies, agreeing on a common voting
position before UN meetings.
A crucial problem is how to choose the common position. Each country knows what it wants, and
it also knows that a coalition of countries will have a better chance of getting what it asks for than a
single country, hence there is an incentive to form such coalition. But if its members have conflicting
preferences, what will the coalition stand for? If the coalition intends to act as a “voting bloc” and
cast all its votes together, it requires an internal decision-making rule to aggregate the preferences
of its members. This internal decision-making rule will map the possibly disparate preferences of
the members into a single alternative for which all members of the coalition will vote.
The internal rule that maximizes the aggregate utility for the coalition is simple majority. How-
ever, only under certain conditions every member of the coalition benefits from forming a voting
bloc if simple majority is chosen as the internal aggregating rule.
If all members do not benefit from simple majority, then the coalition must find other rules to
aggregate the preferences of its members. Constitutional design studies the rules that determine how
to change voting rules within a society. In our case, I assume that the coalition of agents can form
a voting bloc to coordinate their votes only by unanimous agreement of all members. Thus every
member of the coalition must be made better off, otherwise the coalition will not be able to function
as a voting bloc, because some members will block the project. For instance, any one country of the
EU can veto a new EU treaty that intended to unify the foreign policy of its members.
I find that the sufficient conditions for a supermajority internal rule to make every member of
the coalition better off are less stringent than those needed for simple majority to do so. I also find
that an “opt-out” rule benefits every member in some cases when supermajorities do not. Overall,
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for a very large set of possible preference profiles there exists some rule that satisfies every member
in the coalition.
Imagine a successful coalition that has found one such rule and functions as a voting bloc, casting
all its votes together according to the outcome of its internal decision-making rule and making every
member better off than if everyone voted individually according to their own preferences. I find that
under certain conditions some members will still have an incentive to leave the coalition (if that is
possible). The coalition needs more than a rule that benefits everyone to function as a voting bloc:
It needs to solve the collective-action problem in which members prefer others but not themselves
to participate, although everyone is better off if all of them participate than if no one does.
Several non-cooperative theories of coalition formation with economic applications are surveyed
in Carraro [14]. Closer to the motivation of this chapter, Buchanan and Tullock [12] analyze the
costs and benefits of forming a coalition and praise the virtues of unanimity as internal voting rule.
Barberá and Jackson [6] let agents choose among several rules and they define “self-stable” voting
rules as those that will not be beaten by any other rule if the given voting rule is used to choose
among rules. Maggi and Morelli’s [39] study “self-enforcing” rules to determine whether collective
action will be taken by a group of agents, and they conclude that no other rule but simple majority
or unanimity is ever optimal.
A different approach to coalition formation comes from the voting power literature. Felsenthal
and Machover [27], Gelman [28] and Feix, Lepelley, Merlin and Rouet [26] among others, analyze
the probability of casting a decisive vote in an election and the effect of coalitions and alliances of
voters over this probability. I focus instead on the probability of getting the desired outcome in
the election. Laruelle and Valenciano [36] provide a rigorous analysis of the relation and differences
between maximization of the probability of being pivotal, which is the object of study of the voting
power literature, and maximization of the probability of success or satisfaction with the outcome,
which is the approach I take. In essence, in the voting power literature the agents seek to maximize
their probability of being able to alter the outcome; whereas, in my model the agents want to
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maximize the probability that the policy outcome coincides with their policy preference. The voting
power approach applies to an scenario in which the goal of a voter is to win by one vote. If instead
the goal of an agent is to win, be it by one vote or by a landslide, then my model applies.
I analyze the potential benefits of forming a voting bloc, coalescing with other agents to cast all
votes in the same direction to make it more likely that a preferred alternative wins the election. I
am interested in the effect of a voting bloc on the degree of satisfaction of its members, how the
heterogeneity of such members may affect their gain in utility and which internal voting rules in the
coalition may make the voting bloc satisfactory for a broader range of parameters.
These theoretical questions are particularly relevant to the ongoing debates about the need or
desire for a common foreign policy in the EU, a purpose that was first vaguely stated in the Maastricht
Treaty (1992) 2, but that has been recently the subject of much deeper debates and controversy
during the negotiations towards a constitution (started in 2002) and will probably continue to be
in the European political agenda for years to come. Therefore, I frequently refer to the EU as a
motivating example along the exposition.
After introducing the model and showing that there is a surplus to be gained by forming a voting
bloc in section 3.2, in section 3.3 I ask whether the formation of the voting bloc will benefit every
member of the coalition. In section 3.4 I study an “opt-out” rule that allows one agent to stay
out of the voting bloc and discuss under what conditions introducing such a rule will benefit all
the members of the coalition. In section 3.5 I summarize the findings of the chapter. An appendix
contains the proofs for the results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.2 The Model: Gains from Forming a Voting Bloc
Let N = {1, 2, .., N} be an assembly of voters, where N ≥ 5 is finite and odd. The members of the
assembly (legislators, countries, etc.) face a binary decision: either to keep the status quo, or to
2The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992.
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vote for an alternative a to replace it. All agents are called to vote either for a (yes), or against a
(no). If the number of favorable votes is equal or higher than a threshold T, then a is implemented.
Each agent strictly prefers either the status quo or the alternative a, and I assume no intensity in
preferences. Preferences over lotteries will simply be determined in favor of the lottery that assigns
the higher weight to the preferred alternative.
The agents in assembly N are divided into two sets. A set of agents M with size NM lack
coordination powers and vote individually. The remaining agents can coordinate among themselves
and may at wish form a voting bloc. I call this second set of agents the coalition C, which has size
NC = N −NM , where NC is odd.3
If each of its members agrees, coalition C forms a voting bloc. In this case coalition C will hold
an internal meeting to predetermine its voting behavior in the general vote. In the internal meeting,
all members of the coalition will vote yes or no according to their preferences for or against a. Then:
1. If the majority in this internal vote has strictly more than rCNC votes, where rC ∈ [12 ,
NC−1
NC
],
then the majority prevails and all members of coalition C will vote as a bloc in the general assembly
casting NC votes according to the preferences (either yes or no) of the majority of the coalition.
The outcome of the coalitional internal meeting is binding.
2. If the majority gathers no more than rCNC votes in the internal vote, then the coalition fails
to act as a bloc in the general assembly and all members are free to vote according to their individual
preferences.
Note that threshold rC defines the rC −majority rule used by the coalition to decide whether
or not it will act as a bloc rolling its internal minorities. A threshold rC ∈ [12 ,
1
2 +
1
NC
) corresponds
to simple majority, rC ∈ [12 +
1
NC
, NC−1NC ) to a supermajority and rC =
NC−1
NC
to unanimity.4
Forming a voting bloc with unanimity as internal voting rule is in essence identical to not forming
a voting bloc, because the coalition will only cast its votes as a bloc if all its members share the
3The assumption that NC is odd is for technical convenience. Qualitative results are the same if NC is even.
4 I use the notation x ∈ [a, b] to mean a ≤ x ≤ b and x ∈ (a, b) to mean a < x < b.
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same preference, in which case all votes will be cast as they would in the absence of a voting bloc.
If the coalition does not form a voting bloc, then all the members of the coalition will vote
according to their individual preferences in the general assembly.
Coalition members decide to form a voting bloc with an rC−majority internal voting rule before
the alternative a is specified, so agents do not know if they will prefer alternative a or the status
quo. Agents have no power over the specification of alternative a, which is exogenous.
Every agent i has a type ti, which is the probability that agent i will prefer alternative a to the
status quo, once alternative a is revealed.5 This type can be interpreted as a propensity for change,
or as a displeasure with the status quo in general. Let t−i denote the vector of types of all agents
in the society other than i. Types are common knowledge, and so are true preferences once agents
learn what the alternative a is.
Each realization of preferences is independent from the others. Once alternative a is revealed,
each of possibly many agents with a type t0 has an independent probability t0 of supporting alter-
native a. Typically several of them will end up supporting a, whereas some others will prefer the
status quo.
If the coalition forms a voting bloc, in the internal vote, voting will be sincere and there will
be no abstention. With simple majority as the internal decision making rule, if the number of yes
votes surpasses the number of negative ones, then the whole coalition (now a voting bloc) will cast
a total of NC yes votes in the general vote which includes all agents in the society. If the number
of no votes surpasses the number of favorable ones, then the coalition accordingly votes as a bloc
casting NC no votes in the general vote.
The voting bloc behavior I have described consists of rolling internal minorities to present a
common front in the general vote, strengthening the position of the coalition’s majority with the
minority votes which are “converted” or “swayed” to the majoritarian camp, increasing the chances
5This probabilistic model of voter uncertainty was first considered by Rae [47] and developed by Badger [5] and
Curtis [16].
49
of eventually getting the outcome the majority wishes (of course, in doing so the probability of
getting what the minority wishes decreases).
Proposition 12 Let type ti ∈ (0, 1) for each agent i in the society. Then, for any NC ≥ 3 (number
of agents in the coalition), NM ≥ 2 (number of agents not in the coalition), and T (threshold to
accept alternative a), a coalition of NC members strictly increases the sum of expected utilities of its
members by forming a voting bloc with either simple majority or any supermajority as the internal
voting rule. Simple majority rule is the internal voting rule that maximizes sum of expected utilities
of the members of the voting bloc.
Forming a voting bloc only has an effect in utilities if the formation of a bloc and the subsequent
rolling of minority votes within the coalition alters the outcome of the general vote. If so, every
member of the coalition who is in the coalitional majority benefits from the voting bloc formation, at
the cost of every voter in the minority. Since the majority is by definition bigger than the minority,
there are more members benefiting than suffering from the bloc, and since the intensity of preferences
is set to be equal for every member, in the aggregate forming a voting bloc generates a surplus of
utility for the coalition. Any other rule that in some cases fails to roll a minority is giving away
this net gain in utility and therefore underperforms in comparison to simple majority in terms of
aggregated gains in utility.6
It follows from proposition 12 that if all the members of the coalition share a common type,
then forming a voting bloc increases the utility of every member in the coalition. Therefore, a
homogeneous coalition of agents who have the same type should always form a voting bloc with
simple majority as the internal voting rule to maximize their probability of winning the final vote
in a larger electorate. Also from proposition 12, I derive the following corollary:
Corollary 13 If all but one of the members of the coalition share a common type, all the homoge-
6Beyond the sketched intuition provided here, the interested reader can find a formal proof of Proposition 12 and
Proposition 14 below in the working paper version, Eguia [21], and a generalization of Proposition 12 to multiple
coalitions in Proposition 32 in Chapter 4. These proofs follow in part the insight due to Curtis [16].
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neous members benefit from the formation of a voting bloc.
Suppose all members in C except for i share a common type. Then if member i is in the rolled
minority, more of the homogeneous members are in the majority benefiting from the rolling of votes
the voting bloc imposes than in the hurt minority, thus in the aggregate the homogeneous members
strictly benefit from the bloc. If member i is in the majority, there are at least the same number
of homogeneous members in the majority as in the minority. Thus, in the aggregate the bloc is at
worst neutral to the homogeneous members. Since both cases are possible, overall there is a surplus
for the homogeneous members (maybe not so for the heterogeneous one).
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 I will show under which conditions will every member of an heterogeneous
coalition benefit from the formation of a voting bloc. I now ask whether the formation of a voting
bloc benefits or harms the interests of the agents who are not part of the coalition. The answer will
depend on the voting rule in the general election.
Proposition 14 Let type ti ∈ (0, 1) for each agent i in the society and let coalition C form a voting
bloc with any internal rule other than unanimity. Then, if the voting rule in the general election is
unanimity, every agent not in the coalition strictly benefits from the formation of the voting bloc. If
the general voting rule is simple majority, there is a loss in aggregate utility for the agents not in
the coalition and the society as a whole.
If the rule in the general election is unanimity, then each agent has a veto power over changes to
the status quo. If a coalition forms a voting bloc, it removes the veto power from its members, but
not from non-members, who therefore benefit from the formation of a voting bloc by the coalition.
If the rule in the general election is simple majority, a voting bloc will only change the outcome to
make a minority of the society win. That is contrary to the interests of a majority of non-members
of the coalition. As shown by Curtis [16], simple majority maximizes the social welfare of the society.
Once a coalition forms a voting bloc, the wishes of the majority not always prevail, hence social
welfare is reduced. From proposition 12 we know that if a coalition forms a voting bloc, the sum of
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utilities of its members increases; it must then be that the sum of utilities of non-members decreases
with the formation of the voting bloc.
Even if the formation of a voting bloc is in the aggregate hurting non-members of the coalition,
this effect will in general not be uniform. Some agents not in the coalition will win, whereas some
lose expected utility if the coalition forms a voting bloc. For instance, suppose that the members of
the coalition have types such that almost always the yes wins in the coalitional internal vote and a
small but significant no minority is rolled. Then the bloc behavior by the coalition tilts the general
vote in favor of alternative a. Agents with a high type, who are likely to prefer alternative a, will be
then happy to see the coalition form a voting bloc.
To summarize, forming a voting bloc is inconsequential if the coalition uses unanimity as internal
voting rule, but with any other rule, forming a bloc gives a surplus in utility to the coalition and
simple majority is the internal voting rule that maximizes such surplus. Every agent in the rest
of the society benefits from the formation of a bloc by the coalition if the general voting rule is
unanimity, but if the general voting rule is simple majority these agents suffer an aggregate loss in
utility.
In the next section I investigate under what conditions the coalition can reach unanimous agree-
ment among its members to proceed with the formation of a voting bloc and appropriate the surplus
in utility that comes with the voting bloc.
3.3 Achieving Consensus to Form a Voting Bloc
We wish to find an internal rule for the coalition to aggregate preferences in such a way that
maximizes the aggregate utility of its members relative to a default in which the coalition uses
unanimity as internal voting rule and all members always vote according to their true preferences in
the general election. This internal rule must be such that in expectation every member prefers it to
unanimity. Because each member of the coalition can block deviations from unanimity as internal
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voting rule, the coalition needs full consensus to use any other rule to aggregate its preferences.
Given an internal voting rule v, I say that v is beneficial for C if in expectation every member in
C is weakly better off using v rather than unanimity as the internal voting rule and some member
in C is strictly better off.
In short, a rule is beneficial for the coalition if it benefits all its members to adopt it instead of
unanimity.
In this section I assume that the general election rule is simple majority and I investigate which
rC−majority internal rules are beneficial for C. If there are several beneficial majority rules, I focus
on whichever one maximizes the overall surplus for the coalition. Recall from proposition 12 that
the internal voting rule that maximizes the aggregated utility for the coalition is simple majority.
However, in an heterogeneous coalition, some members may not benefit from pooling votes in a
voting bloc with simple majority.
I label unanimity rule as ∅ as a reminder that using unanimity as internal voting rule is identical
to not forming a voting bloc, or no members joining the voting bloc.
I label as rC a rC −majority rule in which every member of the coalition participates in the
voting bloc, and minorities of size strictly less than rCNC are rolled to join the position of the
majority of the coalition in the general vote. Simple majority, denoted Sm, refers to the special case
in which rC = 12 .
For any internal voting rule v, let EUi[v] denote the expected utility for agent i if the coalition
forms a voting bloc with v as internal voting rule.
Before I present the results, I need to make some assumptions on the types of the agents:
Assumption 1 The number of favorable votes cast by the NM agents not in coalition C follows a
symmetric distribution around NM2 with some positive probability of casting a quantity of favorable
votes different than NM2 .
This condition significantly relaxes the standard assumption in the voting power literature that
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all agents have a common type of 0.5.7 Instead, it suffices that the NM agents can be paired in such
way that for each pair (j, j0), tj+ tj0 = 1, with at least one pair of agents with types strictly between
zero and one. Let f (x) denote the probability that the number of favorable votes for alternative a
cast by the NM agents not in the coalition is exactly x, and let F (x) =
Px
k=0 f(k) be the distribution
function of the number of favorable votes cast by these NM agents.
I make a milder assumption on the types of the members of coalition C. Namely, I assume that
coalition C “leans toward” accepting alternative a. Let g−i(x) denote the probability that xmembers
of C\{i}, the coalition without i, prefer alternative a. Then I require the following:
Assumption 2 For all k ∈ [1, NC−12 ] and for all i ∈ C, g−i(
NC−1
2 + k) > g−i(
NC−1
2 − k).
Note that g−l(k) =
P
A⊆C\{l}
|A|=k
[
Q
i∈A
j∈C\(A∪{l})
ti(1− tj)].
Assumption 2 states that given any NC − 1 members of the coalition and given any particular
majority-minority split of votes in this subset of the coalition, it is more probable that this majority
in the subset is for the yes side. A sufficient condition for this assumption to hold is that excluding
any member, we can pair the rest in such a way that for each pair (i, i0), ti + ti0 ≥ 1, with strict
inequality for at least one pair.
Let g−ij(x) denote the probability that exactly x members of C\{i, j}, the coalition without i
or j, prefer alternative a. Formally,
g−lh(k) =
X
A⊆C\{l,h}
|A|=k
[
Y
i∈A
j∈C\(A∪{l,h})
ti(1− tj)].
Let l ∈ C be the agent with the lowest type in the coalition, so that tl ≤ ti for all i ∈ C. From
Assumption 2, it follows that for all i ∈ C, and for all k ∈ [0, NC−32 ],
g−li(
NC − 1
2
+ k) > g−li(
NC − 3
2
− k).
7 See, for instance, Felsenthal and Machover [27].
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I prove this technical claim in an appendix at the end of the chapter.
With these two assumptions on the types of the agents and simple majority as the voting rule in
the general election, a member of the coalition will like to form a voting bloc with a rC −majority
rule as internal voting rule if her type is “high enough”: If a given member would benefit from
forming a voting bloc with a rC − majority, then every other member with a higher type would
benefit even further.
Lemma 15 Let l, h ∈ C such that th ≥ tl. Then EUh[rC ]−EUh[∅] ≥ EUl[rC ]−EUl[∅].
By lemma 15 we can focus only on the member with the lowest type to see if she benefits from
the formation of a voting bloc with a rC−majority. If she does, then every member in the coalition
benefits from forming a voting bloc with a rC −majority rule:
Proposition 16 Let l ∈ C be the member with the lowest type. Then a rC − majority rule is
beneficial as an internal voting rule for coalition C if and only if tl > trC ,∅ (t−l).
In the appendix to this chapter I find the exact expression of trC ,∅ (t−l) as a function of the types
of the agents and the threshold rC .
Since the coalition “leans” towards accepting alternative a, the majority within the coalition will
be in favor of alternative a more often than not, with the result that the negative votes will be rolled
more often than the favorable ones. Therefore it becomes more likely that alternative a wins the
general election. Member l only likes such voting behavior if her type is high “enough,” where the
exact meaning of “enough” is given by the threshold in the proposition.
I illustrate proposition 16 with the aid of Figure 3-1, for the specific case of simple majority as
the internal voting rule.
To be able to plot the threshold tSm,∅ (t−l) with respect to only one variable, in Figure 3-1 I
assume that the distribution of votes by the agents not in coalition C follows a binomial Bi(NM , 12)
and that all the members of coalition C except l share a common type tC , and I set NM = 176 and
55
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
tC 
YES 
NO 
NO 
tl φ,Smt  
Figure 3-1: Consensus to form a voting bloc with simple majority.
NC = 25 to approximate the European Union example. I use the same assumptions for all the other
figures.
The model corresponds to the right half of the graph: if the common type tC of the NC − 1
members other than l is bigger than one half, member l supports the formation of a voting bloc
with simple majority if the type tl is above the depicted threshold. The left half of the picture
is a symmetric case in which the coalition leans towards rejecting a. Then member l supports the
formation of a bloc only if her type is below the threshold.
For some type profiles, simple majority is not beneficial for C. Nevertheless, the coalition can
form a voting bloc with a supermajority internal voting rule that benefits every member. Using
a more stringent supermajority internal voting rule enables the coalition to accommodate a more
extreme member l with a low type tl, making l benefit from the formation of a voting bloc with a
rC −majority internal rule, even if l rejects a bloc with simple majority.
I depict this result in Figure 3-2, which shows four possible rules for a coalition the size of the
EU: Simple majority, two-thirds majority, four-fifths majority, and nine-tenths majority.
Note how the range of parameters for which a voting bloc would benefit every member increases
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Figure 3-2: Supermajority rules.
as the supermajority rule becomes more stringent. However, since simple majority maximizes the
overall surplus for the coalition, setting higher thresholds for approval of a common position dimin-
ishes the value of the voting bloc, although it may help to bring an outlier on board.
Aiming to maximize the utility of the coalition subject to not hurting any member, the optimizing
solution is the lowest possible supermajority that would benefit (or at least leave indifferent) the
member with the lowest type.
In the remainder of this section I investigate how changes in the size of the coalition or the
heterogeneity of types of its members affect which rules the coalition will be able to use to the
benefit of all its members.
I find that if the size of the coalition is too large, then no coalition in which all members but l
share a common type tC > tl can form a voting bloc with simple majority.
Proposition 17 Let M be fixed. Let tl < tC for l ∈ C and ti = tC for all i ∈ C\{l}. There exists
some N such that if NC > N, simple majority is not beneficial for C.
As the size of the coalition becomes very large relative to NM , the internal majority coincides
with the external majority unless the coalition is almost evenly split. The coalition is more likely
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to vote for a than against a. Since member l is the member with the lowest type, conditional on
the coalition being evenly split, member l is more likely to be against a, thus on the losing side.
Therefore, if the coalition becomes so large that rolling its votes only affects the outcome when the
coalition is almost evenly split, the member with the lowest type rejects the formation of a bloc with
simple majority. In the limit, only a fully homogeneous coalition where every member has the same
type could form a voting bloc with simple majority.
Beyond size, I ask how heterogeneity affects the chances of a coalition forming a voting bloc.
We know that simple majority is beneficial for any homogeneous coalition, whereas heterogeneous
coalitions may run into obstacles. Nevertheless, I show by means of an example that the possibility
of forming a voting bloc with simple majority is not monotonic with heterogeneity.
Compare three coalitions with the same mean type and the same lowest type. I measure het-
erogeneity by the standard deviation of types. I find that the most homogeneous and the least
homogeneous of the three coalitions cannot form a voting bloc with simple majority, whereas the
intermediate one can.
Example 2 Let all agents not in C have a type tM = 0.5 and let there be 10 of them.
Let C1 be a coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75}. The mean type is 0.689.
The standard deviation 0.1368. If C = C1, then tSm,∅ (t−l) = 0.4943 and l rejects the formation of
a voting bloc with simple majority as internal voting rule.
Let C2 be another coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 1}, mean type 0.689, standard
deviation 0.2847. If C = C2, then tSm,∅ (t−l) = 0.441 so forming a voting bloc with simple majority
benefits every member of the coalition.
Let C3 be yet another coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.45, 0.55, 1, 1}, mean type 0.689,
standard deviation 0.2869. If C = C3, then tSm,∅ (t−l) = 0.446 so once again member l vetoes the
formation of a voting bloc with simple majority.
For coalitions C1 and C3 in Example 2, using a two-thirds majority or a 3/4 majority (or any
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other value of rC that requires a majority of 4 to 1 to roll the minority) every member benefits from
forming a voting bloc. In C1, using rC = 3/4, t3/4,∅ (t−l) = 0.39 so member l favors the formation
of a voting bloc that rolls only minorities of size one. Similar results hold for coalition C3.
Considering coalition C1 in Example 2, I quantify the impact that the formation of a voting bloc
would have over the outcome in the general election. I show the results in Table 3.1. The numbers
represent the probability that the event indicated in each row occurs, given the internal rule the
coalition uses. In the second column, the coalition uses unanimity or forms no bloc, in the third
column it forms a bloc with simple majority and in the fourth column it uses a 3/4 majority.
Table 3.1: The impact of forming a voting bloc
No bloc 1/2 maj 3/4 maj
a approved 69.52% 79.58% 73.45%
a approved given l likes a 79.82% 90.00% 84.72%
a approved given l dislikes a 61.26% 71.22% 64.42%
l satisfied with outcome 57.02% 56.02% 57.44%
j ∈ C\l satisfied with outcome 67.26% 74.70% 70.57%
m /∈ C satisfied with outcome 59.44% 53.51% 57.61%
Since the coalition leans towards a, forming a voting bloc makes approval of a more likely. All
the members except for l benefit and all non-members are hurt forming a voting bloc. Member l
is hurt if simple majority is used, so in order to benefit all its members, the coalition has to select
a supermajority that makes l better off, but attenuates the advantage for all the other members.
Forming a voting bloc with simple majority would have a substantial impact: the probability of
approving a increases ten percentage points and the probability of getting the desired outcome out
of the election would increase seven percentage points for all members of coalition C1 but l. Using
a 3/4 majority reduces this benefit of a voting bloc to roughly a half, but it makes all members of
C1 more likely to see their preference prevail in the general election.
In this section I have described the necessary and sufficient condition for a coalition to be able
to form a voting bloc with a majority rule. I show that although simple majority always maximizes
the aggregate surplus, there are type profiles for which simple majority is not beneficial for the
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coalition but some supermajority rules are and the coalition can choose one of them to gain some
of the surplus of a voting bloc benefiting all its members.
3.4 An Opt-Out Rule
In this section I explore a more nuanced rule, which consists of forming a voting bloc with all but
one of the members of the coalition. The excluded member does not participate in the internal vote
of the voting bloc, but votes directly and according to her true preferences in the general election.
This scheme differs from expelling one member from the coalition in a crucial detail: The exclu-
sion is voluntary, the member who does not participate in the voting bloc agrees to the formation of
the voting bloc without her, and hence she opts to be out, or “opts-out.” The member who opts-out
has to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc by the other members, otherwise she would
rather veto the whole project and keep unanimity in place as the voting rule to aggregate votes in
the coalition.
Denote by Out the “Opt-Out for l” rule in which the member l with the lowest type does not
participate in the voting bloc which is formed by every other member of the coalition and simple
majority is chosen as internal voting rule.
Throughout this section I assume that the general election rule is simple majority.
The first result on opt-out rules considers the conditions under which the member of the coalition
who stays out of the voting bloc benefits from its formation.
Proposition 18 The formation of a voting bloc with simple majority rule by every member of
coalition C except l, benefits member l if and only if tl > tOut,∅ (t−l).
I provide the expression of tOut,∅ (t−l) in the appendix at the end of the chapter.
The threshold function tOut,∅ (t−l) is always positive given our assumptions on types; it is not
increasing with respect to the type of all other members of the coalition and it does not always
converge to one as the types of the members of the coalition do. This last feature guarantees that in
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Figure 3-3: An opt-out rule as a solution.
some cases in which member l rejects forming a voting bloc with simple majority she benefits from
the formation of a bloc with an “Opt-Out for l” rule. If all the other members also benefit from the
“Opt-Out for l” rule, then this rule is beneficial for C and it offers a solution for a coalition which
couldn’t form a bloc with rC −majority rules. The next proposition states this result.
Proposition 19 If 5 ≤ NC ≤ NM+1, there exist type profiles for which an “Opt-Out for l” internal
voting rule is beneficial for C and no rC −majority rule is. If N = 3 or NC > NM +1, there exists
no type profile for which “Opt-Out for l” is beneficial for C and simple majority is not.
If NC = 3, allowing one member to step out reduces the bloc to size two, which is identical to
not forming a bloc at all, or forming it with unanimity. If NC > NM , then the coalition acts as a
dictator even if one member opts-out, thus the member who opts-out cannot be better off out of the
voting bloc than in the voting bloc.
Figure 3-3 compares the threshold tOut,∅ (t−l) with tSm,∅ (t−l) from the previous section. Notice
that if types are in the area below the threshold tSm,∅ (t−l) and above tOut,∅ (t−l), l would veto
forming a voting bloc with simple majority if it included all the members. By allowing l to stay
out, the coalition can form a voting bloc with simple majority with every other member and in
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expectation raise the utility of every member including l.
This result casts a favorable light over “opt-out” rules. On the other hand, “opt-out” rules have
two setbacks: If the coalition is heterogeneous (and not just dichotomous with all members but l
sharing a common type) and l opts out, it is possible that the member with the next lowest type
opposes the formation of the reduced bloc. Allowing this member to opt-out as well may simply
pass the problem to the next member until the bloc fully unravels and every member but the last
two opt-out, which negates the purpose of a voting bloc.
Even if this unravelling does not take place, there is a second latent complication to opt-out
rules: if the coalition allows for the member with the lowest type to opt-out, then other members
may also request to opt-out, even if they benefit from the formation of a voting bloc, simply because
they would benefit even more by opting-out. If the coalition lets every member join in or stay out of
the voting bloc, then it faces a “free-rider” problem, where some members who would benefit from
joining the voting bloc, may prefer to opt-out and passively take advantage of the pooling of votes
by other coalition partners.
Definition 9 Member l “free rides” if she would have benefitted from forming and participating in
a voting bloc, but benefits even more as a result of opting-out.
With no opt-out rules, there is no chance to free ride, since the coalition faces an “all-or-none”
binary decision: either every member joins the voting bloc, or the bloc is not formed. If instead
members can individually choose whether to join in or to stay out, some may choose not to join in.
In the following Proposition I explore whether a member would prefer to participate in or to stay
out of a voting bloc formed by every other member of the coalition.
Proposition 20 Member l prefers to participate in a voting bloc formed by the coalition with simple
majority as internal decision rule better than to opt-out and not participate in the pooling of votes
by the rest of the members of the coalition if and only if tl > tSm,Out(t−l).
I provide the exact expression of tSm,Out(t−l) in the appendix to this chapter.
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Figure 3-4: Opt-out and free ride.
From proposition 16 we obtained the condition for l to benefit from forming and participating in
a voting bloc with simple majority. Proposition 20 now states when will member l prefer to opt-out
from such a bloc. Combining Propositions 16 and 20 I obtain proposition 21, which demonstrates
the downside of opt-out rules: They create a free-riding problem when member l would benefit from
participating in the bloc but prefers to opt-out.
Proposition 21 An “Opt-Out for l” rule creates a free-rider problem if and only if tSm,∅ (t−l) <
tl < tSm,Out(t−l). If 5 ≤ NC ≤ NM + 1, there exist type profiles for which this condition is met. If
N = 3 or NC > NM + 1, this condition cannot hold and free riding cannot occur.
If tl < tSm,Out(t−l), member l prefers not to participate in the voting bloc and she free rides if
participating would be better for l than not forming a voting bloc.
Let us visualize when a member will prefer to opt-out and free ride on her coalition partners with
the aid of Figure 3-4. If type tl is above tSm,∅ (t−l) but below tSm,Out(t−l), member l would have
supported a voting bloc with simple majority and no opt-outs better than no bloc, but she prefers
to opt-out if she can. If she opts-out, the overall utility for the coalition is reduced.
As a summary, allowing a member to opt-out can be a good solution in a coalition with great
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homogeneity of types and one outlier, but in many other instances it can generate free-rider problems,
which are aggravated if the possibility to opt-out is extended to every member.
3.5 Conclusions
A coalition of agents who are a part of a larger electorate or assembly facing a vote may choose to
form a voting bloc. The coalition will then pool its votes and cast them all together according to
the outcome of an internal vote. I have shown that forming a voting bloc generates a surplus in
the aggregate utility of the members of the coalition and I have checked that simple majority is the
internal rule for the voting bloc that maximizes such surplus.
However, if there is heterogeneity among the members of the coalition, the surplus will not be
evenly shared. In the absence of transfers, the formation of a voting bloc may be detrimental to
some members of the coalition. Ordering members from the least likely to the most likely to support
changes to the status quo, I find a single cutting point separating those members of the coalition
who support the formation of a voting bloc, and those who reject it. This implies that either every
agent in the coalition supports the voting bloc, or at most, agents at one tail of the distribution of
types reject it.
Under the motivation that each member of the coalition can veto the formation of any kind of
voting bloc, I have analyzed possible solutions to reach consensus to form a voting bloc with an
alternative internal rule when some member of the coalition opposes a bloc with simple majority.
Using qualified majority rules (supermajorities) as the internal voting rules reduces the overall
surplus in aggregate utility but it sometimes enables the coalition to achieve unanimous support for
the formation of a voting bloc, when no such agreement was possible to form a bloc with simple
majority. This result contrasts with the findings of Maggi and Morelli’s model [39], in which only
simple majority or unanimity are ever found to be optimal, but their focus is on homogeneous agents.
In the last section I have considered another solution: for some range of parameters, allowing
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an extreme agent who opposes the formation of a voting bloc to opt-out and not participate in the
bloc is sufficient to achieve unanimous support (including support by the member who chooses to
opt-out) for the formation of a voting bloc by the rest of the coalition.
These theoretical results have practical implications, suggesting that a collection of countries with
some similarity in their policy preferences would do better by forging a common foreign policy that
was not based in unanimity. In particular, each of the 25 members of the EU would be more likely
to see its preference prevail at a UN Assembly meeting (or at any international forum that grants
one vote per country) if the Union first predetermined how it will cast all its 25 votes according to
an internal voting rule that rolled minorities within the EU.
A more interesting extension and generalization of this model to fit a wider set of applications
consists on allowing several coalitions, not just one, to form voting blocs. Ideally, any subset of
agents would be allowed to form a voting bloc and we would look for stable partitions of the space of
agents into voting blocs. A very natural scenario in which voting blocs may occur is any legislature
in which political parties may be formed. If we want to explain party formation, we need to allow
for different parties to exist. Starting with a set of individual legislators, parties would be each one
of the voting blocs that are formed. I pursue this approach in the next chapter of this thesis.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of Claim from Assumption 2
Assumption 2: For all k ∈ [1, NC−12 ] and for all i ∈ C, g−i(
NC−1
2 + k) > g−i(
NC−1
2 − k).
We want to show that g−li(NC−12 + k) > g−li(
NC−3
2 − k) for any i ∈ C.
Let us first introduce some useful notation. For any set of agents D ⊆ N , let gD(x) denote the
probability that exactly x agents in D prefer alternative a, and let gD−i(x) denote the probability
that exactly x agents in D\{i} prefer alternative a. We then proceed in two steps.
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Claim 22 Let D ⊆ N be such that ND is even and gD(ND2 − k) ≤ gD(ND2 + k) for any positive
integer k. Let l ∈ D be such that tl ≤ ti for any i ∈ D. Let D0 = l0 ∪D\l with tl0 > tl. Then
gD
0
(
ND
2
− k) ≤ gD0(ND
2
+ k) for any positive integer k.
Proof. Consider D\l and let GD−l be the distribution function of the number of agents in D\{l}
who prefer alternative a. Its probability mass function gD−l is determined by the aggregation of
independent Bernoulli experiments, hence it is unimodal, as shown by Darroch [17]. Let y denote
the mode. Since preferences are independent, for any number x and any agent l,
gD(x) = tlg
D
−l(x− 1) + (1− tl)gD−l(x).
Hence
gD0(x)− gD(x) = (tl0 − tl)[gD−l(x− 1)− gD−l(x)]. (3.1)
Since gD−l is unimodal, for any x > y it follows that g
D
−l(x) ≤ gD−l(x − 1) and expression (3.1) is
positive. For any x ≤ y it follows that gD−l(x) ≥ gD−l(x− 1) and expression (3.1) is negative. It also
follows from the unimodality of gD−l that the modes of g
D and gD
0
are either y or y+1, call them yD
and yD
0
respectively. Further, since gD(ND2 − 1) ≤ gD(
ND
2 + 1), it must be that
ND
2 ≤ yD ≤ y + 1.
Hence ND2 − 1 ≤ y and gD
0
(ND2 − k) ≤ gD(
ND
2 − k) for any positive integer k.
For k such that ND2 + k > y
D0 ≥ y, it follows that
gD
0
(
ND
2
− k) ≤ gD(ND
2
− k) ≤ gD(ND
2
+ k) ≤ gD0(ND
2
+ k),
where the first and third inequalities hold by the sign of expression (3.1) and the second inequality
by assumption.
For k such that ND2 + k ≤ yD
0
, gD
0
(ND2 − k) ≤ gD
0
(ND2 + k) by the unimodality of g
D0 .
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The proof of this first step is similar for D of odd size, with gD
0
(ND−12 − k) ≤ gD
0
(ND+12 + k) for
any non negative integer k. The second step follows.
Claim 23 Let D ⊆ N be such that ND is even and let tl ≤ ti for any i ∈ D. Suppose that
gD(ND2 − k) ≤ gD(
ND
2 + k) for all positive k. Then g
D
−l(
ND
2 − 1 − k) ≤ gD−l(
ND
2 + k) for any
non-negative integer k.
Proof. Note that the statement is immediately true if tl ≥ 1/2. We only need to prove it for
tl < 1/2. First construct D0 = {D ∪ l0}\l with tl0 = 1/2. By Claim 22, for any non-negative integer
k, coalition D0 satisfies
gD
0
(
ND
2
− k) ≤ gD0(ND
2
+ k). (3.2)
The rest of the proof proceeds by induction. First, for k = ND2 − 1, I prove that gD
0
−l0(0) ≤
gD
0
−l0(ND − 1).
From inequality (3.2), gD
0
(0) ≤ gD0(ND). It follows (1 − tl0)gD−l(0) ≤ tl0gD−l(ND − 1). Since
tl0 = 1/2, then gD−l(0) ≤ gD−l(ND − 1).
Suppose that gD−l(
ND−2
2 − k) ≤ gD−l(
ND
2 + k) holds for k = k
0. I then show that it holds for
k = k0 − 1.
From gD
0
(ND2 − k0) ≤ gD
0
(ND2 + k
0), get
tl0g
D0
−l0(
ND − 2
2
− k0)+ (1− tl0)gD
0
−l0(
ND
2
− k0) ≤ tl0gD
0
−l0(
ND
2
+ k0− 1)+ (1− tl0)gD
0
−l0(
ND
2
+ k0), (3.3)
gD
0
−l0(
ND − 2
2
− k0) + gD0−l0(
ND
2
− k0) ≤ gD0−l0(
ND
2
+ k0 − 1) + gD0−l0(
ND
2
+ k0), (3.4)
gD
0
−l0(
ND
2
− k0) ≤ gD0−l0(
ND
2
+ k0 − 1), (3.5)
gD−l(
ND − 2
2
− (k0 − 1)) ≤ gD−l(
ND
2
+ k0 − 1). (3.6)
Expression (3.3) implies (3.4) because tl0 = (1 − tl0) = 1/2. Expression (3.4) implies (3.5) because
gD−l(
ND−2
2 − k0) ≤ gD−l(
ND
2 + k
0) by assumption. Expression (3.6) is merely a reformulation of (3.5).
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The induction argument is then complete.
Finally, for an arbitrary i ∈ C\{l}, let D = C\{i}. Then by Claim 23, g−li(NC−32 − k) ≤
g−li(NC−12 +k) for any non-negative integer k. Assuming strict inequality of g
D(ND2 −k) ≤ gD(
ND
2 +k)
at the statement of Claim 22 yields the strict inequality
g−li(
NC − 3
2
− k) < g−li(
NC − 1
2
+ k)
at the end result of Claim 23, as desired. We can now prove lemma 15.
3.6.2 Proof of Lemma 15
Let A and B be two internal voting rules for coalition C. Let us define two functions, which depend
on the rules A and B, and the vector of types t−i:
αi(B,A, t−i) = Probability that, given that member i prefers yes, the outcome in the general
election is yes if the coalition uses rule B and no if it uses rule A.
βi(B,A, t−i) = Probability that, given that member i prefers no, the outcome in the general
election is no if the coalition uses rule B and yes if it uses rule A.
I will use these functions in most of the proofs in this Appendix. In lemma 15, we want to show
that EUh[rC ]−EUh[∅]− (EUl[rC ]−EUl[∅]) ≥ 0.
Proof. EUi[rC ]−EUi[∅] =
tiαi(rC ,∅, t−i) + (1− ti)βi(rC ,∅, t−i)− tiαi(∅, rC , t−i)− (1− ti)βi(∅, rC , t−i) for i ∈ {l, h}.
In Step 1 I show that
thαh(rC ,∅, t−h) + (1− th)βh(rC ,∅, t−h)− tlαl(rC ,∅, t−l)− (1− tl)βl(rC ,∅, t−l)
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is positive. In Step 2, I show that
−thαh(∅, rC , t−h)− (1− th)βh(∅, rC , t−h) + tlαl(∅, rC , t−l) + (1− tl)βl(∅, rC , t−l)
is also positive, thus adding all the terms, EUh[rC ]−EUh[∅]− (EUl[rC ]−EUl[∅]) is also positive.
Step 1:
Let dxe denote the smallest integer equal or larger than x and similarly let bxc denote the largest
integer smaller or equal to x. With this convention, for i = {l, h},
αi(rC ,∅, t−i) =
NC−2X
k=brCNCc
g−i(k)[F (
NM +NC − 3
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)].
Then, writing g−l(k) as g−l(k) = thg−lh(k − 1) + (1− th)g−lh(k), I obtain:
tlαl(rC ,∅, t−l) =
=
NC−2X
k=brCNCc
tl[thg−lh(k − 1) + (1− th)g−lh(k)][F (
NM +NC − 3
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)],
and
thαh(rC ,∅, t−h) =
=
NC−2X
k=brCNCc
th[tlg−lh(k − 1) + (1− tl)g−lh(k)][F (
NM +NC − 3
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)],
so:
thαh(rC ,∅, t−h)− tlαl(rC ,∅, t−l) =
=
NC−2X
k=brCNCc
[(th − tl)g−lh(k)][F (
NM +NC − 3
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)].
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which relabeling the counter in the summation becomes:
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
[(th − tl)g−lh(
NC − 1
2
+ k)][F (
NM
2
− k − 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)].
Now, noting that for i = {l, h},
βi(rC ,∅, t−i) =
d(1−rC)NCe−1X
k=1
g−i(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 1
2
− k)],
and omitting a very similar step I directly obtain that
(1− th)βh(rC ,∅, t−h)− (1− tl)βl(rC ,∅, t−l)
= −
d(1−rC)NCe−1X
k=1
[(th − tl)g−lh(k − 1)][F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 1
2
− k)],
which, since drCNCe+ b(1− rC)NCc = NC , relabeling the counter in the summation becomes:
(1− th)βh(rC ,∅, t−h)− (1− tl)βl(rC ,∅, t−l)
= −
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
[(th − tl)g−lh(
NC − 3
2
− k)][F (NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k)].
By Assumption 1,
F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k) = F (
NM
2
− k − 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
),
it follows
(1− th)βh(rC ,∅, t−h) + thαh(rC ,∅, t−h)− (1− tl)βl(rC ,∅, t−l)− tlαl(rC ,∅, t−l)
=
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
[(th − tl)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k)][g−lh(
NC − 1
2
+ k)− g−lh(
NC − 3
2
− k)],
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which is positive by Assumption 2 as shown by Claim 23.
Step 2:
Noting that for i = {l, h},
αi(∅, rC , t−i) =
d(1−rC)NCe−2X
k=0
g−i(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 3
2
− k)] and
βi(∅, rC , t−i) =
NC−1X
k=brCNCc+1
g−i(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)],
and repeating the same steps as in Step 1, I get:
thαh(∅, rC , t−h)− tlαl(∅, rC , t−l)
=
d(1−rC)NCe−2X
k=0
[(th − tl)g−lh(k)][F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 3
2
− k)],
which relabeling the counter in the summation becomes:
thαh(∅, rC , t−h)− tlαl(∅, rC , t−l)
=
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
[(th − tl)g−lh(
NC − 3
2
− k)][F (NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k)],
and
(1− th)βh(∅, rC , t−h)− (1− tl)βl(∅, rC , t−l) =
= −
NC−1X
k=brCNCc+1
[(th − tl)g−lh(k − 1)][F (
NM +NC − 1
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)],
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which, relabeling once again, becomes
(1− th)βh(∅, rC , t−h)− (1− tl)βl(∅, rC , t−l)
= −
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
[(th − tl)g−lh(
NC − 1
2
+ k)][F (
NM
2
− k − 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)].
Therefore,
−(1− th)βh(∅, rC , t−h)− thαh(∅, rC , t−h) + (1− tl)βl(∅, rC , t−l) + tlαl(∅, rC , t−l) =
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
[(th − tl)[F (
NM
2
− k − 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)][g−lh(
NC − 1
2
+ k)− g−lh(
NC − 3
2
− k)]
which is also positive by Assumption 2.
It follows that EUh[rC ]−EUh[∅]− (EUl[rC ]−EUl[∅]) ≥ 0.
3.6.3 Proof of Lemma 24
To shorten the proofs of Propositions 16, 18 and 20 I introduce a second lemma:
Lemma 24 Given two internal voting rules A and B for coalition C, a member i ∈ C is indifferent
between A and B if:
ti =
βi(A,B,t−i)−βi(B,A,t−i)
αi(B,A,t−i)−αi(A,B,t−i)+βi(A,B,t−i)−βi(B,A,t−i)
.
Proof. EUi(B)−EUi(A) = ti[αi(B,A, t−i)−αi(A,B, t−i)] + (1− ti)[βi(B,A, t−i)−βi(A,B, t−i)],
where the functions αi and βi are as defined in the proof of lemma 15.
Equating to zero and solving for ti I get:
ti =
βi(A,B,t−i)−βi(B,A,t−i)
αi(B,A,t−i)−αi(A,B,t−i)+βi(A,B,t−i)−βi(B,A,t−i)
.
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3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 16
Let simple majority be the general election rule. Then the formation of a voting bloc by the coalition
with rC as the internal decision rule benefits member l ∈ C if and only if tl > trC ,∅ (t−l).
Proof. By lemma 24, member l is indifferent between a voting bloc with a rC − majority or a
voting bloc with unanimity (identical to no voting bloc) if:
trC ,∅ (t−l) =
βl(∅ ,rC ,t−l)−βl(rC ,∅ ,t−l)
αl(rC ,∅ ,t−l)−al(∅ ,rC ,t−l)+βl(∅ ,rC ,t−l)−βl(rC ,∅ ,t−l)
,
where:
αl(rC ,∅, t−l) =
NC−2X
k=brCNCc
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 3
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)];
βl(rC ,∅, t−l) =
d(1−rC)NCe−1X
k=1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 1
2
− k)];
al(∅, rC , t−l) =
d(1−rC)NCe−2X
k=0
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 3
2
− k)];
and βl(∅, rC , t−l) =
NC−1X
k=brCNCc+1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)].
The derivative with respect to tl of the surplus for member l generated by the voting bloc with
internal voting rule rC is equal to the denominator of trC ,∅ (t−l), which relabeling the counter in the
four summations in the denominator, is equal to:
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k)[F (
NM
2
− k − 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)]
−
NC−3
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−12
g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k)[F (NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k)]
+
NC−1
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−32
g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k)[F (
NM
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)]
−
NC−1
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−32
g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k)[F (NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k − 1)]
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=
NC−1
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−32
g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k)[F (
NM
2
− k)− 2F (NM −NC − 1
2
) + F (
NM
2
− k − 1)]
+g−l(brCNCc)[F (NM +NC − 3
2
− brCNCc)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)
−
NC−1
2X
k=brCNC)c−NC−32
g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k)[2F (NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k − 1)− F (NM
2
+ k)]
−g−l(N − brCNCc)[F (NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM −NC + 1
2
+ brCNCc)].
Then note that, by assumption,
F (
NM
2
− k − 1) = 1− F (NM
2
+ k);F (
NM
2
− k) = 1− F (NM
2
+ k − 1),
and 2F (NM−NC−12 ) = 2− 2F (
NM+NC−1
2 ).
Substitute accordingly to get:
NC−1
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−32
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[g−l(NC−12 + k)− g−l(
NC−1
2 − k)]
[2F (NM+NC−12 )− F (
NM−1
2 + k)− F (
NM
2 + k − 1)]
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
+g−l(brCNCc)
NC−2−drC(NC−1)eX
k=0
f(
NM −NC − 1
2
+ k)
−g−l(NC − 1− brCNCc)
NC−1X
k=brCNCc+1
f(
NM −NC + 1
2
+ k) =
NC−1
2X
k=brCNCc−NC−32
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[g−l(NC−12 + k)− g−l(
NC−1
2 − k)]
[2F (NM+NC−12 )− F (
NM−1
2 + k)− F (
NM
2 + k − 1)]
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
+[g−l(brCNCc)− g−l(NC − 1− brCNCc)]
NC−2−brCNCcX
k=0
f(
NM −NC + 1
2
+ k).
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Since brCNCc is bigger than NC − 1− brCNCc for rC ≥ 12 , if follows
g−l(brCNCc) ≥ g−l(NC − brCNCc),
and thus the denominator is positive.
Therefore,
EUl[rC ]−EUl[∅] > 0⇐⇒ tl > trC ,∅ .
Then, by lemma 15, EUl[rC ]−EUl[∅] > 0 =⇒ EUi[rC ]−EUi[∅] > 0 for all i ∈ C.
As a corollary note, if the internal voting rule is simple majority, then brCNCc = NC−12 , and the
threshold trC ,∅ (t−l) becomes tSm,∅ (t−l), which is equal to
NC−1P
k=
NC+1
2
g−l(k)[F (NM+NC−12 − k)− F (
NM−NC−1
2 )]−
NC−1
2P
k=1
g−l(k)[F (NM+NC−12 )− F (
NM+NC−1
2 − k)]
NC−1
2P
k=1
[g−l(NC−12 + k)− g−l(
NC−1
2 − k)][2F (
NM+NC−1
2 )− F (
NM
2 + k)− F (
NM
2 + k − 1)]
.
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3.6.5 Proof of Proposition 17
Proof. Let NM be fixed. Let all the NC − 1 members in C\{l} have a common type tC . Then
EUl[Sm]−EUl[∅] =
tl
NM
2 −1X
k=0
g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k)F (
NM
2
− k − 1)
+(1− tl)
NM
2 −1X
k=0
g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k)[1− F (NM
2
+ k)]
−tl
NM
2 −1X
k=0
g−l(
NC − 3
2
− k)[1− F (NM
2
+ k)]
−(1− tl)
NM
2 −1X
k=0
g−l(
NC + 1
2
+ k)[F (
NM
2
− k − 1)].
Since F (NM2 − k − 1) = [1− F (
NM
2 + k)], this is equal to:
NM
2 −1X
k=0
µ
NC − 1
NC−1
2 − k
¶
[tlt
NC−1
2 +k
C (1− tC)
NC−1
2 −k + (1− tl)t
NC−1
2 −k
C (1− tC)
NC−1
2 +k]F (
NM
2
− k − 1)
−
NM
2 −1X
k=0
µ
NC − 1
NC−3
2 − k
¶
[tlt
NC−3
2 −k
C (1− tC)
NC+1
2
+k
+ (1− tl)t
NC+1
2 +k
C (1− tC)
NC−3
2
−k
]F (
NM
2
− k − 1),
where
¡a
b
¢
= a!b!(a−b)! .
Let t∗ the value of tl such that the expression above is equal to zero. Then:
NM
2 −1X
k=0
t∗
½
1
NC − 1− 2k
[t2k+1C (1− tC)− tC(1− tC)2k+1]−
1
NC + 2k + 1
[(1− tC)2k+2 − t
2k+2
C ]
¾
=
NM
2 −1X
k=0
Ã
t
2k+2
C
NC + 2k + 1
− (1− tC)
2k+1
NC − 2k − 1
!
.
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Now break this equation into NM2 different equations and impose that for each k ∈ {0, M2 − 1},
t∗
½
1
NC − 2k − 1
[t2k+1C (1− tC)− tC(1− tC)2k+1]−
1
NC + 2k + 1
[(1− tC)2k+2 − t
2k+2
C ]
¾
=
t
2k+2
C
NC + 2k + 1
− (1− tC)
2k+1
NC − 2k − 1
A solution to this system of equations (with just one unknown) also solves the original equation.
For each individual equation:
t∗ =
(NC − 2k − 1)t2k+2C − (NC + 2k + 1)tC(1− tC)2k+1
tC(1− tC)[t2kC − (1− tC)2k](NC + 2k + 1)− (NC − 2k − 1)[(1− tC)2k+2 − t
2k+2
C ]
,
which, as NC −→∞, converges to
t2k+2C − tC(1− tC)2k+1
t2k+1C (1− tC)− tC(1− tC)2k+1 − (1− tC)2k+2 + t
2k+2
C
= tC .
So lim
NC−>∞
tSm,∅ (t−l) = tC . Since by assumption tl < tC , this implies that for NC large enough,
tl < tSm,∅ (t−l) and then member l would be hurt if C forms a voting bloc with simple majority.
3.6.6 Proof of Proposition 18
Proof. Let Out denote the internal voting rule for the coalition under which NC − 1 members form
a voting bloc with simple majority and member l stays out of the bloc and does not pool her vote
with the rest of the coalition. By lemma 24 member l is indifferent between rules Out and ∅ if:
tOut,∅ (t−l) =
βl(∅, Out, t−l)− βl(Out,∅, t−l)
αl(Out,∅, t−l)− αl(∅, Out, t−l) + βl(∅, Out, t−l)− βl(Out,∅, t−l)
, where:
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αl(Out,∅, t−l) =
NC−2X
k=
NC+1
2
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 3
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)];
βl(Out,∅, t−l) =
NC−3
2X
k=1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 1
2
− k)];
αl(∅, Out, t−l) =
NC−3
2X
k=1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 3
2
)− F (NM +NC − 3
2
− k)];
and βl(∅, Out, t−l) =
NC−2X
k=
NC+1
2
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
− k)− F (NM −NC + 1
2
)].
Relabeling the counters in the summations, the denominator
αl(Out,∅, t−l)− αl(∅, Out, t−l) + βl(∅, Out, t−l)− βl(Out,∅, t−l)
is equal to:
NC−3
2X
k=1
g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k)[F (
NM
2
− k − 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)]
−
NC−3
2X
k=1
g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k)[F (NM +NC − 3
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k − 1)]
+
NC−3
2X
k=1
g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k)[F (
NM
2
− k)− F (NM −NC + 1
2
)]
−
NC−3
2X
k=1
g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k)[F (NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k)].
Since
[F (
NM
2
− k)− F (NM −NC + 1
2
) + F (
NM
2
− k − 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)] =
[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k) + F (
NM +NC − 3
2
)− F (NM
2
+ k − 1)],
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the denominator simplifies to
NC−3
2X
k=1
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[g−l(NC−12 + k)− g−l(
NC−1
2 − k)]
[F (NM2 − k)− F (
NM−NC+1
2 ) + F (
NM
2 − k − 1)− F (
NM−NC−1
2 )]
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
,
and tOut,∅ (t−l) is equal to:
PNC−3
2
k=1 g−l(
NC−1
2 + k)[F (
NM
2 − k)− F (
NM−NC+1
2 )]− g−l(
NC−1
2 − k)[F (
NM+NC−1
2 )− F (
NM
2 + k)]
PNC−3
2
k=1
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[g−l(NC−12 + k)− g−l(
NC−1
2 − k)]
[F (NM2 − k)− F (
NM−NC+1
2 ) + F (
NM
2 − k − 1)− F (
NM−NC−1
2 )]
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
The difference in utility for agent l between the formation of a bloc without l and no bloc at all
is
EUl[Out]−EUl[∅] =
= tl[αl(Out,∅, t−l)− αl(∅, Out, t−l)] + (1− tl)[βl(Out,∅, t−l)− βl(∅, Out, t−l)].
The derivative of EUl[Out] − EUl[∅] with respect to tl coincides with the denominator of the
threshold tOut,∅ (t−l), which is positive. Therefore, for tl above the threshold tOut,∅ (t−l), member l
prefers the formation of a voting bloc in which l does not participate better than not forming any
bloc at all; whereas for tl below tOut,∅ (t−l), member l prefers to form no bloc than to form a bloc
in which l does not participate.
3.6.7 Proof of Proposition 19
Let V be the set of type profiles (t1, t2, ..., tN) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Let V rC ⊂ V be
the subset of type profiles such that a rC − majority rule is beneficial for C, let (V rC )C be its
complement such that V rC ∪ (V rC )C ≡ V and let V Out ⊂ V be the subset of type profiles such
that an “Opt-Out for l” rule is beneficial for C. Then, for any NM and for any 5 ≤ NC ≤ NM + 1,
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(V rC )C ∩ V Out is not empty.
Proof. Suppose 5 ≤ NC ≤ NM + 1, tl = (1− δ) and tj = (1− ε) ∀j ∈ C\{l}. Then:
EUl[Out]−EUl[∅] =
= (1− δ)
NC−2X
k=brC(NC−1)c+1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 3
2
− k)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)]
+δ
d(1−rC)(NC−1)e−1X
k=1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM +NC − 1
2
− k)]
−(1− δ)
d(1−rC)(NC−1)e−1X
k=1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 3
2
)− F (NM +NC − 3
2
− k)]
−δ
NC−2X
k=brC(NC−1)c+1
g−l(k)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
− k)− F (NM −NC + 1
2
)].
As ε converges to zero, g−l(k)g−l(NC−2) converges to zero for any k < NC − 2 and EUl[Out]−EUl[∅]
converges to:
(1− δ)g−l(NC − 2)[F (NM−NC+12 )−F (
NM−NC−1
2 )]− δgl(NC − 2)[F (
NM−NC+3
2 )−F (
NM−NC+1
2 )]
which is positive for a sufficiently low δ, provided that f(NM−NC+12 ) > 0.
Then, there exist a δ > 0 and ε > 0 such that for all ε < ε, EUl[Out]−EUl[∅] > 0.
Therefore, if 5 ≤ NC ≤ NM + 1, and the types of all the members but l converge to 1, member
l with type tl = (1− δ) benefits from a voting bloc with an “Opt-Out for l” rule. Given that all the
other members of C share a common type, they all benefit from forming a voting bloc without l.
Since trC ,∅ (t−l) converges to 1, member l would not benefit from a rC −majority internal voting
rule in a voting bloc that includes every member. It follows that if ε < ε, any profile of types in
which tl = (1− δ) and tj = (1− ε) ∀j ∈ C\{l} is in V Out but not in V rC , thus V Out * V rC .
If NC > NM + 1, then EUl[Sm] − EUl[Out] = 2gl(NC−12 )[F (
NM+NC−1
2 ) − F (
NM
2 )] > 0, thus
V Out ⊂ V Sm. If NC = 3, then Out coincides with ∅ and V Out is empty.
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3.6.8 Proof of Proposition 20
Proof. By lemma 24, member l will be indifferent between participating in the voting bloc or opting
out if
tSm,Out(t−l) =
βl(Out, Sm, t−l)− βl(Sm,Out, t−l)
αl(Sm,Out, t−l)− αl(Out, Sm, t−l) + βl(Out, Sm, t−l)− βl(Sm,Out, t−l)
,
where
αl(Sm,Out, t−l) = g−l(
NC − 1
2
)[F (
NM
2
− 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)],
βl(Sm,Out, t−l) = g−l(
NC − 1
2
)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
)],
αl(Out, Sm, t−l) =
NC−3
2X
k=0
g−l(k)f(
NM +NC − 1
2
), and
βl(Out, Sm, t−l) =
NC−1X
k=
NC+1
2
g−l(k)f(
NM −NC + 1
2
).
Since F (NM2 − 1)− F (
NM−NC−1
2 ) = F (
NM+NC−1
2 )− F (
NM
2 ) and f(
NM+NC−1
2 ) = f(
NM−NC+1
2 )
it follows that αl(Sm,Out, t−l) = βl(Sm,Out, t−l) and we can simplify the denominator to
αl(Out, Sm, t−l)− βl(Out, Sm, t−l) =
⎡
⎢⎣
NC−1X
k=NC+12
g−l(k)−
NC−3
2X
k=0
g−l(k)
⎤
⎥⎦ f(NM +NC − 1
2
)
=
NC−1
2X
k=1
[g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k)− g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k)]f(NM +NC − 1
2
),
and
tSm,Out(t−l) =
PNC−1
k=
NC+1
2
g−(k)f(
NM−NC+1
2 )− g−l(
NC−1
2 )[F (
NM+NC−1
2 )− F (
NM
2 )]PNC−1
2
k=1 [g−l(
NC−1
2 + k)− g−l(
NC−1
2 − k)]f(
NM+NC−1
2 )
.
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The advantage for member l of staying in is EUl[Sm]−EUl[Out]
= tl[αl(Sm,Out, t−l)− al(Out, Sm, t−l)] + (1− tl)[βl(sm,Out, t−l)− βl(Out, Sm, t−l)].
Its derivative with respect to tl coincides with the denominator of tSm,Out(t−l). Since
g−l(
NC − 1
2
+ k) > g−l(
NC − 1
2
− k) for all k ∈ [1, NC − 1
2
],
the denominator and thus the derivative are positive. Therefore, member l prefers to stay in if
type tl is above the threshold tSm,Out(t−l) and member l prefers to opt-out than to stay in if
tl < tSm,Out(t−l).
3.6.9 Proof of Proposition 21
Proof. The first statement comes straightforward from Propositions 16 and 20. For the second one,
suppose ti = tC ∀i ∈ C. Then all members benefit from the formation of a voting bloc with simple
majority: EUi[Sm] > EUi[∅] ∀i ∈ C. The extra gains of stepping out for member l when simple
majority is the general voting rule are:
EUl[Out]−EUl[Sm] = tC
NC−3
2X
k=0
g−l(k)f(
NM +NC − 1
2
) + (1− tC)
NC−1X
k=
NC+1
2
g−l(k)f(
NM −NC + 1
2
)
−pgl(
NC − 1
2
)[F (
NM
2
− 1)− F (NM −NC − 1
2
)]
−(1− tC)g−l(
NC − 1
2
)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
)].
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For tC ∈ (1/2, 1) and any NC , NM :
EUl[Out]−EUl[Sm]
> (1− tC)
NC−1X
k=
NC+1
2
g−l(k)f(
NM −NC + 1
2
)− g−l(
NC − 1
2
)[F (
NM +NC − 1
2
)− F (NM
2
)]
> (1− tC)f(
NM −NC + 1
2
)g−l(NC − 1)−
1
2
g−l(
NC − 1
2
),
which letting α = f(NM−NC+12 ) and β =
(NC−1)!
(NC−1)
2 !
(NC−1)
2 !
is equal to:
α(1−tC)tNC−1C − 12βp(NC−1)/2(1−tC)(NC−1)/2 = (1−tC)t
(NC−1)/2
C [αp
(NC−1)/2− 12β(1−tC)
NC−3
2 ],
which is positive if and only if
2αp
NC−1
2 ≥ β(1− tC)
NC−3
2 ⇐⇒ t
NC−1
2
C
(1− tC)
NC−3
2
≥ β
2α
⇐⇒ tC
(1− tC)
NC−3
NC−1
≥
µ
β
2α
¶ 2
NC−1
.
Letting γ > 0 be any number such that tC ≥ γ, this last inequality will be satisfied if
γ
(1− tC)
NC−3
NC−1
≥
µ
β
2α
¶ 2
NC−1
⇐⇒ (1− tC)
NC−3
NC−1 ≤ γ
µ
2α
β
¶ 2
NC−1
⇐⇒ (1− tC) ≤ γ
µ
2α
β
¶ 2
NC−3
⇐⇒ tC ≥ 1− γ
µ
2α
β
¶ 2
NC−3
,
which is less than one for NC ∈ [5,M + 1], provided that f(NM−NC+12 ) > 0.
Note that if NC = 3, then
³
2α
β
´ 2
NC−3 = 0; whereas if NC > NM + 1, α = 0.
If NC = 3, then EUl[Out] = EUl[∅], thus EUl[Sm] > EUl[∅] implies EUl[Sm] > EUl[Out].
If NC > NM + 1, then f(NM+NC−12 ) = f(
NM−NC+1
2 ) = 0, thus
EUl[Out]−EUl[Sm] = −pgl(
NC − 1
2
)F (
NM
2
− 1)− (1− tC)g−l(
NC − 1
2
)[1− F (NM
2
)] < 0.
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Chapter 4
Voting Blocs, Coalitions and
Parties
abstract: In this chapter I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in
an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its
members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. I prove that there
exist stable endogenous voting bloc structures, and in an assembly with two parties I
show how the incentives to join a bloc depend on the types of the agents, the sizes
of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. I also provide an
empirical application of the model to the US Supreme Court and I show that justices
face a strategic incentive to coalesce into voting blocs.
4.1 Introduction
Democratic deliberative bodies, such as committees, councils, or legislative assemblies across the
world choose policies by means of voting. Members of an assembly can affect the policy outcome
chosen by the assembly by coordinating their voting behavior and forming a voting bloc. A voting
bloc is a coalition with an internal rule that aggregates the preferences of its members into a single
position that the whole coalition then votes for, acting as a single unit in the assembly. From factions
at faculty meetings in an academic department, to alliances of countries in international relations
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or political parties in legislative bodies, successful voting blocs influence policy outcomes to the
advantage of their members. In national politics, legislators face incentives to coalesce into strong
political parties in which every member votes according to the party line. Exercising party discipline
to act as a voting bloc, strong parties are more likely to attain the policy outcomes preferred by a
majority of party members.
However, agents are not identical and the benefits of forming a voting bloc are not equally shared
by all. Some members of a voting bloc may prefer to leave the bloc, making it unstable. Who benefits
when agents with diverse preferences form a voting bloc? What makes a voting bloc stable? What
configuration of voting blocs do we expect to find in an assembly with heterogeneous voters? These
are some of the questions that I address in this chapter, modeling an assembly with a finite number
of agents who can coordinate with each other to form voting blocs before they vote to pass or reject
a policy proposal.
My theory adds a novel insight about endogenous party formation. A group of members of an
assembly -a party- strategically coalesce into a voting bloc to coordinate their votes, seeking to
influence the policy outcome for an ideological gain. Party members commit to accept the party
discipline and to vote for the party line, which is chosen according to an aggregation rule internal
to the party.
In the first part of the chapter I consider an assembly with two exogenously given parties, one
on each side of the political spectrum, and I analyze whether or not every member of a party has
an incentive to accept the party discipline depending on factors such as the types of the agents, the
polarization of the assembly, the sizes of the parties, the internal rule that a party uses to aggregate
the preferences of its members, and the process that leads to the formation of a voting bloc.
I find that in each party there is one extreme party member who is the least likely to benefit from
the coordination of votes in her party, and this extreme agent determines whether or not the party
can form a stable voting bloc with a given internal aggregation rule. I show that for some preference
profiles a party cannot form a stable voting bloc that always imposes party discipline on its members,
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but it can form a stable voting bloc with laxer party discipline using an internal voting rule that lets
members vote freely when there is substantial disagreement within the party. I also show that for
some other preference profiles, a party cannot form a stable voting bloc even though the formation
of a bloc would benefit every member because the party faces a collective-action problem: Each
member individually benefits more by staying out of the bloc and letting others coordinate their
vote, even though they all become better off if they all commit to form a voting bloc. With respect
to polarization of preferences, I find that party discipline becomes increasingly difficult to sustain as
a stable outcome as the parties become more extreme. In fact, a party of sufficiently extreme agents
can only form a voting bloc if it uses a very permissive rule that lets members vote freely as soon
as two of them disagree with the party line.
Voting blocs are not only a consequence of political parties and their sophisticated partisan
strategies. Rather, the coordination of votes and the gains to be made by forming a voting bloc
are in itself a reason for the endogenous formation of parties. In the second part of the chapter I
consider an assembly in which any subset of voters can coordinate and coalesce to form a voting bloc.
I show that given the configuration into blocs by the rest of the assembly, any arbitrary coalition of
agents who form a voting bloc attains a net gain in the sum of expected utilities of its members. I
analyze the endogenous formation of voting blocs in the assembly and I seek voting bloc structures
-partitions of the assembly into voting blocs- that are stable. I show that there exist Nash stable
voting bloc structures. In these structures, no agent has an incentive to leave the bloc she belongs
to and join some other bloc. I find that Nash stable voting blocs must be of size less than minimal
winning.
To obtain sharper predictions about the configuration of voting blocs, I apply the model to a
small assembly and I introduce a new “Split stable” concept that allows for coalitional deviations
in which at most one bloc splits. I show that in a stylized assembly with 9 members whose types
are symmetrically distributed, all Nash and Split stable voting bloc structures have two voting blocs
one at each side of the ideological spectrum and a group of independents including the median in
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between the two blocs. In the last section of the chapter I compare this result with the predictions
derived from empirical data on the voting patterns of the United States Supreme Court from 1995
to 2004.
Using data on the 419 non-unanimous decisions that the Court reached in this period, I provide
estimates of the ideal position of each justice in one- and two-dimensional spaces, and I calculate how
the formation of voting blocs would have changed the decisions of the Court. For each hypothetical
connected voting bloc structure I find the decisions that would have been reversed due to the
coordination of votes inside the blocs if this voting bloc structure had formed. I assume that the
justices that dissented (voted with the minority) on a decision would have liked a reversal of the
decision, and those who in the data voted with the majority and won would have been worse off
had the decision been reversed. Aggregating over all the decisions, I calculate the net balance of
beneficial minus detrimental reversals for each justice induced by the given voting bloc structure,
relative to the original data. Assuming that these individual net balances of reversals are payoffs
to the justices, I calculate which connected voting bloc structures are stable if justices form voting
blocs to maximize their payoff. The only Nash and Split stable connected partitions involve two
voting blocs of size three: Three of the four liberal justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer) in
a liberal bloc, and the three most conservative justices, namely Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas in
a conservative voting bloc. This empirical exercise shows that justices have strategic incentives to
coalesce into voting blocs.
The theory in this chapter draws inspiration from several literary subfields.
In the coalition formation literature, the seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock [12] analyzes the
costs and benefits of forming a coalition and praises the virtues of unanimity as internal voting rule.
Hart and Kurz [29] study the endogenous formation of economic coalitions under the restriction that
the overall partition of the society into coalitions is efficient. Carraro [14] surveys more recent non-
cooperative theories of coalition formation, but mostly with economic and not political applications.
Traditional models of coalition formation assumed that agents only care about by the coalition they
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belong to, not by the actions of other agents outside their coalition. The newer partition function
approach recognizes that agents are affected by the actions of outsiders, and it defines utilities as a
function of the whole coalition structure in the society. Bloch [10] and Yi [59] survey the literature on
coalitions that generate positive externalities to non-members, such as pollution-control agreements,
and coalitions that create negative externalities to non-members, such as custom unions. However,
there is no literature on the more general case in which a coalition generates both positive and
negative externalities to non-members. The formation of a voting bloc or a political party generates
positive externalities to those who agree with the policies endorsed by the party, and negative
externalities to agents with an opposed policy preference. My model provides intuitive results for
the mixed or hybrid case in which the formation of a voting bloc or party generates both positive
and negative externalities to non-members, in a simple framework where the outcome of a voting
game determines the payoff to each agent.
In previous formal theories of party formation, Snyder and Ting [57] describe parties as informa-
tive labels that help voters to decide how to vote, Levy [38] stresses that parties act as commitment
devices to offer a policy platform that no individual candidate could credibly stand for, Morelli [42]
notes that parties serve as coordination devices for like-minded voters to avoid splitting their votes
among several candidates of a similar inclination. All these theories explain party formation as a
result of the interaction between candidates and voters. Baron [7] and Jackson and Moselle [33] note
that members of a legislative body have incentives to form parties within the legislature, irrespective
of the interaction with the voters, to allocate the pork available for distribution among only a subset
of the legislators. My theory shows that legislators also have an incentive to form parties -voting
blocs- in the absence of a distributive dimension, merely to influence the policy outcome over which
they have an ideological preference.
From the applied American Politics literature, Cox and McCubbins [15] find that legislators in the
majority party in the US Congress use the party as means to control the agenda and the committee
assignments, and Aldrich [1] explains that US parties serve both to mobilize an electorate in favor
88
of a candidate, and to coordinate a durable majority to reach a stable policy outcome avoiding the
cycles created by shifting majorities. I complement their explanations proving that voting blocs
of size less than minimal winning also influence the outcome even if they are not big enough to
guarantee a majority, and they generate an ideological policy gain to their members.
Two recent papers in the political economy literature deal with the selection of the voting rule
for a single coalition: Barberá and Jackson [6] define self-selecting rules as those that would not be
beaten by any other rule if the given voting rule is used to choose among rules; Maggi and Morelli
[39] study self-enforcing rules such that agents would want to undertake collective action under such
rule. Another strand of literature studies the formation of governments by coalitions of parties. Four
decades after Riker [49] showed the advantages of forming minimal winning coalitions, Diermeier
and Merlo [18] show that if agents bargain over ideology and not just the distribution of resources,
coalitions may be smaller or larger than minimal winning and in a recent book, Schofield and Sened
[54] survey the latest theoretical and empirical findings about the formation of government coalitions
in multiparty democracies. Finally, the voting power literature exemplified by the work of Gelman
[28] takes a different approach on coalition formation and assumes that agents want to maximize the
probability of being pivotal in the decision, instead of maximizing the probability that the outcome
is favorable to their interests.
In the following sections I attempt to apply the game-theoretic insights of the coalition formation
literature to shed light on the political economy problem of coordinating the voting behavior of the
members of a coalition.
4.2 Motivating Examples
In this section I present three examples to illustrate how the formation of voting blocs affects voting
results and policy outcomes. After a simplistic example that illustrates how voting blocs work, I
present a more complete example in which two stable voting blocs form in a small assembly, and I
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present an application to a larger assembly.
Example 3 Suppose there is an assembly with five agents who have to take a binary choice decision
-to approve or reject some action- by simple majority. Suppose that the agents face uncertainty about
preferences, in particular, the probability that an agent i favors the action is 12 for each i, and these
probabilities are independent across agents. The probability that at least three agents favor the action
and the action is approved is also 12 . The outcome coincides with the preference of a given agent i if
at least two other agents have the same preference as i. This event occurs with probability 1116 .
Suppose three agents form a voting bloc, such that all three members vote according to the prefer-
ences of a majority of members of the bloc -that is, if two members agree, the third votes with them
regardless of her own preference. Then the decision reached by the assembly depends exclusively
on the preferences of the members of the bloc. The probability that the outcome coincides with the
preference of a member i is equal to the probability that at least one other member of the voting bloc
has the same preference, which is 34 =
12
16 >
11
16 . Hence, the agents who form a voting bloc increase
the probability that the policy outcome coincides with their wishes. The probability for non-members
drops to 816 .
A bloc of three agents in Example 3 is stable in the minimal sense that no member wants to leave
the bloc. If a member leaves, the new situation with a bloc of size two is identical to the original
situation with no blocs, because a bloc of two agents is always ineffective: Either both members
agree and vote together as they would in the absence of a bloc, or if they disagree, no side holds a
majority so each agent is free to vote her true preference, just as if they were not in a bloc.
However, the bloc with three members is not stable if outsiders are free to join in. Indeed, both
outsiders want to join. If one or both of them join, the probability that any agent in the assembly
obtains her desired outcome becomes 1116 , which represent a loss for the three original members of
the bloc, but a gain to the entrant. The outsiders cannot achieve anything by forming a new bloc of
their own because the old bloc of size three is big enough to act as a dictator in an assembly of size
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five. Some intuitions gained in this example generalize, as I shall show below: Forming a voting bloc
always generates a gain in aggregate utility to its members (proposition 32) relative to remaining
independent, but if entry to the bloc is open to outsiders, stable blocs cannot be too big relative to
the size of the assembly (proposition 38).
In Example 3, the agents are identical random voters, so that only the size of the bloc matter,
and not the characteristics of its members. In the rest of the chapter I study heterogeneous agents,
some of whom are ex ante more likely than others to favor the action or policy proposal that is put
to a vote.
We can interpret the uncertainty about preferences in two complementary ways. First, suppose
there is a time difference between the moment when agents coalesce in voting blocs, and the time
of voting in the assembly. Then, when the agents make the commitment to act together they do
not fully know which outcome they will prefer at the time of voting. Three legislators may sign a
pact today to vote together in votes to come in the future, but they do not know today the agenda
or the details of the policies they will vote on in the future.1 Alternatively, in a world of complete
information in which agents vote repeatedly, a legislator who votes for the liberal policy with a
certain frequency x can be modeled as a legislator with a probability x of voting for the liberal
policy in a one-shot voting game.
The random voting model used in Example 3 and in much of the voting power literature2 is an
extreme case of uncertainty, when agents not only do not know exactly how they will feel about
future policy proposals, but they cannot even take a guess. In my model, I assume that there is some
uncertainty about how agents vote, but that ex ante it is possible to differentiate agents according to
their expected preferences. For instance, it is not a foregone conclusion that a Republican legislator
in the US Senate will vote in favor of future tax cuts and a Democratic senator against them, but
1For instance, the countries of the European Union regularly discuss the notion of a common foreign policy. If
some day they sign a treaty establishing a binding common foreign policy, they will sign the treaty with incomplete
information about the foreign policy issues that will be salient after the treaty is ratified and comes to effect.
2Within this literature, see Felsenthal and Machover [27] for a study of voting blocs, and Hosli [31] and [32] for
an exception in which she calculates the voting power of different states in the European Union council taking into
account preferences by noting that some coalitions are more likely to emerge than others.
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it is ex ante more probable that the Republican, rather than the Democrat, will favor the tax cuts.
The ex ante differences in the preferences of the agents are key determinants of the strategic
incentives to form voting blocs. Let us see how a polarized small assembly splits into two different
voting blocs, none of which is minimal winning.
Example 4 Suppose there is an assembly with seven agents who have to take a binary choice de-
cision -pass or reject some policy proposal- by simple majority. Suppose that agents have uncertain
preferences, so that each agent i favors the proposal with an independent probability ti. Suppose
t1 = t2 = t3 = 14 and t4 = t5 = t6 = t7 =
3
4 . Table 4.1 shows the probability that the policy pro-
posal gathers at least four votes and passes unconditional (column one) and conditional on agent 7
favoring the policy proposal (column two), and the probabilities that the outcome coincides with the
preferences of agents 7 (column three), 4 (column four) and 1 (column five), given that the following
voting blocs form: no blocs (row one); agents 5, 6, 7 form a bloc (row two); agents 1, 2, 3 form a bloc
(row three); both blocs form (row four); agents 1, 2, 3 form a bloc and 4, 5, 6, 7 form another bloc
(row five). If a bloc forms, the whole bloc votes according to the preference of the majority of its
members, and in case of a tie, each member votes according to her own preferences.
Table 4.1: Probabilities that the proposal passes and the agents like the outcome
Bloc Pass Pass| 7 favors 7 satisfied 4 satisfied 1 satisfied
None 59.4% 68.8% 68.8% 68.8% 57.3%
{5,6,7} 75.7% 83.9% 75.3% 76.3% 41.9%
{1,2,3} 42.3% 51.2% 59.5% 59.5% 63.4%
{1,2,3},{5,6,7} 68.4% 74.7% 68.6% 85.4% 45.4%
{1,2,3},{4,5,6,7} 77.1% 86.6% 77.8% 77.8% 39.4%
The numbers on the table come from simple binomial calculations. Glancing at the table it is
evident that the formation of different voting blocs has a significant effect on the outcome. Note
that regardless of whether the three low types form a bloc or not, three high types are better off
forming a voting bloc if they take the actions of the other members as given, and similarly, given
that a bloc with three high types form, or given that it does not form, the three low types are better
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off forming their bloc. The outcome with two blocs of size three is Nash stable -no member of a bloc
wants to leave, no other agent wants to enter.
Note that agent 4 in Example 4, identical in all respects to agents 5, 6, 7 does not want to join
the bloc of high types. Rather, with two opposing blocs the remaining independent agent is better
off, since the two blocs are likely to counterbalance each other and the outcome is then often left
for the independent to decide. With only the purely ideological motivation of caring for the policy
outcome and no rents from office to distribute among the members of the winning coalition, agent
4 has no incentive to join the bloc of high types, and blocs will not be of minimal winning size.
The insights gained in the previous abstract two examples have important applications to voting
in committees, councils, assemblies, and, in particular, in legislatures where legislators can coalesce
into political parties that function as voting blocs. For ease of calculation and exposition, the agents
in the following example have very specific preference profiles; this is only for illustration, and the
body of the chapter generalizes the intuitions provided in the example.
Example 5 Consider an Upper House with 100 members in a bicameral system such that a bill
approved in the Lower House requires 51 favorable votes in the Upper House to become Law, otherwise
a status quo remains in place. Suppose that the Lower House is under liberal control and always
passes liberal bills, while legislators in the Upper House come in three types: 20 conservatives, 30
moderates and 50 liberals. Conservatives oppose every bill, liberals favor every bill, and each moderate
favors exactly one third of the bills, in such a way that exactly one third of the moderates favor any
given bill. Then, in the Upper House every bill has 60 supporters (10 moderates and 50 liberals) and
40 opponents (20 conservatives and 20 moderates) and in the absence of voting blocs the advocates
of the bill always win.
Suppose all 30 moderates and 10 conservatives in the Upper House form a voting bloc which they
call the Coalition, and they commit to always vote together by first meeting in a Coalition Caucus
and reaching a common position by simple majority in the caucus. For each bill that comes to the
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Upper House, the Coalition Caucus gives the same outcome: 10 − 30 against the bill. Then, if all
the members follow the dictates of the voting bloc they have just formed, in the division of the Upper
House none of them votes for the bill, each bill then receives only 50 votes in the floor of the Upper
House, all coming from liberal legislators, and the bill is defeated.
The formation of a voting bloc by a minority in Example 5 crucially affects voting results, policy
outcomes, the utilities of the legislators involved and, ultimately, the utility of their constituencies.
Conservative legislators now always achieve their desired outcome (defeating the bill). Moderate
legislators achieve their desired policy in two out of three cases (those in which they oppose the bill),
which is twice as often as without a voting bloc. But the example shows only the potential gains of
forming a bloc, not the difficulties in making it stable to safeguard these gains. The minoritarian
Coalition dominates the Upper House in Example 5 because it manages to forge a voting bloc that
quashes internal dissent and shows no fissures in voting patterns.
The Coalition is not stable. Every moderate has an individual incentive to leave. Suppose one
moderate defects and becomes an independent. If the independent opposes the bill, the defection
has no effect; the bill gathers only 50 votes and fails. But in the event that the independent favors
the bill, the bill passes 51−49. The independent is now pleased with the outcome with certainty,
thus she benefit from her defection to the detriment of those legislators who remain in the Coalition.
The probabilities over events in this example are contrived to make calculations trivial, but two
important intuitions generalize.
First, note that while every moderate has an incentive to abandon the Coalition, the conservatives
gain nothing by leaving. In proposition 26 below I show that given a voting bloc that leans towards
one side of the political spectrum, it is only the most moderate members of the bloc who threaten
the stability of the bloc; if the moderate members benefit from participating in the bloc, it follows
that the extreme members also benefit from participating. In other words, it is only the liberal wing
of a conservative party, and the conservative wing of a liberal party who determine whether the
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party can form a stable voting bloc. Intuitively, if the most left-leaning legislator in the US House
of Representatives introduces a bill to her liking, the hope that it passes must lie in gaining the
favorable vote of Democrats, as it is implausible that a progressive liberal bill could pass against the
opposition of Democrats by gathering enough Republican votes. If a majority of Democrats opposes
the bill, the bill is doomed anyway, so the legislator has nothing to gain in terms of policy outcomes
by defecting from the Democratic Party.
Second, suppose that the Coalition Caucus changes its rules and adopts the following superma-
jority internal voting rule: Members have freedom to vote in the Upper House according to their
own wishes unless three quarters of the members of the Coalition share the same view, in which
case the whole Coalition must vote together. In a bloc of either 39 or 40 members this rule requires
that at least 30 members share the same opinion before the minority is forced to vote with the
majority. If all moderates stay in the Coalition they always achieve the threshold and the bloc
functions equally as if it was using simple majority: Thirty members oppose the bill, so the whole
Coalition votes against it and the bill fails with just 50 liberal votes. Now consider the incentives
of a moderate given the new rule. As a member of the bloc, the legislator attains the outcome she
wants whenever she opposes the bill, which occurs with probability two thirds. Suppose she leaves
the bloc and she opposes the bill. Then there are only 29 legislators left opposing the bill inside the
bloc, not enough according to the new rule to force the minority of dissenters to reverse their vote.
Hence 10 moderates vote for the bill, and the bill passes 60− 40. The deviant is now worse off as an
independent, because her vote is necessary for the Coalition to act together as a voting bloc, and as
a result the Coalition with the new supermajority rule becomes stable.
This result generalizes, as shown in proposition 29: Under weak conditions on the size of the
parties that compose the assembly, and for any size of the assembly, there exist type profiles such
that a party cannot form a stable voting bloc if it chooses simple majority as its internal voting rule,
but it can form a stable voting bloc with some supermajority internal voting rule.
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The first preliminary insight into the gains reaped by voting blocs is the following: Whenever
the bloc changes the outcome by casting all its votes according to the preferences of its internal
majority instead of splitting its vote according to the preferences of all its members, it benefits a
majority of members and hurts only a minority, thus producing a net gain for the bloc as a whole.
The second basic insight is that generating a gain is not sufficient for the bloc to be stable -or to
form in the first place. Rather, it must be that every agent has a strategic incentive to participate
in the bloc. The rest of the chapter explores the individual incentives to participate in blocs, and
the resulting stability properties of different voting bloc formations as a function of the preferences
of the members of the assembly and of the voting rules used by the voting blocs.
4.3 The Model
Let N ={1, 2, ..., N} be an assembly of voters, where N ≥ 7 is finite and odd. This assembly must
take a binary decision on whether to adopt or reject a policy proposal pitted against a status quo.
The division of the assembly is a partition of the assembly into two sets: the set of agents who vote
in favor of the proposal, and the set of agents who vote against the proposal. The assembly makes
a decision by simple majority and the policy proposal passes if at least N+12 agents vote in favor.
A voter i ∈ N receives utility one if the policy outcome coincides with her preference in favor
or against the proposal and zero otherwise, hence there is no intensity of preferences. Let si = 1 if
agent i prefers the proposal to pass, and zero otherwise; let s = (s1, ..., sN ) be a preference profile for
the whole set of voters, and let s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sN ) be the profile without the preference
of i. Similarly, let vi = 1 if agent i votes in favor of the proposal in the division of the assembly, and
vi = 0 otherwise.
Agents face uncertainty at the initial stage. They do not know the profile of preferences in
favor or against the proposal. They only know, for each profile of preferences s ∈ S = {0, 1}N , the
probability that s will occur. Let Ω : {0, 1}N −→ [0, 1] be the probability distribution over profiles
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and assume Ω is common knowledge. Let ti be the type of agent i, which is the probability that i
favors the policy proposal, so ti = P [si = 1]. If these probabilities are not correlated across agents,
then I say that types are independent.
Definition 10 Types are independent if Ω(s) =
Q
i∈N
[tisi + (1− ti)(1− si)] for all s ∈ S.
If types are independent the probability that i favors the policy proposal is ti for any given
realization of preferences by the rest of agents, that is, P [si = 1|s−i] = ti for all i ∈ N and all
s−i ∈ S−i = {0, 1}N−1.
Let the assembly be composed of two exogenously given coalitions L and R, which I call “parties”
and a set M of independent agents who belong to neither of the two parties, so N =L ∪ R ∪M .
Let NL, NR and NM be the respective sizes of L, R and M and assume for simplicity that all
three sizes are odd. This setting applies to a legislature such as the US House of Representatives or
the US Senate in which legislators affiliate to one of the two dominant political parties, or remain
independent. Each of the two parties C = L,R can coordinate the voting behavior of its members
by forming a voting bloc VC = (C, rC) with an internal voting rule rC that maps the preferences of
its members into votes cast by the bloc in the division of the assembly. Then it becomes a strong
party that exhibits party discipline in voting. I assume that joining a voting bloc is voluntary, so
the party as a whole forms a voting bloc only if every member wants to participate in it, otherwise
only a coalition of agents representing the subset of party members who want to participate form
a voting bloc, and the rest of party members do not coordinate their votes, effectively becoming
independents. Independent agents who are not originally affiliated to a party do not coordinate their
votes.
The timing of events is as follows.
Given an arbitrary pair of internal voting rules rL and rR, each member in party L simultaneously
chooses whether to join the voting bloc with rule rL or remain outside the bloc to act independently,
and similarly each member in R chooses whether to join the voting bloc with rule rR or not. Two
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voting blocs thus form, each bloc containing the members of a party who choose to join it. Then a
preference profile s is realized, each agent i learns her own preference si, and the two voting blocs
hold their internal meetings. Finally the whole assembly meets and agents vote according to the
outcome of their voting bloc’s internal meeting if they have joined any, or according to their own
wishes otherwise.
Given a coalition C of size NC that forms a voting bloc, in their internal meeting the members
of C determine their coordinated voting behavior according to their own internal rule rC , where
rC = rL if C ⊆ L and rC = rR if C ⊆ R and I assume that the voting bloc has commitment
mechanisms such that the outcome of this internal meeting is binding. In particular:
1. If
P
i∈C
si ≥ rCNC , then
P
i∈C
vi = NC . If the fraction of C members who prefer the policy
proposal is at least rC , then the whole bloc votes for the proposal in the division of the assembly.
2. If
P
i∈C
si ≤ (1 − rC)NC , then
P
i∈C
vi = 0. If the fraction of C members who are against the
policy proposal is at least rC , then the whole bloc votes against the proposal in the division of the
assembly.
3. If (1− rC)NC <
P
i∈C
si < rCNC , then
P
i∈C
vi =
P
i∈C
si. If neither side gains a sufficient majority
within the voting bloc, each member votes according to her own preference in the division of the
assembly.
I assume that rL and rR are such that the thresholds rLNL and rRNR are integers weakly larger
than NL+12 and
NR+1
2 respectively. With an rC −majority internal rule, the integer rCNC is the
number of votes the majority in the voting bloc (C, rC) must gather in order to roll the internal
minority and act as a unitary player in the division of the assembly, casting all NC votes in favor of
the policy advocated by the majority of the bloc. A rule rC = NC+12NC is simple majority, and rC = 1
is unanimity, which is identical to not coordinating any votes -members only vote together if they
all share the same preference.
Members of a voting bloc reveal their private preference by voting in the internal meeting of
the bloc. Since there are only two alternatives, and the rules of both blocs and the assembly are
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such that the probability that each alternative wins is increasing in the number of votes it receives,
sincere voting is weakly dominant; voting against her preference can only make an agent worse off.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that members of a bloc reveal their preference truthfully and then it
is without ambiguity that I use the same notation for the true preference si and the vote of agent
i inside the bloc.3 In a more straightforward interpretation that bypasses internal voting, a bloc
learns the true preferences of its members, and its aggregation rule maps the internal preferences
into a number of votes to be cast in favor of the policy proposal in the division of the assembly.
Since non-dominance alone results in sincere voting, the only remaining strategic consideration
in the model is about membership in a voting bloc. Participation in a voting bloc is voluntary,
and members of a party choose to join their party’s voting bloc according to their own individual
incentives. Agents seek to maximize the ex ante (before preferences are revealed) probability that
the policy outcome in the assembly coincides with their policy preference. They only participate in
a voting bloc if belonging to the bloc increases this ex ante probability.
I seek to explain under what conditions a party can behave as a cohesive unit, forming a stable
voting bloc in which every member voluntarily participates. While the equilibrium properties of the
entry game I have described are interesting, I focus on the narrower question of the stability of the
party. Rather than searching for equilibria after the original parties break up and subsets of these
parties form voting blocs, I find under what conditions a party can form a voting bloc imposing voting
discipline on its members and every member accepts the party discipline so that the voting bloc is
stable. The stability concept that I use is merely a voluntary participation condition. Whoever
belongs to a bloc must be weakly better off as a member of the bloc than deviating to become an
independent. If a single party member does not want to join the bloc given that every other member
does, the party cannot form a stable voting bloc with voluntary participation.
3To be formally precise, I would need to define a new variable bsi to denote the preference expressed by i in the
internal meeting of coalition C, and let
P
i∈C
bsi determine the outcome of the internal meeting, but since sincere voting
is weakly dominant, bsi = si for all i ∈ C, all C ⊆ N and all s ∈ S.
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Definition 11 A voting bloc VC = (C, rC) is Individual-Exit stable if every member i ∈ C weakly
prefers to join the bloc than to become an independent and let the bloc (C\i, rC) form instead.
Members of a voting bloc must be weakly better off ex ante, at the time they commit to participate
in the bloc, before they learn their own preferences. Once voting blocs form, I assume that there
are binding mechanisms so that ex post the losing minority within a bloc cannot renege from the
commitment to vote with the bloc’s majority; that is, the outcome of the internal meeting of the
voting bloc is enforced.
This is a partial-equilibrium definition: For C = L,R, a voting bloc VC = (C, rC) is Individual-
Exit stable if it is a best response in the entry game for every agent in C to join the voting bloc given
that every other agent in C joins the bloc, and taking as given the outcome of the formation process
in the other party. Each party may then be Individual-Exit stable conditional on the formation or
not of a voting bloc in the other party. I study the stability of the assembly as a whole at the end
of the section, providing a more formal extension of Definition 11 to encompass the incentives to
deviate by all agents in multiple voting blocs. First, I focus on the formation of a bloc by a given
party as a best response to the strategies of the other party.
To capture the insight that party membership is correlated with policy preferences, I assume
that party L leans left and tends to vote in the aggregate against the policy proposal, while party R
leans right and with high probability a majority of its members favor the policy proposal. To make
this informal statement more precise, I introduce some notation.
Given the probability distribution Ω over preference profiles, for any C ⊆ N , let gC(x) be the
probability that
P
i∈C
si = x. For any i, h in C, let gC−i(x) be the probability that
P
k∈C\i
sk = x and let
gC−ih(x) be the probability that
P
k∈C\{i,h}
sk = x.
Definition 12 A set of agents C of odd size NC leans right if for any non-negative k
gC(
NC − 1
2
− k) ≤ gC(NC + 1
2
+ k).
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C leans left if the inequality signs are reversed and is symmetric if the condition holds with equality.
For a set of even size, the relevant inequalities are:
gC(
NC
2
− k) ≤ gC(NC
2
+ k) for any positive k.
Definition 12 is best interpreted as follows: A coalition C leans right if for any size of the internal
majority and minority within the coalition, it is at least as likely that the majority favors the policy
proposal than that the majority rejects the proposal. Similarly, if for any majority-minority split of
preferences it is more likely that the majority rejects the alternative, then the coalition leans left.
Definition 12 extends the definition of “leaning towards a” in chapter 3 to make it applicable to
any subset of agents, and it provides a natural one-dimensional interpretation in which we imagine
that the proposal is always conservative (right) so that left-leaning agents often reject the proposal
and right-leaning agents tend to accept it. Formally, coalition C in chapter 3 “leans towards a” if
and only if the subset C\{i} leans right for any i ∈ C.
Assuming that one party leans left, a second party leans right, and the set of independent agents
is symmetric, the following results show the necessary and sufficient condition on the types of the
members of a party for this party to be able to form a stable voting bloc, given that the opposing
party forms (or does not form) its own bloc.
Lemma 25 Let N =L∪M ∪R. Suppose types are independent, L leans left and forms a voting bloc
(L, rL), M is symmetric and for any i ∈ R, R−i leans right. Let l ∈ R be such that tl ≤ ti for all
i ∈ R. Suppose R forms a voting bloc with an internal rule rR. If agent l prefers to participate in
the voting bloc (R, rR) than to become an independent, then every i in R prefers to participate.
Lemma 25 provides an important insight: The stability of the voting bloc (R, rR) depends only
on the agent with the lowest type in R. The intuition is that if the most leftist member in party R
has an incentive to participate in a right-leaning voting bloc, then every other party member has
an even greater incentive to belong to the bloc. The left-most agent is the least likely to benefit
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from the actions of the bloc and the most likely to be rolled to vote against her wishes, hence if she
doesn’t want to deviate, no one else will.
Lemma 25 and other results below assume that M is symmetric and L leans left and forms a
voting bloc (L, rL). This assumption can be weakened. First, since the result holds if rL is unanimity,
it implicitly holds as well if no voting bloc forms in L -since forming a voting bloc with unanimity is
identical to not forming a bloc. More generally, it suffices to assume that the distribution of votes
cast in the division of the assembly by the set of agents L∪M (those not in R) is such that given any
size of the majority vote in L∪M, with probability at least 12 this majority is against the proposal.
Formally, it suffices that:
P [
X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k] ≥ P [
X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k] for any positive k.
This condition is similar to L ∪M leaning left, but it applies to the probability distribution of
actual votes cast in the division of the assembly after accounting for the coordination of votes inside
L, and not to the probability distribution over true preferences.
Lemma 25 shows that inside each party only one extreme agent matters to determine whether
the party can form a stable voting bloc. In particular, I next show that a party leaning right can
form a stable voting bloc if and only if its left-most agent is not too far to the left, or, in other
words, if the lowest type in the party is high enough.
Proposition 26 Let N =L ∪M ∪ R. Suppose that types are independent, L leans left and forms
a voting bloc (L, rL), M is symmetric and for any i ∈ R, R−i leans right. Let l ∈ R be such that
tl ≤ ti for all i ∈ R. Suppose R forms a voting bloc with an internal rule rR. The voting bloc (R, rR)
is Individual-Exit stable if and only if tl is higher than a cutoff function tInR(rR, rL,t−l).
If the type of agent l is high enough, she wants to participate in the (R, rR) voting bloc; if she
wants to participate, every other member of R wants to participate and the bloc is Individual-Exit
stable. Intuitively, if R forms a voting bloc the main consequence is that with a high probability
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most members of R favor the policy proposal, those who do not are rolled and compelled to vote in
favor of it, and the policy proposal passes with a higher probability. An agent l only wants to join
such a bloc that essentially turns around naysayers to make them support the policy proposal if l
likes the proposal with a high enough probability. The cutoff is a function of the sizes of the blocs,
the internal rules they use, and the types of all the other agents in the society.
A symmetric result applies to the left party. Given that (R, rR) forms, the voting bloc (L, rL) is
stable only if the highest type th among the members of L is below a cutoff function tInL(rL, rR, t−h).
Taking both results together, a corollary follows:
Corollary 27 Let N =L∪M ∪R. Suppose that types are independent, L−i leans left for all i ∈ L,
M is symmetric and R−j leans right for any j ∈ R. Let h ∈ L be such that th ≥ ti for all i ∈ L
and let l ∈ R be such that tl ≤ tj for all j ∈ R. Then it is a Nash equilibrium of the entry game for
every agent in L and R to respectively join (L, rL) and (R, rR) if and only if
th ≤ tInL(rR, rL,t−h) and tl ≥ tInR(rL, rR,t−l).
The two parties can each form a stable voting bloc if the highest type in the left bloc is not
too high, and the lowest type in the right bloc is not too low. Note that the types of the members
of each bloc may overlap, i.e., the right-most member of the Left bloc may be to the right of the
left-most member of the Right bloc, but not too far to the right, and similarly agents too far to the
left will not belong to the Right bloc.
The exact threshold tInR(rR, rL, t−l) above which an agent with type tl wants to join the voting
bloc (R, rR) depends on the size and voting rule of the bloc (L, rL), the number of independents and
the type profile of all agents other than l in the assembly, all of which are variables exogenous to R.
But it also depends on party R, both on its size and the voting rule it uses to aggregate preferences
within its own bloc.
Simple majority, rC = NC+12 , is the internal rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the
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members of a voting bloc VC = (C, rC). I show this in detail in the more general proposition 32
below, but the intuition is as follows: A voting bloc only has an effect in utilities if the coordination
of the voting behavior of its members alters the policy outcome in the division of the assembly. A
voting bloc subtracts votes from the position supported by its internal minority, adding them to the
internal majority position. Hence, if the bloc alters the outcome in the assembly, it changes it from
the outcome preferred by a minority of the members of the bloc to the one preferred by a majority of
members of the bloc. Since there is no intensity of preferences, it follows that the sum of utilities in
the bloc increases. Simple majority always rolls the minority votes, so it maximizes the probability
that the bloc alters the outcome in the division of the assembly and gains a surplus, so it maximizes
the sum of utilities of the bloc.
Notwithstanding the advantages of simple majority, for some parameters a bloc with simple
majority is not stable: Agents face a temptation to leave and “free ride” from the coordination of
votes by the bloc. Other supermajority rC internal rules reduce the surplus gained by the bloc, but
in some instances make the bloc stable. I explore this possibility in the following two results.
Proposition 28 Let N =L ∪ M ∪ R. Suppose types are independent and R is composed of NR
homogeneous agents with a common type tR. Then the voting bloc (R, rR) with rR = NR−1NR is
Individual-Exit stable.
The voting bloc thus formed is stable regardless of the formation process of other voting blocs
or the types of other agents in the assembly. Indeed, irrespective of the other agents, forming a
bloc generates a surplus for its members, as discussed briefly above and proved below for a more
general case in proposition 32. Identical members of a homogeneous bloc all benefit from the surplus.
Under a supermajority rule NR−1NR , if the bloc loses a single member, it effectively disbands, since
with the reduced membership it would only reach the internal threshold for a sufficient majority if
all agents agree, in which case the bloc never affects the outcome and generates no surplus. For
example, imagine a bloc with 7 members and a 6/7 rule, so that only minorities of one are rolled. If
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an agent deviates and leaves the bloc, the new bloc with 6 members and a 6/7 rule is irrelevant: A
majority of 5 to 1 does not represent a 6/7 majority, so the bloc never rolls its minorities. Thus, a
stringent supermajority rule that makes every agent essential to roll a minority deters exit -at least
in a homogeneous bloc. The loss in surplus is significant with such a stringent rule, since the bloc
forsakes the opportunity to roll bigger minorities granted by simple majority. However, as shown in
the next proposition, there are some parameters for which a bloc with simple majority is not stable,
and if a party wants to form a stable bloc, it would need a more stringent internal voting rule.
Proposition 29 Let N =L ∪M ∪ R. Suppose that types are independent with ti ∈ (0, 1) for all
i ∈ N\R. Suppose that L leans left and forms a voting bloc (L, rL), M is symmetric, NL ≤ N−12 and
3 < NR ≤ N+12 . There exists a vector of type profiles for the members of R such that R leans right
and (R, rR) is not Individual-Exit stable if rR is simple majority, but it is Individual-Exit stable for
some supermajority internal rule r0R.
Parties that cannot form a voting bloc with simple majority (because their members would
leave), can form a stable voting bloc that only coordinates the votes of its members when the
internal majority in the party is more substantial than a mere majority of one. Figure 4-1 illustrates
this result. To be able to plot tInR(rR, rL, t−l) as a function of a single parameter, I let NL = 11,
NR = 9, NM = 31, ti = 0.3 for all i ∈ L,4 rL = 611 (simple majority), tm = 0.5 for all m ∈ M and
th = tR for all h ∈ R\l. Given these values, I plot tInR(rR, rL, t−l) as a function of tR for rR = 59
(simple majority), 2/3 and 8/9. It is clearly observed that the more stringent the internal voting
rule of R, the lower the type of l can be such that l wants to participate in the voting bloc (R, rR).
While I do not study in this work the endogenous selection of voting rules for a party, it follows
that the internal voting rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the members of a voting bloc
among the class of r−majority rules, subject to the constraint that the voting bloc be Individual-
Exit stable is the lowest possible rule such that the bloc is stable. For some parameters, this rule is
4The assumption that the L members have a common type 0.3 is arbitrary, and a very similar graph would result
for any vector of types in coalition L such that L will vote no with probability close to one.
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Figure 4-1: Individual-Exit stability of (R, rR) for rR ∈ {1/2, 2/3, 8/9}.
a supermajority.
This result contrasts with the findings of Maggi and Morelli [39] who study a single coalition that
votes on whether or not to take a collective action. They find that the optimal self-enforcing rule
in an infinitely repeated game is always either the rule that maximizes the social welfare if agents
are patient enough, or unanimity if agents are impatient, and never an intermediate rule. A key
difference between this model and theirs is that they restrict attention to homogeneous agents (or in
their terminology, “symmetric” agents) who all share the same type. A second important difference
is that in their model the collective action of the coalition does not generate an externality to
non-members. I show that once we take into account that agents are heterogeneous and that the
actions of a coalition generate externalities to non-members, a supermajority rule that is not welfare-
maximizing for the coalition sometimes becomes the optimal internal rule given the constraint that
agents cannot be forced to join a voting bloc to participate in the collective action -in my case, the
coordination of votes- undertaken by the coalition.
This formal result is consistent with the “conditional party government” applied theory of Rohde
[53] and Aldrich and Rohde [2], who look at party discipline in the US Congress and conclude that
backbenchers delegate authority to their leaders to impose a party line only when there is little
disagreement within the party. In the words of Cox and McCubbins [15], page 155:
106
The gist of conditional party government is that the party leadership is active only
when there is substantial agreement among the rank and file on policy goals. If this
hypothesis is true, one would expect that decreases in party homogeneity should lead,
not to decreases in support given to the leaders when they take a stand, but rather to
leaders taking fewer stands. This is essentially what we find.
Proposition 29 shows that this finding is not an idiosyncrasy of the Democratic and Republican
parties in the US Congress, but rather, a general principle is at work: Party leaders find it easier
to make their party work as a disciplined voting bloc if they only enunciate a party line when the
minority of dissenters inside the party is small, and they let members vote freely whenever the
internal minority is large.
Next I study how the possibility that a party forms a stable voting bloc depends on the extremism
of the types of its members. I show that a sufficiently extreme party cannot form a stable voting bloc
unless it uses the very restrictive almost-unanimity internal voting rule considered in proposition 28.
Proposition 30 Let N =L∪M ∪R. Suppose types are independent, M is symmetric, R leans right
and forms a voting bloc (R, rR) and NL < NR +NM . Let (x1, ..., xNL) be an arbitrary vector such
that xi ∈ [0, 1] for all i = 1, ..., NL. Suppose the types (t1, ..., tNL) of the members of L are of the
form ti = αxi. If α is low enough, (L, rL) with rL ≤ NL−2NL is not Individual-Exit stable.
A corollary to proposition 30 is that no extreme party of size more than three but less than
minimal winning can form a voting bloc with simple majority, even if its members all share a
common type. The intuition for this negative result on the stability of extreme parties is that the
preference of the internal majority is all but certain: In an extreme-left party, the majority rejects the
policy proposal with probability very close to one. In the -almost complete- absence of uncertainty
about the result of the internal vote, agents prefer to step out of the voting bloc to avoid being rolled
when they happen to favor the policy proposal. Only if rCNC = NC − 1 the result in proposition
28 applies and a party of extremist is stable because if one of them steps out of the bloc, the bloc
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dissolves and there is no possibility to enjoy the benefits of the formation of the bloc while remaining
out of it.
With simple majority as internal voting rule, the maximum size up to which a minority voting
bloc is stable is inversely related to the extremism of its members. I show this in a numerical example,
which tracks the maximum size of parties capable of forming stable voting blocs as a function of the
polarization of both a symmetric and an asymmetric assembly, split into two homogeneous parties
one at each side of the political spectrum and a number of moderate independents in between.
Example 6 Let N =L∪M ∪R. Suppose N = 101, types are independent, ti = 1/2 for every agent
i ∈M, tj = tL for every member j ∈ L and tk = tR for every member k ∈ R. Columns two and three
of the following table show the maximum size of the two parties L,R such that (L, rL) and (R, rR)
are Individual-Exit stable with rC = NC+12NC for C = L,R, for a symmetric assembly where NL = NR
(column two) and an asymmetric assembly where NL = 2NR − 1 (column three), given the degrees
of polarization specified in the different rows.
(tL, tR) NL = NR NL = 2NR − 1
(0.45, 0.55) 31, 31 29, 15
(0.4, 0.6) 23, 23 25, 13
(0.3, 0.7) 13, 13 17, 9
(0.2, 0.8) 7, 7 9, 5
(0.1, 0.9) 3, 3 5, 3
The example illustrates the plausible intuition that extremists are only able to coordinate in
small numbers, while moderate agents can form larger voting blocs.
Sometimes a party cannot form a stable voting bloc because it faces a free-riding problem. Every
party member would be better off if the party forms a voting bloc, but some individual party
members benefit even more if the bloc is formed without them, so they have an incentive to leave
the party and let others coordinate their votes. To address this collective action problem, suppose
that a party does not allow a single member to step out of the bloc and free ride on the advantages
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provided by the voting bloc, but rather, the party only forms a voting bloc if all of its members
participate. In other words, the party renounces to enforce any voting discipline if a single member
refuses to accept it.
If a party is able to commit to an “all or none” outcome in which either the whole party forms a
voting bloc or every party member votes independently, individual incentives to participate change:
Now an agent cannot leave the party and expect to reap the benefits from the rolling of minority
votes inside the bloc while facing no risk of ever being forced to vote against her own preference. In
the new calculation each agent weighs the gain brought by the bloc, and not the marginal advantage
of being in or out of a bloc that forms. It follows that under some circumstances, agents who would
prefer not to participate in the bloc now choose to join only because their participation becomes
essential to the very existence of party discipline. By committing to form a bloc only by unanimous
agreement, a party can sometimes overcome the collective action problem it faced under individual
participation.
Given that the opposite party forms a voting bloc, suppose party C ∈ {L,R} plays the following
game GC : Every i ∈ C simultaneously chooses whether or not to sign a conditional participation
contract, by which i joins the voting bloc if and only if every other member in C joins the bloc too.
If every i ∈ C signs the contract, then the party forms the voting bloc (C, rC), otherwise member
of C do not coordinate their votes.
The players in the closed membership game GC are the NC members of party C. The set of
pure strategies of each player is binary: Sign or not sign. Payoffs for each agent are given by the
probabilities over policy outcomes determined by Ω and by the voting blocs resulting from the game.
The internal voting rule for the bloc is in this description exogenous, but it could be incorporated
into the strategy of the players, making the party form a bloc if and only if all the members agree on
a common rule, and those who do not want to participate can merely propose unanimity, assuring
that no bloc with a rule different than unanimity can form. Let G describe a larger game in which
both parties choose simultaneously whether or not to form a voting bloc by signing conditional
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contracts.
Results similar to lemma 25 and proposition 26 apply to the closed membership game GC just
described (these results are available from the author). If the type of the member with the lowest
type in party R is high enough then this member benefits from the formation of the bloc (R, rR)
and it is a weakly dominant strategy for her to commit to participate in the voting bloc. If so, it is
a weakly dominant strategy for every member to commit to participate.
Party C has something to gain by playing the game GC to form a voting bloc instead of trying
to form a bloc with whoever wants to join. For some parameters, by threatening not to form a bloc
if a single party member fails to join, in the equilibrium of the game GC party C forms the voting
bloc (C, rC) even though this bloc is not Individual-Exit stable if the bloc does not dissolve after an
individual deviation. Proposition 31 states this result formally.
Proposition 31 Let N =L∪M ∪R. Suppose that types are independent, M is symmetric, R leans
right and forms a voting bloc (R, rR) and NL < NM + NR. Then there exists a vector of types
(t1, ..., tNL) for the members of L for which the voting bloc (L, rL) with rL ≤ NL−2NL is not Individual-
Exit stable, but in the game GL it is a Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies for every
i ∈ L to commit to participate in (L, rL).
In short, if the dissolution of the voting bloc follows the departure of a single party member,
then such departure -which would occur if the bloc did not react to the deviation and continued
functioning with a shrunk membership- is forestalled. This result extends to the game G in which
both parties use conditional contracts to determine the formation of their respective voting blocs:
There exist vector of types for which, regardless of whether R forms or not a voting bloc, party L
cannot form an Individual-Exit stable voting bloc with rL ≤ NL−2NL , but nevertheless in the Nash
equilibrium of the game G every member of L commits to participate in the voting bloc (L, rL).
Conditional contracts to form a voting bloc only with unanimous participation allow parties to solve
the collective-action action problem that sometimes arises when parties try form a voting bloc to
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coordinate the votes of their members.
I have studied the incentives of each of two parties to form a voting bloc. Proposition 26 shows
the necessary and sufficient condition for a voting bloc with a majority rule to be Individual-Exit
stable. Propositions 29 and 31 propose two solutions that can help a party form a voting bloc when
a bloc with simple majority is not stable: Either to use a supermajority, or to commit not to form
the voting bloc unless every party member participates, if such a commitment is possible.
In the following subsection, I generalize the model by weakening several assumptions and allowing
new voting blocs to form.
4.3.1 Generalization: Endogenous Voting Blocs
The model so far applies to an established assembly that uses simple majority as its voting rule and
has two well-defined parties. The results have shown under what conditions these parties can form
stable voting blocs that coordinate the votes of all their members.
Now imagine instead an assembly N where all agents are free to coalesce with whomever they
wish, with no preassigned cleavages or factions to restrict their coordination with any other member
of the assembly. The assembly uses a majority voting rule rN which may differ from simple majority,
such that the (still exogenous) policy proposal passes if it gathers at least rNN votes and a status
quo stays in place otherwise.
The probability distribution over preference profiles is as before Ω, but types need not be inde-
pendent. Rather, the only restriction that I impose for some results below is that Ω has full support,
that is, Ω(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S = {0, 1}N .
Agents form voting blocs facing uncertainty over preferences, then they privately learn their own
preference, they vote internally in the voting bloc they belong to, and then they vote in the assembly
according to the outcome of their bloc or according to their own wish if they are not members of
any bloc.
I am interested in the problem of finding a configuration of the assembly into voting blocs that is
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stable. Let C0 denote the subset of agents who remain independent and do not coordinate their votes
with any other agent. I treat this subset of agents as if they formed a voting bloc with unanimity
as its internal voting rule, so that they only vote together if they all agree. Then, I refer to the
configuration of agents into voting blocs in the assembly as the voting bloc structure of the assembly.
Definition 13 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is a pair composed of a partition of the assembly π =
{Cj}Jj=0 and a corresponding set of voting rules {rj}Jj=0 such that r0 = 1 and for j ∈ {1, ..., J},
Vj = (Cj , rj) is a voting bloc with internal rule rj .
Note that the voting bloc structure specifies both the membership of each voting bloc, and the
rule that each bloc uses to aggregate its internal preferences. I assume that for any voting bloc
VC = (C, rC), the rule rC is such that rCNC is an integer weakly larger than NC+12 , where NC is
the size of coalition C. When I consider deviations from the voting bloc (C, rC), I assume that rC
does not change following the defection of some members or the entry of a new member; as a result,
in the new voting bloc (C0, rC) with size N 0C that follows the deviation it is possible that rCN
0
C is
no longer an integer.
The voting bloc structure (π, r), together with the preference profile s determines the vote of
agent i in the division of the assembly, which I denote vi(π, r, s). Let ui(π, r) be the ex ante expected
utility for agent i with the voting bloc structure (π, r).
An important result is that any coalition of agents attains a non-negative net change in aggregate
utilities if they form a voting bloc instead of remaining independent, regardless of the configuration
of the rest of the assembly.
Proposition 32 Given a voting bloc structure (π, r), suppose a subset C0J+1 ⊂ C0 deviates and
forms a new voting bloc (C0J+1, r
0
J+1). Denote the resulting voting bloc structure in which no further
deviations from (π, r) take place by (π0, r0). Then
P
i∈C0J+1
ui(π0, r0) ≥
P
i∈C0J+1
ui(π, r). A simple majority
internal voting rule r0J+1 maximizes the sum of utilities for the members of the new voting bloc
{C 0J+1, r0J+1}.
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As discussed in the previous subsection, a voting bloc only has an effect if it reverses the policy
outcome. If it does, it favors its internal majority at the expense of its internal minority, generating a
net gain. With simple majority the bloc always rolls its internal minority, maximizing the probability
that the bloc alters the outcome in the division of the assembly and generates the mentioned net
gain. Consequently, simple majority is the internal rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the
members of the bloc, just as it is the rule for the assembly that maximizes the utilitarian social
welfare if all agents vote independently, as shown by Curtis [16].
Not only the members of the new bloc benefit. Agents whose preference coincides with the
majority of the new bloc with high enough probability also benefit from the formation of the bloc.
In the aggregate, the impact of a new voting bloc on the utilities of non-members depends on the
voting rule rN of the assembly.
I say that Ω has full support if every profile of preferences s occurs with strictly positive proba-
bility.
Proposition 33 Suppose Ω has full support. Let (π, r) be any voting bloc structure. Let (π0, r0)
be a new voting bloc structure in which a subset C of size at least 3 contained in the original set
of singletons C0 forms a voting bloc with a rule rC < 1, and the rest of the structure remains
unchanged. If rN = 1, then ui(π0, r0) > ui(π, r) for any i in the new set of singletons C 00 andP
i∈N
ui(π0, r0) >
P
i∈N
ui(π, r).
If the assembly uses a unanimity rule, the members of any voting bloc that forms with an internal
rule short of unanimity relinquish their veto power. Agents who retain their veto powers by staying
out of any bloc then unambiguously benefit. If the assembly did not use unanimity to begin with,
the picture is murkier: Some agents will typically benefit by the formation of a voting bloc, others
will suffer. Social welfare may increase or decrease depending on whether the new structure makes
it more likely that the will of the majority coincides with the voting outcome in the division of
the assembly. It follows from the results by Curtis [16] that social welfare is maximized with a
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simple majority rule in the assembly and no voting blocs, but with simple majority, if there already
exist some welfare-reducing voting blocs, new voting blocs may increase social welfare. For instance,
imagine an assembly in which there is always a bare majority of agents in favor of the policy proposal,
but there is one voting bloc that always rolls a few votes to the negative camp, swinging the outcome
towards a rejection of the proposal. The creation of another bloc that rolls a few negative votes into
favorable votes nullifies the negative effect of the first bloc and enhances social welfare.
Individual utility maximizing agents, however, are not concerned with social welfare or the effect
of a bloc on the rest of society. They are only concerned from the benefit they derive from joining
a voting bloc. Proposition 32 assures members of a bloc that collectively they benefit from its
formation, but if agents cannot make compensating transfers, a surplus for a coalition does not
guarantee a benefit to each of its members, and even if they all benefit, some agents may still have
an incentive to leave and receive the benefits of the bloc as an externality without bearing the costs.
The main goal in this subsection is to find stable voting bloc structures in the assembly when any
arbitrary coalition of agents can form a voting bloc. I consider alternative definitions of stability.
The first notion is the already familiar Individual-Exit stability, which only requires voluntary
participation in voting blocs, so that each agent is free to leave and become an independent. I now
define the concept more rigorously for a voting bloc structure.
Definition 14 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is Individual-Exit stable if ui(π, r) ≥ ui(π0, r) for any
i ∈ N and any partition π0 = {C 0j}Jj=0 such that:
(i) l ∈ C0j ⇐⇒ l ∈ Cj for all l ∈ N\i and all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, and
(ii) i ∈ C 00.
Informally, a voting bloc structure is Individual-Exit stable if each of its voting blocs is itself
Individual-Exit stable. This stability concept is similar, but less restrictive than the Individual
Stability used by Drèze and Greenberg [19].
Definition 15 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is Individually stable if ui(π, r) ≥ ui(π0, r) for any
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i ∈ N and any partition π0 = {C 0j}Jj=0 such that:
(i) l ∈ C0j ⇐⇒ l ∈ Cj for all l ∈ N\i and all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, and
(ii) for j ∈ {1, ..., J}, if i ∈ C0j then ul(π0, r) ≥ ul(π, r) for all l ∈ C 0j .
Individual-Exit stability considers deviations only by departure from a bloc; Individual Stability
allows for entry if it benefits every member of the coalition that receives an entrant. Entry is even
more fluid under Nash stability; in a Nash stable voting bloc structure each agent is free to leave
its bloc to become an independent or to migrate to any other bloc. In a Nash stable voting bloc
structure every agent belongs to the bloc she likes most.
Definition 16 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is Nash stable if ui(π, r) ≥ ui(π0, r) for any i ∈ N and
any partition π0 = {C0j}Jj=0 such that l ∈ C0j ⇐⇒ l ∈ Cj for all l ∈ N\i and all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}.
It follows from the definitions that the set of voting bloc structures that are Nash stable is
contained in the set that are Individually Stable, which is itself contained in the set of Individual-
Exit stable voting bloc structures.
Once stable voting bloc structures are identified, it is important to know if they have any effect
in the outcome. Taking the structure with no voting blocs in which all agents act as independents
as a benchmark, I analyze whether or not the formation of voting blocs affects the policy outcomes
at least under some preference profile. If it never affects the policy outcomes, the coordination of
voting behavior prompted by the voting blocs is irrelevant.
Definition 17 Let (π0, r0) be the voting bloc structure in which all agents remain independent.
A voting bloc structure (π, r) is relevant if with positive probability the policy outcome under the
structure (π, r) differs from the outcome under (π0, r0).
In short, if there is a relevant stable voting bloc structure, the coordination of voting behavior
inside the blocs affects the policy outcome. It is possible to apply a similar definition to specific
voting blocs, rather than to the whole structure. A particular voting bloc (C, rC) is relevant if the
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coordination of votes inside the bloc (C, rC) affects the policy outcome with positive probability.
Formally:
Definition 18 Let (π, r) be a voting bloc structure with J blocs j = {0, 1, ...,bj, ..., J} such that
r0 = 1. Let (π, r0) be such that r0bj = 1 and r0j = rj for all j ∈ {0, ..., J}\bj. The voting bloc
Vbj = {Cbj , rbj} is relevant in the structure (π, r) if with positive probability the outcome under the
structure (π, r) differs from the outcome under (π, r0).
The next two results show that there exist relevant stable voting bloc structures.
Proposition 34 Suppose Ω has full support and rN ≤ N−1N . Then there exists a relevant Individual-
Exit stable voting bloc structure. In particular, any structure with a single voting bloc (C, rC) such
that NC ≥ rNN + 1 and rCNC < rNN is relevant and Individual-Exit stable.
A voting bloc that is more than large enough to act as a dictator is Individual-Exit stable because
no agent gains anything by leaving a bloc that can still impose its will in the assembly after the
defection. Since the outcome of the internal meeting of the bloc determines the outcome of the
assembly, agents are better off participating in the internal meeting. The bloc is relevant because
it needs a lower number of favorable votes to adopt the policy proposal -and impose it upon the
assembly- than the threshold set by the voting rule of the whole assembly.
Proposition 35 Suppose Ω has full support and rN ≤ N−1N . Then there exists a relevant Individu-
ally stable voting bloc structure. If rN ∈ (N+12N ,
N−1
N ], then a voting bloc structure with a single bloc
(C, rC) such that C = N and rC < rN is relevant and Individually stable.
If the grand coalition forms a voting bloc, there is no possibility of deviating by entering a bloc.
Hence the voting bloc structure is Individually stable -and Nash stable- if and only if it is Individual-
Exit stable. From proposition 34, if the voting rule in the assembly is not simple majority, then a
voting bloc by the grand coalition with a lower internal voting rule is relevant and Individual-Exit
stable, hence it is Individually stable and Nash stable.
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Corollary 36 Suppose Ω has full support and rN ∈ (N+12N ,
N−1
N ]. Then there exists a relevant Nash
stable voting bloc structure. In particular, a voting bloc structure with a single voting bloc (C, rC)
s.t. C = N , rC < rN is relevant and Nash stable.
If the voting rule of the assembly is simple majority, then proposition 35 shows that a relevant
Individually stable voting bloc structure exists. In particular, a voting bloc structure with a unique
voting bloc (C, rC) such that NC = N − 2 and rC is simple majority is relevant and Individually
stable. The bloc acts as a dictator and its members do not want to leave and would not benefit
by admitting any of the two non-members into the bloc. This particular voting bloc structure is
not Nash stable because the two non-members, who are essentially excluded from the decision-
making process, would enter the bloc is such a deviation was feasible for them. In fact, for some
probability distributions over preference profiles, there is no relevant Nash stable structure. The next
result shows existence of a Nash stable structure, and the following one describes characteristics of
relevant Nash stable structures, provided they exist.
Proposition 37 A Nash stable voting bloc structure exists.
The grand coalition C = N with rC ∈ [rN , 1] is irrelevant, but Nash stable. In a bloc (N , rC)
with rC ≥ rN , if the majority in the bloc had enough supporters to roll i, then it has enough
supporters to win in the division of the assembly, regardless of the rolled votes. Thus, an agent
cannot change the outcome by leaving, and the bloc is Nash stable.
Proposition 37 relates closely to corollary 36: If the coalition of the whole forms a bloc with
a lower internal voting rule than the rule used in the division of the assembly, the voting bloc is
relevant. If it forms a bloc with a higher internal voting rule, it is irrelevant. In both cases it is Nash
stable, but in the first one it effectively functions as if it endogenously changed the voting rule of
the assembly, and in the second case it merely makes some proposals pass (or fail) with unanimity
when they would have passed (or failed) just by majority.
If they exist, Nash stable voting blocs have to be of size smaller than minimal winning.
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Proposition 38 Suppose Ω has full support and rN = N+12N . Then in any relevant Nash stable
voting bloc structure (π, r), NC < N+12 for any voting bloc {C, rC} with a simple majority internal
voting rule, and if there exist at least one singleton in (π, r), then NC < N+12 for any relevant voting
bloc {C, rC}.
Proposition 38 tells us that a relevant voting bloc cannot be large enough to act as a dictator.
If it is, every agent would like to join. To illustrate this result, think of the solid Democratic
South of the US during the first half of the 20th century. In an essentially one-party system, any
politician with some aspirations of furthering his ideal policies through the State legislatures had a
strong incentive to become a Democrat, irrespective of his political ideology. With no barriers to
enter blocs, competition among opposing blocs only occurs if the weaker blocs also have a hope of
influencing the policy outcomes.
None of the solution concepts that I have studied so far allows members of a bloc to coordinate
a coalitional deviation. Hard as it may be for agents to communicate and coordinate across blocs,
it seems easier to scheme a deviation in which a subset of members in a bloc defect together, and
possibly form a new voting bloc. The following stability concept allows for a coalitional deviation in
which one bloc faces a split, a number (possibly zero) of its members defect, and at the same time a
(possibly empty) subset of the defectors and previously independent agents form a new voting bloc.
Definition 19 A voting bloc structure (π, r) with J blocs is Split stable if there exists no partition
π0 = {C0j}J+1j=0 , rule rJ+1 and coalition Cbj ∈ π such that:
(i) For all j ∈ {1, ..., J}, r0j = rj ,
(ii) for all j ∈ {1, ..., J}\bj and all i ∈ N , i ∈ C 0j ⇐⇒ i ∈ Cj ,
(iii) for all i ∈ N , i /∈ Cbj =⇒ i /∈ C 0bj ,
(iv) for any i ∈ N s.t. i ∈ C00 and i /∈ C0, ui(π0, r ∪ rJ+1) ≥ ui(π, r) and for any i s.t. i ∈ C 0J+1,
ui(π0, r ∪ rJ+1) > ui(π, r).
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Definition 20 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is weakly Split Stable if there exists no partition π0 =
{C 0j}J+1j=0 and bloc Vbj satisfying conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) in Definition 19 and
(iv)’ For any i ∈ N and j ∈ {0,bj}, if i ∈ Cj and i /∈ C 0j then ui(π0, r ∪ rJ+1) > ui(π, r).
Conditions (i) and (ii) say that all other blocs remain unaffected by the coalitional deviation
involving independent agents and members of bloc Vbj ; both the internal rules and the membership of
these blocs remain the same, and the internal rule rbj of the bloc Vbj is also kept intact. Condition (iii)
states that in the new partition the bloc that suffered the defection gains no new members. Condition
(iv) states that agents who defect become better off. When agents are indifferent between deviating
or not, this fourth condition incorporates an intuitive discrimination: Agents would abandon a bloc to
become independents when indifferent, but they only deviate to a new bloc for a strict improvement.
That is, agents break indifference as if they had a lexicographic preference for independence. The
slightly stricter condition (iv)’ foregoes this refinement over indifference, and accepts as weakly Split
stable any voting bloc structure in which agents do not have a strictly positive incentive to deviate.
The intuition for the Split notion of stability5 is that coalitional deviations across blocs are
harder to coordinate, perhaps because communication is limited across blocs, or because different
blocs are antagonistic and suspicious of each other (i.e., Western and Soviet blocs during the Cold
War); whereas, a disaffected subset of a bloc can more easily break apart and possibly recruit some
independent agents for a new voting bloc. As an example, the moderate wing of the UK’s Labour
party broke off in 1981 and formed the Social Democratic Party, which attracted up to 28 former
Labour MPs.6
The notion that some members of a coalition may organize a coordinated defection even though
deviations across coalitions are not feasible is common to two previous concepts of equilibrium in the
non-cooperative coalition formation literature: The Coalition-Proof equilibrium by Bernheim, Peleg
5Kaminski [34] and [35] first introduced the term Split Stability to denote a similar but different concept in which
coalitions of parties can split, in an applied study of political parties in Poland.
6Admittedly, cross-party deviations are sometimes also successful, as illustrated by the new Kadima party in the
Israeli Knesset.
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and Whinston [8] and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements by Ray and Vohra [48]. In these two
concepts, agents negotiate as if each coalition was in a separate room, and any group of agents in the
same room could leave and find a new room for themselves, with the important proviso that every
deviation must itself be immune to further deviations (once they deviants reach their new room, it
must be that no subset of them would want to leave for yet another room), so the definitions are
recursive.
Split stability is different first in that it is not a recursive concept, since I do not require a
coalition of deviants to be immune to further deviations. Second, while I do not consider deviations
across coalitions, I allow deviants to coordinate with independents. Under Split stability, agents
negotiate as if each coalition was in its own room, but the independents were all in a central lobby,
so that when a set of deviants departs from a coalition they can recruit any number of independents
in their way to a new room.
Why use Split stability? First, although the requirement that deviations be themselves immune
to further deviations adds consistency to the Coalition-Proof and Equilibrium Binding Agreements
solution concepts and makes them theoretically more elegant, it also adds a layer of unwelcome
complexity. Allowing for best-response type of deviations makes Split stability a much simpler
concept to define and use in applications. Second, agents may prefer to proceed with a deviation
even if this deviation is itself unstable. If it is difficult to predict the stream of deviations that
will follow an initial departure and agents cannot anticipate the ultimate outcome propitiated by
their deviation, a subset of agents displeased with the original configuration may choose to deviate
for a short-sighted gain even if subsequent deviations by other agents could potentially undo the
improvement brought by their first move. If so, Coalition-Proof and Equilibrium Binding Agreements
solutions will be unstable.
Previous literature has shown that existence of stable coalition structures becomes problematic
as soon as coalitional deviations are allowed. Hart and Kurz [29] consider five alternative notions
of stability with coalitional deviations, including core stability and the Strong Nash equilibrium of
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an associated membership game called the ∆ game in which agents simultaneously choose which
coalition to join. Hart and Kurz [30] then show that even the largest of these five solution sets may
be empty. Split stability restricts the possible coalitional deviations to those involving members of
at most one voting bloc. As a result, the solution set is larger than core stability or Strong Nash
equilibrium of the ∆ game. Under some restrictions on the probability distribution of preference
profiles, Split stable voting bloc structures exist.
Proposition 39 Suppose types are independent, ti = t ∈ (0, 1) for any i ∈ N and rN is simple
majority. Then there exists a relevant weakly Split stable voting bloc structure (π, r) in which as many
voting blocs of size three as feasible form and there remain zero, one or two singletons, depending
on N. If N is not a multiple of three, this relevant voting bloc structure is Split stable.
A complete characterization of Nash or Split stable voting bloc structures in full generality is
an overly ambitious task, since the solution varies with the size of the assembly and the probability
distribution over preference profiles of its members. Instead, in the following section I illustrate the
model at work applying the theory to a small assembly of size nine, using the empirical data from
the United States Supreme Court.
4.4 A Small Assembly: The US Supreme Court
The theoretical model of endogenous voting blocs at the end of the previous section showed that
there exist stable partitions of an assembly into voting blocs, but besides predicting that Nash stable
voting blocs are of size less than minimal winning, it provided limited information about the features
of these stable voting bloc structures. In this section I seek a more detailed description of the voting
blocs that we expect to find in a small assembly. First I provide the theoretical prediction in a
stylized assembly of size nine, and then I look at data from the United States Supreme Court from
1995−2004.
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4.4.1 Endogenous Voting Blocs in a Small Assembly
Consider an assembly with nine voters who have independent and symmetric types distributed as
follows: t1=t2=0.5− α − β; t3=t4=0.5 − α; t5=0.5; t6=t7=0.5+α; t8=t9=0.5+α+β, with α, β ≥ 0
and α+ β ≤ 0.5. That is, types are symmetrically distributed around one-half.
The parameters α and β have an intuitive interpretation: α measures the polarization of pref-
erences within the assembly. A hypothetical coalition of moderates comprising agents 3 through 7
(enough to become a majority centered around the median) spans an interval of types of length 2α.
The more polarized the members of the assembly are, the larger α and the larger the differences in
types that a coalition of moderates must accommodate in order to form a voting bloc. The parame-
ter β, albeit crudely, reflects the heterogeneity in types within each side of the assembly, or in other
words, the extremism of the left-most and right-most wings.
An intuitive conjecture is that intense polarization in the assembly would make a central voting
bloc unstable and would induce the formation of two opposing voting blocs, one on each side of the
median.
Using numerical simulation for a fine grid of values of α and β, I find which connected voting
bloc structures are relevant and Nash and Split stable such that no agent or group of agents would
have an incentive to deviate to a different structure.
Definition 21 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is connected with respect to the order < if for all
C ∈ π and for all i, j, k ∈ N , (i, k ∈ C and i < j < k) implies j ∈ C.
The order of agents is according to their type, so a voting bloc is connected if its members are
in consecutive positions in the ordering by types. Axelrod [4] provides a detailed argument in favor
of connected coalitions over non-connected ones.
The intuition that in a very polarized assembly there will not be a unique moderate bloc, but
rather, two blocs one on each side of the political spectrum is verified. There are only four connected
voting bloc structures that are Nash and Split stable. These are all such that exactly two blocs L and
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Figure 4-2: a,b,c. Nash and Split stable voting bloc structures.
R form with simple majority internal voting rules, each with three members, and L ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4},
R ⊂ {6, 7, 8, 9}. That is, three of the four members of the assembly with a low type form a voting
bloc, and three members with a high type form another bloc. It is easy to visualize the L bloc as a
pro status quo party, which tends to vote against the policy proposal, and the R bloc as a reform
party, which tends to vote for the policy proposal.
Figure 4-2 a,b,c shows in black the parameter values for which each voting bloc structure is Nash
and Split stable. For any α < 0.5, the voting bloc structure is relevant.
The three figures share the common characteristic that only for a high α the voting bloc structure
is stable. If the assembly is not polarized and agents share similar types, then each agent in voting
bloc L has an incentive to defect to R, effectively disbanding L since no bloc can function with only
two members. If there is enough polarization, defections across blocs no longer occur.
As a summary, this subsection has shown that if the assembly is sufficiently polarized, there is
a stable and relevant connected voting bloc structure composed of two opposing blocs, located one
at each side of the median. In the rest of the section I depart from the stylized assumptions of
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the modelled assembly (symmetry and independence of types), looking instead at real data from
the United States Supreme Court. After introducing the Court and the policy preferences of its
members, I calculate the effect of voting blocs upon the outcome of the Court.
4.4.2 The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court is the ultimate appellate court in the United States judicial
system, and the arbiter of the United States Constitution. It is composed of nine justices and it
uses a simple majority rule, so that the vote of five justices are enough to decide a case. The Court
makes a binary decision on the merits of each case: It either affirms or reverses the ruling of a lower
court. In an accompanying opinion, the Court provides the argumentation for its decision, and this
opinion serves as precedent for future cases.
I use the data on the decisions of the Court from The United States Supreme Court Judicial
Database compiled by Spaeth [58] and I select all non-unanimous cases with written opinions in
which all nine justices participate.7 Spaeth codes the votes of each justice as zero or one depending
on whether the vote to affirm or reverse the decision of the previous court is interpreted as more
liberal or more conservative. An alternative binary coding of the votes which is unambiguously
objective divides the votes between votes with the majority, and dissents -votes with the minority.
Table 4.2 shows the number of liberal votes and the number of dissents that each justice cast in
the 419 non-unanimous decisions recorded from 1995 and 2004. The nine justices, abbreviated by
the first three letters of their surname, are: Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas.
Table 4.2: Liberal and dissenting votes in 419 decisions
1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
Liberal 344 308 307 276 160 155 98 84 71
Dissent 203 159 136 141 71 78 115 161 156
7The unit of analysis in my data is the case citation (ANALU=0), the type of decision (DEC_TYPE) equals 1
(orally argued cases with signed opinions), 6 (orally argued per curiam cases) or 7 (judgments of the court), and I
drop all unanimous cases and all cases in which less than 9 justices participate in the decision.
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The most extreme justices, either liberal or conservative, find themselves in the minority of
dissenters more often than the moderate justices. Justice O’Connor, traditionally regarded as the
swing justice, dissents in only about one in six cases, while Justice Stevens, who is the most liberal
member of the Court, dissents from the majority in roughly a half of the cases.
If justices formed voting blocs, the coordination of votes would change the voting record of the
justices, the composition of the majority and dissent justices in each case, the outcome of some
decisions, and, assuming that justices are policy oriented, the utility or satisfaction of the justices
with the outcome of the Court. I calculate the changes brought by any possible connected voting
bloc structure in the Court.
The notion of a connected voting bloc requires an ordering of justices from one to nine. In the
tables and the text of this section I use the ordering according to the number of liberal votes cast
as recorded by Spaeth [58]. I check if this ordering is robust by means of calculating the ideal
location of the justices in a space vector using three mathematical methods that abstract from the
substantive content of each case and attend only to the voting patterns and correlations across the
justices. Although my basic goal is to obtain an objective and robust ordering of the justices, these
analyses have an intrinsic value in that they provide estimates of the location of each justice in a
vector space with an easy interpretation in ideological terms such as a liberal/conservative scale.
The three methods I use are: Singular Value Decomposition of the original data, Eigen De-
composition of the square matrix of cross-products of the locations of the justices, and the Optimal
Classification method developed by Poole [45], and I compare these three estimates with the findings
of Martin and Quinn [40] and [25], who use Bayesian inference in a probabilistic voting to estimate
the ideal points of the justices.8 In Table 4.3 I provide the ideal position of the justices estimated
by Single Value Decomposition and Eigen Decomposition, the rank ordering given by the Optimal
Classification method in one dimension, the estimate of the position in the first dimension given by
8See Brazill and Grofman [11] for a comparison of the relative merits of multidimensional scaling methods versus
factor analysis methods such as the Eigen or Single Value Decomposition.
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the Optimal Classification method in two dimensions, and the estimates obtained by Martin and
Quinn. First I briefly explain each of the methods.
Mathematically, the Singular Value Decomposition of a rectangular matrix X419∗9 is
X419∗9 = U419∗419D419∗9V9∗9 s.t. UtU = I and VtV = I.
The matrix X contains the original data of zeroes (dissents) and ones (votes with the majority), each
case in a row and each justice in a column. This original data is decomposed into two orthogonal
matrixes and a diagonal matrix. The vectors in the square matrix V represent the estimates of the
ideal point of each justice in nine new dimensions, such that the estimates for the first dimension
represents the best fit to the original data with only one dimension; the estimates for the second
dimension are the best fit adding a second dimension but taking the estimates for the first dimension
as given, and the estimates for the kth dimension are the best fit in k dimensions taking the previous
k − 1 dimensions as given. Here, “best fit” means the approximation that minimizes the sum of
the squared error between the approximation and the original data. The “single values” along the
diagonal of D are all positive and represent the weights of each of the dimensions. See Eckart and
Young [20] for the original mathematical idea.
The Single Value Decomposition generates nine new coordinates capturing the most frequent
alignments of voting in the Court, and gives the location of each justice in all nine dimensions, so
that taking only the first one or two dimensions gives the best approximation of the location of the
justices in this reduced subspace.
The Eigen Decomposition and the Optimal Classification method require some previous steps.
First, I calculate the disagreement matrix, which is a 9 by 9matrix that shows for each pair of justices,
the proportion of cases in which they do not vote together. Second, I convert the disagreement score
matrix into a matrix of squared distances, just by squaring each cell. Third, I double center the
squared distances matrix by subtracting from each cell the row mean and the column mean, adding
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the matrix mean, and dividing by -2. Double centering the squared distances matrix removes the
squared terms and produces a cross-product matrix of the legislator coordinates. For details of
these steps, see Poole [45]. The Eigen Decomposition of the cross-products matrix produces nine
eigenvectors, which we can interpret as estimates of the location of the justices in nine dimensions,
and nine corresponding eigenvalues, which assign weights to each of the dimensions. Mathematically,
the Eigen Decomposition of a square matrix X9∗9 is
X9∗9 = U9∗9 D9∗9 U
−1
9∗9,
where the elements of the diagonal are the eigenvalues, and the vectors of U the eigenvectors.
The Optimal Classification method in one dimension applied to the Supreme Court data ranks
justices from one to nine, and ranks each case in between a pair of justices, predicting that all
justices to one side will vote one way, and all justices on the other side will vote the other way. For
instance, if a case is ranked between 2 and 3, the OC method predicts that justices 1 and 2 vote in
the minority and the other seven justices in the majority. If in the real data justice 3 also votes with
1 and 2, then that is one classification error, and the OC method aims to minimize the number of
these errors.
The algorithm used in the Optimal Classification method is as follows. Starting with the rank
ordering of the justices given by the first vector of the Eigen Decomposition of the double-centered
squared-distances matrix, assign a rank to every case in such a way that the ranks minimize the total
number of errors. Then, given the rank of every case, assign a new rank to the justices to minimize
the number of errors given the ranking of cases. The algorithm proceeds iteratively reranking cases
given the ranking of justices and then reranking justices given the ranking of cases until it converges
to a solution that jointly gives a rank of both justices and cases that minimizes the number of
classification errors. In two dimensions, instead of rank orderings, the OC method assigns a position
in the space for each justice -or, more precisely, an area where the justice is located- and for each
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case it gives a cutting line partitioning the space into the area where it predicts that justices vote
with the majority and the area where it predicts that justices vote with the minority. Poole [45]
provides a careful explanation of this method.
To my best knowledge, the most complete analysis of the location of the ideal policies of recent
Supreme Court justices is the Supreme Court Ideal Point Research conducted by Martin and Quinn
[40] and [25], who use a probabilistic voting model and Bayesian inference to estimate the ideal
policies of the justices in a unidimensional space. A particularly useful feature of their project
is that they study the dynamics of the Court, and they update they results year by year at the
homesite of the project at adw.wustl.edu/supct.php. I take the average of the estimates they report
for the years 1995−2004. Estimates by Singular Value Decomposition and the Optimal Classification
method range from minus one (most liberal) to plus one (most conservative). Martin and Quinn’s
estimates could take any value in the real line, but since the scaling of their estimates is arbitrary,
I rescale their estimates dividing by five to ease the comparison across rows in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Estimates of the location of ideal policies
1.Ste 2.Gin Sou Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh Sca Tho
SVD −0.425 −0.382 −0.351 −0.335 0.089 0.154 0.294 0.398 0.459
Eigen D −0.418 −0.296 −0.250 −0.253 0.161 0.212 0.348 0.455 0.459
OCM 1D 1st 2nd 4th 3rd 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
OCM 2D −0.736 −0.583 −0.506 −0.498 0.169 0.274 0.489 0.704 0.661
M&Q −0.590 −0.302 −0.248 −0.221 0.099 0.146 0.289 0.598 0.678
As shown in the table, the different methods produce similar estimates that mostly corroborate
the initial ordering of the justices according to the proportion of liberal votes cast, as coded by
Spaeth [58].
The ordering according to Martin and Quinn and according to the Single Value Decomposition
(SVD) coincides exactly with the ordering according to the proportion of liberal votes. It is important
to note that the estimates from the SVD in the table correspond to the second dimension of the SVD.
The first dimension is an “agreement dimension” in which all justices get a very similar value; this
dimension captures the insight that justices tend to vote together very frequently, and it is only the
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second vector that provides the relevant information of the location of the justices in the dimension
of interest. I report the estimates for the first dimension and the weight for all nine dimensions in the
appendix. Sirovich [56] used the same method to study the voting patterns of the Court from 1995
to 2002, and his estimates are similar to mine as was to be expected, with two differences. First, he
fails to omit the unanimous decisions. As a consequence, the first dimension in his analysis is more
accurately an agreement dimension in which all justices get an approximately equal estimate, and
this (uninteresting) “agreement dimension” carries more weight than in my analysis. Second, in my
data Justice Souter appears to be more liberal. This reflects the fact that Justice Souter gradually
drifted during his tenure in the Court, a fact also recorded by Martin and Quinn.
The estimates according to the first eigenvector of the Eigen Decomposition of the cross-product
of justices’ coordinates switch the positions of Souter and Breyer by a very slim margin, and otherwise
coincide with the proportion of liberal votes or the estimates by SVD.
The Optimal Classification method with one dimension again switches the ordering of Souter and
Breyer, but with two dimensions, Optimal Classification returns Souter back to the left of Breyer
and it alters the ordering of Scalia and Thomas.
All estimates agree in the following partial order ≺:
Ste ≺ Gin ≺ Sou
Bre
≺ O0Co ≺ Ken ≺ Reh ≺ Sca
Tho
.
The only open questions are the relative ordering of Breyer and Souter, and the relative ordering
of Scalia and Thomas. Rather than making a questionable assumption about these two pairs of
justices, I consider all four lineal orders consistent with the partial order ≺ and I evaluate all the
voting bloc structures that are connected according to one of these four lineal orders. Formally, a
partial order is a binary relation that is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. A lineal order adds
the property of being total, that is, it orders every pair of elements. For instance, the coalition
C = {Ste,Gin, Sou} is connected given the partial order ≺ because it is connected given the linear
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order that ranks Souter third and Breyer fourth and the coalition C 0 = {Ste,Gin,Bre} is also
connected given ≺ because it is connected given the linear order that ranks Breyer third and Souter
fourth. But if a coalition contains both Gin and O0Co, then it must contain both Bre and Sou to
be connected given ≺.
4.4.3 Endogenous Voting Blocs in the US Supreme Court
“People ask me whether I was sorry that I was in the minority in Bush vs Gore. ‘Of
course I was sorry!’ I’m always sorry when I don’t have a majority.” Justice Stephen
Breyer of the US Supreme Court.9
To calculate the effect of voting blocs upon the utility of the justices, it is necessary to make an
assumption about the utility function of the justices.
I assume that justices are outcome oriented: Each individual justice has policy preferences over
the outcome of each decision, and, as quoted from Justice Breyer, wants the Court to reach a decision
according to the preference of the justice. This assumption is consistent with the attitudinal model of
the Court by Segal and Spaeth [55], who consider competing models of the functioning of the Court
and conclude that a model of sincere voting by policy-oriented justices best explains the decisions of
the Court. In earlier work, Rohde [52], studied the formation of coalitions in the writing of opinions
in the Warren Court (1953−1968) and assumed that the optimization problem of the justices is to
have the policy output of the Court approximate as closely as possible his own preference. If Segal
and Spaeth [55] are correct and justices vote sincerely, then each justice wanted the decision of the
Court to coincide exactly with the vote that the justice cast and every dissent is a defeat. Even
if justices do not always vote sincerely, it would be difficult to discern the true preferences of the
justices beyond their revealed preferences, so I assign utilities according to the actual votes cast by
the justices.
9From “Breyer’s Big Idea,” by Jeffrey Toobin, in The New Yorker, October 31st, 2005, pages 36−43.
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The Court makes a binary decision on the merits of each case: It either affirms the ruling from
a lower court, or it reverses it; it sides with the plaintiff, or with the defendant; with the liberal
position, or the conservative one. For instance, in a case in which a lower court took a conservative
view and sided with the plaintiff, the outcome of the decision is either affirm-plaintiff-conservative
or reverse-defendant-liberal. I assume that each justice prefers one of these two outcomes over the
other, and each justice gets a higher utility if his preferred outcome is the one selected by the Court
by majority voting. Then I assume that for the aggregate of all 419 cases from 1995 to 2004 the goal
of each justice was to maximize the number of cases in which the decision of the Court coincides
with the preference of the justices, as revealed by the vote of the justice. Table 4.2 then provides the
ultimate satisfaction of each justice with the series of decisions of the Court: 419 minus the number
of dissents is my measure of the utility or satisfaction of each justice with the output of the Court
from 1995 to 2004. This measure of utility implicitly assumes that justices only care about how
often they obtain a majority, or in other words, that they do not care more about some decisions
over others. While this assumption is admittedly unrealistic, it is a simplifying step to circumvent
the need to assign weights for each case and justice.
I calculate how the outcomes would have changed if justices had formed voting blocs, and how
the satisfaction of each justice would have changed accordingly. For a given voting bloc structure in
the Court, I assume that each bloc holds a private internal vote before the division of the Court, and
in these internal votes I assume that each justice votes according to how the justice voted in reality
in that case. Then I aggregate the votes inside each bloc according to the majority rule of the bloc,
and I calculate the new outcome in the division of the Court, once I take into account that some
justices now cast a vote against their preference along the lines dictated by the majority of their bloc.
Finally, I calculate how many decisions change with the voting bloc structure under consideration
relative to the original data, and for each justice I calculate the net balance of decisions that change
to favor her preferences minus the number of decisions that change against her preference.
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Example 7 Suppose Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer form a voting bloc. Then the net change in the
number of decisions in which each justice is satisfied with the outcome is as follows:
Bloc 1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
{234} 12 12 4 4 -2 -14 -10 -12 -14
Example 7 shows that had Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer committed to always vote together
rolling internal dissent among the three, each of them would have achieved their preferred outcome
more often even if sometimes they had to vote against their preference. Comparing these numbers
to those in Table 4.2, Ginsburg would reduce the number of cases that end up against her preference
by almost 8%. Souter and Breyer by about 3%.
If justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer had formed a voting bloc, 20 decisions out of 419 would
have been reversed, Atwater vs City of Lago Vista (2001) among them. In a 5−4 decision, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense,
such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. Justices Souter, Kennedy, Rehn-
quist, Scalia and Thomas voted with the majority. Justice O’Connor, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg
and Breyer, wrote a dissent arguing that a seatbelt violation is not a reasonable ground for arrest,
and thus the arrest is in violation of the Fourth Amendment that prohibits unreasonable seizure.
With the exception of Souters, there is a clean division of the Court between more liberal justices fa-
voring broader Civil Rights, and more conservative justices favoring Law Enforcement. Had Souters
voted with Ginsburg and Breyer, the Court would have found the arrest to be unconstitutional.
More recently, in two famous cases decided on June 27, 2005, the Court ruled that the display
of the Ten Commandments in two courthouses in Kentucky is in violation of the First Amendment
Establishment Clause for the Separation of Church and State, but it also ruled that a display of the
Ten Commandments in the Texas State Capitol is not unconstitutional. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
Souter and O’Connor voted against the displays both in the Kentucky and Texas cases, while justices
Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas voted in favor of the displays in both cases. Justice Breyer
voted against the Kentucky displays in Mc Creary County vs ACLU, giving the liberals a 5−4
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majority, but he voted in favor of the Texas display in Van Orden vs Perry, giving the conservatives
a 5−4 majority. Had Breyer voted with Souter and Ginsburg in both cases, the Texas display would
have been ruled unconstitutional, just as the Kentucky ones.
Note that when a justice in a voting bloc has to vote against his true preference in the division
of the Court, he would only be satisfied with the outcome if his vote -along with the whole bloc
he belongs to- ends up in the minority of the Court. Hence Example 7 does not measure the extra
number of times that Ginsburg, Souter or Breyer are in the majority, but the extra number of times
that they are satisfied with the outcome. In so far as justices are ideologically motivated, it is
reasonable to say that for a justice to win means that the preferred outcome of this justice prevails,
regardless of whether the justice voted for or against her favored outcome in the division of the
Court.
Epstein and Knight [24] argue that justices make strategic choices deviating from their preference
for the sake of achieving the policy outcomes they desire so that the Law that emanates from the
Supreme Court rulings is “the long term product of short-term strategic decision-making.” I argue
that if justices are strategic in their actions, then they must be tempted to devise not just short-
sighted strategies for one case, but rather long-term strategic plans such as forming a voting bloc.
For instance, if Justice Breyer had formed a voting bloc with Ginsburg and Souter and no other
justice had reacted to that bloc, Justice Breyer would have lost fewer cases, exactly four less.
Assume the counterfactual that Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer form a voting bloc. This bloc is
Individual-Exit stable because all three members benefit from joining so none would want to deviate
and leave disbanding the bloc. However, the voting bloc structure in which Ginsburg, Souter and
Breyer form the only voting bloc is neither Nash stable, nor Split stable, because other justices have
incentives to react to this bloc. Table 4.4 displays the net payoffs to each justice relative to the
benchmark with no voting blocs if Stevens joins the bloc (first row), and if the Rehnquist, Scalia
and Thomas form another voting bloc (second row). A summary comparison between Table 4.4 and
the table in Example 7 reveals that Stevens would benefit if he joined the liberal bloc, increasing
133
his net utility from +12 to +13. Hence the voting bloc Gin − Sou − Bre is not Nash stable. The
second row reveals that Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas would reduce their loses from the formation
of the Gin− Sou−Bre bloc if they formed their own bloc.
Table 4.4: Net change in satisfaction
Blocs 1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
{1234} 13 11 9 5 1 −15 −17 −13 −13
{234},{789} 5 −5 −7 −3 9 −1 −7 −3 −9
{123},{789} −1 −5 −5 3 9 −3 −7 −1 −11
{789} −5 −9 −13 −9 1 1 1 13 3
{123} 8 6 2 8 0 −10 −12 −6 −12
A single bloc with the four liberal justices is Nash stable, but it is not Split stable, because
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas have an incentive to form their own bloc to counterbalance the four
liberals just as much as they do against a bloc of three liberals.
On the other hand, the voting bloc structure with both a liberal bloc formed by Ginsburg, Souter,
Breyer and a conservative bloc formed by Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas is Nash stable and Split stable.
With the partial ordering ≺ discussed above, the following result summarizes my findings on the
stability of hypothetical voting blocs in a nine agent assembly whose members faced an agenda and
preference profile identical to those of the US Supreme Court justices between 1995−2004.
Result 40 Any voting bloc structure in which three of the four most liberal justices (Stevens, Gins-
burg, Souter, Breyer) form a voting bloc and Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form a second voting
bloc is Nash and Split stable, and there exists no other Split stable connected voting bloc structure.
I show the payoffs -net changes in the number of cases that each justice wins- given that
{Ste,Gin, Sou} form a voting bloc, and the three most conservative justices form another vot-
ing bloc in row three of Table 4.4. For the sake of comparison, in rows four and five I show the
payoffs if one member of the liberal bloc deviates and the bloc dissolves, leaving {Reh, Sca, Tho} as
the unique bloc, and the payoffs if the conservative bloc dissolves and {Ste,Gin, Sou} remain as a
bloc. It is clear that no justice wants to abandon the bloc he belongs to.
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In the appendix I provide a table with the payoffs for each justice for a sample of voting bloc
structures with a single bloc and for the two Split Stable voting bloc structures not already listed
in Table 4.4. For all other connected voting bloc structures, I provide the payoffs for each justice
and a deviation (if any exists) that makes such structure not Nash stable or not Split stable in an
Excel file that also contains the original data and formulas to replicate the calculations. This file is
available at www.hss.caltech.edu/~jon, or directly from the author.
According to Result 40, the stable voting bloc partitions are such that two opposing blocs -one
at each side of the ideological spectrum- counterbalance each other, and the swing moderate agents,
in this case O’Connor and Kennedy remain unaffiliated, independent. Stable voting bloc partitions
merely reinforce the polarization of the Court into a liberal group and a conservative group of
justices, and do not produce a major realignment of votes. As a curiosity, the most famous decision
of this court, the 5−4 division in Bush vs Gore (2000) which stopped the recount of the Florida
votes and gave Bush the presidency would not have been reversed, since it was already the case
that the four liberals voted together in the minority, and the two moderate conservatives and three
conservatives voted together in the majority. The formation of a stable connected voting bloc would
have made this particular 5−4 conservative-liberal division more frequent, but this was already the
most frequent split of the Court.
Consider the stable voting bloc structure in which Stevens, Ginsburg and Souter form a voting
bloc, and Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form another voting bloc. In terms of the location of each
of the blocs in an ideological space, each of the blocs converges near the location of its median
member. Indeed, the liberal bloc casts 313 liberal votes where Ginsburg alone casts 308 (Stevens
and Souter cast 344 and 307, see Table 4.2) and its position in space according to SVD is -0.318,
indistinguishable from Ginsburg’s in the dimension of interest, while the conservative bloc casts 72
liberal votes for 84 of Scalia (98 and 71 by Rehnquist and Thomas) and locates by SVD at 0.392,
where Scalia alone is at 0.398.
Compare Result 40 with the stylized assembly with 9 agents who have symmetric and independent
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types. Note that the stable voting bloc structures in Result 40 are a subset of those in the idealized
assembly. The theory predicted that stable voting bloc structures would consist of two blocs of
size three, one with three of the four most liberal members, the other with three of the four most
conservative members. The prediction with the empirical data fits within this set of stable voting
bloc structures, and the only difference is that the conservative bloc has to be {789} and cannot
be {678} instead. The cause of this difference is that the modelled assembly assumed that agents 3
and 4 and agents 6 and 7 are identical. In the empirical application, Souter and Breyer are indeed
similar enough in their voting behavior, but Kennedy is markedly different from Rehnquist, and in
particular Kennedy is not conservative enough to benefit from forming a bloc with Rehnquist and
Scalia.
The following two comments suggest that Result 40 should be interpreted with caution.
First, the Split stable voting bloc structures are in accordance to those predicted by the more
abstract model and reinforce the intuition that the assembly is likely to split into two opposing
voting blocs that counterbalance each other, one at each side of the ideological spectrum and leaving
a number of unaffiliated moderate independents. However, this result is based on the particular
stability concept that I have chosen. The question of which equilibrium refinement or which stability
concept is appropriate is still open in the literature.
Second, this section has shown what voting bloc structures would be stable in an assembly with
nine rational agents who are strategic and can coordinate their votes without constraints, and whose
preferences are consistent with those revealed by the pattern of votes in the US Supreme Court for
1995−2004. It has not provided, nor did it intend to provide, a theory of voting in the Court. I
leave to Supreme Court scholars these tasks. Restraints of a legal, normative or ethical nature may
deter Supreme Court justices from committing to vote as a bloc, and this section does not attempt
to explain voting in the US Supreme Court as much as it intends to illustrate how voting blocs could
affect outcomes in practice, and what voting bloc structures would be stable. The data from the US
Supreme Court serves by proxy to shed some light into the formation of voting blocs in committees,
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councils, small assemblies, and all sorts of political caucuses, in which the incentives to form the
blocs will be salient and the restraints that Supreme Court justices face are probably absent -and,
crucially, the data on the preferences of its members is also absent.
I have proved that members of a committee or assembly with size and preferences identical to
those of the US Supreme Court face strategic incentives to coalesce into voting blocs. An explanation
of whether or not the US Supreme Court justices act upon these strategic incentives is beyond the
scope of this chapter.
4.5 Conclusion and Extensions
Members of a democratic assembly -legislature, council, committee- can affect the policy outcome
by forming voting blocs. A voting bloc coordinates the voting behavior of its members according to
an internal voting rule independent of the rule of the assembly, and this coordination of votes affects
the outcome in the division of the assembly.
I have shown that stable voting bloc structures exist for various concepts of stability in a model
in which agents with heterogeneous preferences coalesce into voting blocs endogenously.
In a model with two parties that can each form a voting bloc I have shown the necessary and
sufficient condition for every member in a party to have an incentive to join the bloc, and how these
incentives change with variations on the type of the agents, the voting rule chosen by the parties,
the sizes of the parties and the polarization of the assembly.
I have illustrated how voting blocs affect voting outcomes using data from the US Supreme Court
decisions between 1995 and 2004.
The theory in this thesis has multiple natural extensions: Comparing the results under other
stability concepts, such as Coalition-Proofness or Equilibrium Binding Agreements; endogenizing
the choice of the internal voting rule for each bloc and allowing for a richer class of rules, not just
anonymous and majoritarian rules; studying the enforceability of the internal rules in a repeated
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game if binding commitments are not feasible; introducing intensity of preferences so that agents
who like the proposal do so to varying degrees; considering unequally weighted individuals or even
pyramidal structures, in which individual agents coalesce into factions, factions coalesce into parties
(voting blocs of second order), parties into alliances (voting blocs of third order) and so on. Empirical
applications range from revisiting the historical records of the early United States Congress to try
to determine the incentives to coordinate votes along state lines or along parties, to salient current
developments such as the theoretical advantages to each of the 27 European Union countries from
pooling their votes under a common foreign EU policy. These questions constitute an agenda for
further research.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Proof of Lemma 25
To prove this lemma I use Claim 23 from the Appendix to chapter 3, and another intermediate result,
which shows that if M is symmetric and L leans left and forms a voting bloc, then the distribution
of the number of votes cast by L∪M in the division of the assembly is such that given any absolute
difference between the number of votes L∪M casts for and against the proposal, the net difference
is negative with probability at least a half.
Claim 41 Let N = L ∪ M ∪ R. Suppose gM (NM−12 − k) = gM (NM+12 + k), gL(NL−12 − k) ≤
gL(NL+12 + k) for all non-negative k and L forms a voting bloc (L, rL). Then:
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k
#
≥ P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k
#
for any positive k.
Proof. Lets first define L to be active given a preference profile s if it rolls its internal minority
given the rule rL, so that si 6= vi for some i ∈ L and let us define L to be inactive otherwise. Then
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the probability that L ∪M casts x votes in favor of the policy proposal is
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi = x|L active
#
P [L active] + P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi = x|L inactive
#
P [L inactive].
I first want to show that
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k|L active
#
≥ P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k|L active
#
. (4.1)
Noting that if L is active then
P
i∈L
vi ∈ {0, NL}, that
P
i∈M
vi =
P
i∈M
si for all preference profiles, and
that
P
"X
i∈M
si =
NM − 1
2
− k
#
= P
"X
i∈M
si =
NM + 1
2
+ k
#
for any k, rewrite inequality 4.1 as:
P [
X
i∈L
vi = NL|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM −NL
2
− k]
+P [
X
i∈L
vi = 0|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM +NL
2
− k] ≥
≥ P [
X
i∈L
vi = NL|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM +NL
2
− k]
+P [
X
i∈L
vi = 0|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM −NL
2
− k].
Regrouping terms:
Ã
P [
X
i∈L
vi = NL|L active]− P [
X
i∈L
vi = 0|L active]
!
Ã
P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM −NL
2
− k]− P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM +NL
2
− k]
!
≥ 0.
Since L leans left, the first term is weakly positive; since the distribution of the number of agents
inM who favor the policy proposal is symmetric (and unimodal), the second term is negative. Thus
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the expression is weakly negative, as desired.
Second, I want to show that
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k|L inactive
#
≥ P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k|L inactive
#
. (4.2)
Note that L is inactive if and only if (1− rL)NL <
P
i∈L
si < rLNL.
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k|L ina.
#
− P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k|L ina.
#
=
rLNL−NL+32X
h=0
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
P [
P
i∈L
si = NL+12 + h|L ina.]
µ
P [
P
i∈M
si = NM−12 + k − h]− P [
P
i∈M
si = NM−12 − k − h]
¶
+
P [
P
i∈L
si = NL−12 − h|L ina.]
µ
P [
P
i∈M
si = NM+12 + k + h]− P [
P
i∈M
si = NM+12 − k + h]
¶
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
=
rLNL−NL+32X
h=0
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
µ
P [
P
i∈L
si = NL+12 + h|L inactive]− P [
P
i∈L
si = NL−12 − h|L inactive]
¶
µ
P [
P
i∈M
si = NM−12 + k − h]− P [
P
i∈M
si = NM−12 − k − h]
¶
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
For any h and k, the first parenthesis is negative because L leans left, and the second one is positive
because the distribution of the number of agents in M who favor the policy proposal is unimodal
and symmetric around NM/2. Thus the whole expression is negative and inequality (4.2) holds as
desired.
I now prove lemma 25.
Proof. For any h ∈ R, let Ah
= P [
X
i∈R−h
si = rRNR − 1][P
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]]
−P [
X
i∈R−h
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
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and similarly let Bh =
P [
X
i∈R−h
si = (1− rR)NR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
−P [
X
i∈R−h
si ≥ rRNR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
].
Then h prefers to participate in the voting bloc (R, rR) if and only if thAh+(1− th)Bh > 0. Suppose
tlAl + (1− tl)Bl > 0. We want to show that
thAh + (1− th)Bh − tlAl − (1− tl)Bl ≥ 0,
which implies thAh + (1− th)Bh > 0.
Let
P1 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]],
P2 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
]],
P3 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
], and P4 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
].
Then, thAh + (1− th)Bh is equal to:
th
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 2] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 1]
!
P1
−
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 2] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]
!
P3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.3)
+ (1− th)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR − 1] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR]
!
P2
−
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR − 1] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR]
!
P4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
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and tlAl + (1− tl)Bl is equal to
tl
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 2] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 1]
!
P1
−
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 2] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]
!
P3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.4)
+ (1− tl)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR − 1] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR]
!
P2
−
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR − 1] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR]
!
P4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Therefore thAh + (1− th)Bh − tlAl − (1− tl)Bl is equal to
(th − tl)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 1]P1 − P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR − 1]P2
+P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR − 1]P4 − P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]P3
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (4.5)
Since M is symmetric and L leans left, it follows by Claim 41 that P1 ≥ P2 and P3 ≤ P4, and since
R−h leans right, by Claim 23 R−lh leans right as well. Then, the expression (4.5) above is weakly
positive.
4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 26
Proof. By lemma 25, if l prefers to participate in the voting bloc, every member of R does.
Therefore, (R, rR) is Individual-Exit stable if and only if l wants to participate in the bloc. Using
the notation from lemma 25, l wants to participate in the bloc if and only if tlAl + (1− tl)Bl ≥ 0.
Suppose Al ≥ Bl, then the expression is increasing in tl and the cutoff that makes the agent
indifferent is at tInR(rR, rL,t−l) = −BlAl−Bl . Hence, it suffices to show that Al ≥ Bl.
Al = P [
X
i∈R−l
si = rRNR − 1]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]]
−P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
],
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Bh = P [
X
i∈R−l
si = (1− rR)NR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
−P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≥ rRNR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
].
Since R−l leans right, for any rR ≥ NR+12NR ,
P [
X
i∈R−l
si = rRNR − 1] ≥ P [
X
i∈R−l
si = (1− rR)NR]
and
P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≥ rRNR] ≥ P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1].
Since M is symmetric and L leans left,
P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]]
≥ P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
and
P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
] ≤ P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
].
Therefore, Al ≥ Bl.
4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 28
This proof and the proof of proposition 31 use the result in proposition 32 below. While it is in
principle inadvisable to use latter results in proofs that appear earlier in the text, proposition 32
shows that voting blocs generate a gain in utility in a more general model with an endogenous
number of voting blocs. To prove the result first for two blocs to use it here and then prove it
again in greater generality would be redundant. I also use the notion of a “voting bloc structure”
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from Definition 13. In short, a voting bloc structure (π, r) is a pair composed of a partition of the
assembly π, and a vector r that contains one rule for each voting bloc resulting from the partition
π.
Proof. Let (π, r) be a voting bloc structure in which R does not form a voting bloc. Let (π0, r0) be
another voting bloc structure in which R forms a voting bloc with rR = NR−1NR and all else remains
equal. From proposition 32,
P
i∈R
ui(π0, r0) ≥
P
i∈R
ui(π, r). Let (π00, r00) be a third voting bloc structure
in which i deviates and leaves the bloc (R, rR) to become an independent, so the bloc shrinks to
(R\i, rR). Note that the new size of the bloc is NR − 1. Hence the number necessary to command
a sufficient majority to roll the minority inside the bloc is
rR(NR − 1) = NR − 1−
NR − 1
NR
> NR − 2.
The new bloc only votes together if the internal majority is of size NR − 1. In other words, rR is
effectively unanimity once i leaves the bloc. Under this rule R\i behaves exactly as if it did not
form a bloc and all agents were independent. Thus,
X
i∈R
ui(π
00, r00) =
X
i∈R
ui(π, r) ≤
X
i∈R
ui(π
0, r0).
Since all agents in R are identical, it follows that for all i ∈ R,
ui(π00, r00) ≤ ui(π0, r0).
Therefore, no agent wants to leave R and R is Individual-Exit stable.
4.6.4 Proof of Proposition 29
Proof. From proposition 28, if rR = NR−1NR and R is homogeneous, then (R, rR) is Individual-Exit
stable. Hence it suffices to show that there exist a homogeneous type profile for R such that with
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simple majority the bloc is not stable. Let P [
P
i∈M∪L
vi = N+12 − NR] = λ. By the assumption on
sizes and types of M and L, λ > 0. Let the common type of agents in R be 1−ε. Let E be the event
that i ∈ R rejects the proposal, a majority of R favors the proposal, and
P
i∈M∪L
vi = N+12 −NR. In
this event, i is better off if she is not part of the bloc. Note that
lim
ε→0
1
ε
P [E] = λ.
Agent i is better off inside the bloc only if the rest of the bloc is tied. But
lim
ε→0
1
ε
P [
X
j∈R
sj =
NR − 1
2
] = 0.
Therefore, for a sufficiently low ε the probability that i is better off outside the bloc outweighs the
probability that i is better off inside the bloc, and i prefers to leave the bloc.
4.6.5 Proof of Proposition 30
Proof. Let xh be the highest coordinate of the vector x and let ε = αxh be the highest type in L.
L is stable if εAh + (1− ε)Bh > 0.
Ah
= P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si = rLNL − 1
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
− rLNL
¸#
−P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si ≤ (1− rL)NL − 1
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm =
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
#
.
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Bh
= P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si = (1− rL)NL
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
+ rLNL,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
¸#
−P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si ≥ rLNL
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm =
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
#
.
Let
P5 = P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
− rLNL
¸#
,
P7 = P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
+ rLNL,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
¸#
,
P6 = P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm =
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
#
and γ =
(NL − 1)!
(rLNL − 1)!(NL − rLNL)!
.
Then,
εAh + (1− ε)Bh < εγεrLNL−1P5 − ε(1− ε)NL−1P6 + (1− ε)γε(1−rL)NLP7.
Divide the right-hand side by ε and take the limit as ε goes to zero.
lim
ε→0
γεrLNL−1P5 − (1− ε)NL−1P6 + (1− ε)γε(1−rL)NL−1P7 = −P6 < 0.
Hence, if ε is low enough, εAh + (1− ε)Bh < 0 and the voting bloc is not Individual-Exit stable.
4.6.6 Proof of Proposition 31
Proof. Let the vector of types be such that ti = tj for all i, j ∈ L. Then, by proposition 32,
every i ∈ L weakly benefits from the formation of the voting bloc (L, rL) and hence it is a weakly
undominated strategy for every i ∈ L to commit to participate in the bloc. By proposition 30, if the
common type of L is low enough, (L, rL) is not Individual-Exit stable.
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4.6.7 Proof of Proposition 32
Proposition 32 and its proof follow very closely proposition 12 in chapter 3, extending the result
from one to several voting blocs.
Proof. Let (π, r) be the initial voting bloc structure and (π0, r0) the new voting bloc structure in
which r0 = {rj}Jj=0 ∪ r0J+1 and π0 = {C0j}J+1j=0 is a finer partition of π such that C0J+1 ∪C 00 = C0 and
C 0j = Cj for all j = {1, ..., J}. For notational simplicity, let C0J+1be just C 0 and r0J+1simply r0C .
Given s, suppose
P
i∈C0
si ≤ (1 − r0C)NC0 . Then
P
i∈C0
vi(π0, r0, s) ≤
P
i∈C
vi(π, r, s) and since the
votes of other agents are unaffected by the formation or not of a bloc (C0, r0C), it follows thatP
i∈N
vi(π0, r0, s) ≤
P
i∈N
vi(π, r, s). Hence, either the outcome is the same under (π, r) and (π0, r0), or if
the outcome changes, it must be that the policy proposal passes under (π, r) but fails under (π0, r0)
and then every agent who is against the proposal benefits from the formation of the bloc (C0, r0C)
and every agent who likes the policy proposal is hurt. If the outcome changes, the aggregate gain
in utility for the coalition C0 is equal to NC0 − 2
P
i∈C0
si ≥ (2r0C − 1)NC0 ≥ 1.
Suppose instead that (1 − r0C)NC0 <
P
i∈C0
si < r0CNC0 . Then the formation of the voting bloc
(C0, r0C) does not affect the voting behavior, the policy outcome or the utility of any agent.
Finally, suppose that
P
i∈C0
si ≥ r0CNC0 . Then, by a symmetric logic to the one in the first case, the
outcome can only change from rejecting to accepting the policy proposal, which benefits a majority
of members of the new bloc.
Hence, either the bloc has no effect, or if it has an effect, it generates a strictly positive surplus
of utility for its members.
Simple majority maximizes this surplus because with simple majority the bloc always rolls its
internal minorities, maximizing the number of preference profiles s for which it alters the outcome
in favor of the majority of the voting bloc.
147
4.6.8 Proof of Proposition 33
Proof. If ∃ i ∈ N\C0J+1 s.t. vi(π0, r0, s) = 0, then it is irrelevant whether the coalition C 0J+1 forms
a voting bloc as in the structure (π0, r0), or it does not as in (π, r). In either case the outcome is a
rejection of the policy proposal. On the other hand, if vi(π0, r0, s) = 1 for every i ∈ N\C0J+1, then if
C 0J+1 does not form a voting bloc and a single member of the coalition votes against the proposal,
the proposal fails; whereas, if C 0J+1 forms a voting bloc the proposal only fails if strictly more than
(1 − r0J+1)NJ+1 members of C0J+1 are against it. By assumption, r0J+1 < 1 and r0J+1NJ+1 is an
integer, so r0J+1 ≤
NJ+1−1
NJ+1
and (1− r0J+1)NJ+1 ≥ 1. Since Ω has full support, there is some positive
probability that exactly one member of the bloc opposes the policy proposal and then formation of
the bloc (C0J+1, r
0
J+1) alters the outcome, from a rejection of a proposal favored by every i ∈ C00,
to an acceptance. Therefore, i ∈ C 00 benefits from the formation of the bloc C 0J+1. Social welfare
increases because the only case in which the formation of a bloc by C 0J+1 affects the outcome is if a
sufficient majority of every bloc including (C 0J+1, r
0
J+1) and every singleton, but not every member
of C 0J+1 favor the policy proposal. In this case the policy proposal fails if C
0
J+1 does not form a
bloc, and passes if it forms a bloc; a majority of the assembly (indeed, a sum of majorities in every
bloc) prefers the outcome that occurs if C 0J+1 forms a bloc.
4.6.9 Proof of Proposition 34
Proof. First I show that the voting bloc structures described in the proposition are relevant, then
that they are Individual-Exit stable, and finally that at least one of them exists.
Suppose
P
i∈C
si =
P
i∈N
si = rCNC < rNN so the policy proposal fails if vi = si for all i ∈ N .
However, if the voting bloc (C, rC) forms, the proposal wins the internal voting of the bloc,
P
i∈C
vi =P
i∈N
vi = NC ≥ rNN and the proposal passes in the division of the assembly. Since Ω(s) has full
support,
P
i∈C
si =
P
i∈N
si = rCNC occurs with positive probability and the bloc is relevant.
Since by assumption NC − 1 ≥ rNN, the bloc remains a dictator after losing one member.
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Suppose i ∈ C and vi = si, agent i is at least equally well off staying in the bloc since i is already
voting her preference and by leaving she can never increase the number of other agents who vote
for her preference in the division of the assembly. Suppose i ∈ C and vi 6= si. Then it must be that
i lost in the internal vote of the bloc, and vj 6= si for all j ∈ C. If i leaves the bloc, it would still
be that a sufficient majority of members of C oppose i0s preference, and vj 6= si for all j ∈ C\i.
Since the bloc without i remains a dictator, i still loses in the division of the assembly after her
defection from the bloc. Therefore, agent i can never be better off leaving the bloc and the bloc is
Individual-Exit stable.
Finally, I want to show that for any rN ≤ N−1N and any N ≥ 7 there exists an rC and NC such
that rC > 12 , rCNC is an integer, NC ≥ rNN + 1 and rCNC < rNN so that the second statement
in the proposition applies. This is straightforward: If rN = N+12N , let NC = N − 2 and rC =
N−1
2(N−2) ,
and if rN > N+12N , let rC =
N+1
2N and NC = N.
4.6.10 Proof of Proposition 35
Proof. First consider the with rN ∈ (N+12N ,
N−1
N ]. Then, by proposition 34, any voting bloc structure
with a unique voting bloc (C, rC) such that C = N and rC < rN is relevant and Individual-Exit
stable. Since there are no agents outside the bloc, there is no possible deviation by entering the bloc
and the voting bloc structure is also Individually stable.
Suppose instead that rN = N+12N . Let (π, r) be any voting bloc structure with a unique voting
bloc (C, rC) such that NC = N − 2 and rC = NC+12NC so that rCNC =
NC+1
2 =
N−1
2 . By proposition
34, the voting bloc structure is relevant and Individual-Exit stable, so the only deviations that need
to be ruled out are those by a non-member who enters the bloc. Suppose a non-member l deviates
and enters the bloc, so that the new bloc is now (C ∪ l, rC). The deviation affects the outcome in
the division of the assembly only if
P
i∈C∪l
si = N−12 . In this case, the result in the new bloc is a tie.
Without l, the result was an internal majority of 1 against the preference of l and the whole bloc
casting all its votes against the preference of l in the division of the assembly. If by entering the
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bloc and bringing a tie inside the bloc l reverts the outcome in the division of the assembly, then a
majority of members of C are hurt by the inclusion of l. Thus, there is a net loss of utility for the
members of C. It must then be that in expectation at least one of them is ex ante worse off by the
entry of agent l, so member l cannot deviate by entering. Consider the incentives of any i ∈ C to
leave the bloc. For any s such that vi(π, r, s) = si member i is at least equally well off staying in
the bloc. Therefore, the bloc is Individually stable.
4.6.11 Proof of Proposition 37
Proof. The grand coalition C = N with rC ∈ [rN , 1] is irrelevant, but Nash stable. For any s such
that agent vi(N , rC , s) = si, agent i is at least equally well off remaining in the bloc. For any s
such that si = 0 but vi(N , rC , s) = 1 it must be that
P
j∈N\i
sj ≥ rCN ≥ rC(N − 1) so if i leaves
the bloc, all N − 1 members vote in favor of the proposal and the proposal passes, so i is not better
off. For any s such that si = 1 but vi(N , rC , s) = 0 it must be that
P
j∈N\i
sj ≤ (1 − rC)N − 1 ≤
(1− rC)(N − 1) so if i leaves the whole bloc votes against the proposal, the proposal fails and i is
not better off. Overall, an agent can never change the outcome towards her preference by leaving
the grand coalition, so (N , rC) with rC ∈ [rN , 1] is Nash stable.
4.6.12 Proof of Proposition 38
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose ∃(C, rC) such that rC is simple majority and N+12 ≤ NC . If
NC = N, then the bloc is not relevant -a contradiction. Suppose NC < N . For any s such thatP
h∈C
sh 6= NC2 , it follows that
P
h∈C
vh ∈ {0, NC} and the policy outcome in the division of the assembly
coincides with the vote of the bloc; since the policy outcome is independent of the votes outside
the voting bloc, any i /∈ C is at least equally well off entering the voting bloc. For any s such thatP
h∈C
sh = NC2 , any i /∈ C who joins the bloc causes
P
h∈C∪i
vh = siNC and i wins in the division of the
assembly with all the votes of the bloc; if i was winning outside of the bloc, i is indifferent between
winning outside the bloc or being pivotal to win inside the bloc, and if i was losing, i is strictly
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better off entering the bloc. There is no preference profile s for which an agent i is better off staying
out of the bloc.
If the bloc is odd sized, ties cannot occur. To find a case in which i is strictly better off entering
a bloc of odd size, let s be such that
P
h∈C
sh =
P
h∈N
sh = NC+12 . Then
P
h∈C
vh =
P
h∈N
vh = NC ≥ N+12
and the proposal passes. If one of the non-members -who oppose the proposal- joins the bloc, then
the expanded bloc is tied,
P
i∈N
vi =
P
h∈C∪i
vh =
P
h∈C
sh < N+12 and the proposal does not pass
in the assembly. Therefore, regardless of whether ties can occur or not in the bloc, for any non-
member i there exist preference profiles for which i is strictly better off joining the bloc. Since Ω
has full support, every preference profile occurs with positive probability and every non-member
strictly prefers to join the bloc. Then, if C 6= N , the voting bloc structure is not Nash stable -a
contradiction.
Suppose the voting bloc structure (π, r) is such that C0 6= ∅, and ∃(C, rC) relevant such that
NC ≥ N+12 . Let (π0, r) be a new voting bloc structure such that C0 = C∪i and C 00 = C0\i and all else
is unchanged. Let s be a preference profile such that vi(π0, r, s) = si. Then ui(π0, r, s) ≥ ui(π, r, s)
since i joining the bloc can never reduce the number of votes cast by other bloc members for the
option preferred by i. Suppose instead that s is such that vi(π0, r, s) 6= si. Since the bloc is a dictator
in the assembly, then ui(π0, r, s) = 0. But note that the bloc would also vote against i if i remained
out of the bloc. Since the bloc without i is also a dictator, ui(π, r, s) = 0. So the agent is in this
case indifferent about joining the bloc. In either case, an agent is never worse off joining the bloc.
Let s be such that
P
h∈C
sh = (1− rC)NC and sk = 1 for all k /∈ C. Then
P
h∈C
vh = 0 and the proposal
fails in the division of the assembly. Since the voting bloc is relevant,
P
h∈C
sh +
P
k/∈C
sk ≥ N+12 and
the proposal would pass if the members of the voting bloc voted sincerely in the assembly. Suppose
i /∈ C enters the bloc, so that C0 = C ∪ i. Then
P
h∈C0
sh > (1− rC)NC0 and
P
h∈C
vh =
P
h∈C
sh so that
the policy proposal passes in the division of the assembly and i is better off -a contradiction.
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4.6.13 Estimates by Eigen-D, SVD and OCM-2D
The top table contains the first and second eigenvectors obtained by the Eigen Decomposition of
the double-centered matrix of squared distances of the justices, the estimates of the location of the
justices in the first and second dimension by Single Value Decomposition and the estimates of the
location in the first and second dimensions obtained by the Optimal Classification method with two
dimensions. Note that the first dimension with SVD is an “agreement dimension” where all justices
take a similar position, and it is only the second dimension that is the relevant and meaningful one,
comparable to the first dimension in the other methods. The bottom table provides the nine single
values of the Eigen Decomposition, and the weights of the nine dimensions from the SVD (to obtain
the single value of each dimension, multiply by 11.065).
Table 4.5: Estimates by Eigen-D, SVD and OCM.
Single values 1.Ste 2.Gin Sou Bre 5.O’C 6.Ken 7.Reh Sca Tho
1st-Eigenv. −0.42 −0.30 −0.250 −0.253 0.161 0.21 0.348 0.455 0.459
2nd-Eigenv. 0.339 0.026 0.198 −0.467 −0.49 −0.15 −0.35 0.277 0.406
SVD 1stD −0.24 −0.31 −0.331 −0.326 −0.40 −0.40 −0.36 −0.30 −0.30
SVD 2ndD −0.42 −0.38 −0.351 −0.335 0.089 0.154 0.294 0.398 0.402
OCM 1stD −0.74 −0.58 −0.506 −0.498 0.169 0.274 0.489 0.704 0.661
OCM 2ndD 0.569 0.087 0.387 −0.730 −0.71 −0.18 −0.52 0.482 0.661
Table 4.6: Relative weights of the nine dimensions
Dimension i 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
Eigenvalue αi −0.817 0.082 0.044 0.037 0.022 −0.021 0.015 −0.008 0.006
Weight Dim SVD 0.385 0.179 0.079 0.072 0.067 0.062 0.056 0.052 0.047
4.6.14 Table following Result 40
The first column in each row contains the voting bloc structure as a list of the blocs that form; the
numbers inside each bloc correspond to the justices in the order given in the top row. The other
cells detail the payoff to each justice. The first two voting bloc structures are Split and Nash Stable
voting bloc structures. The others are not.
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Table 4.7: The effect of different voting bloc structures
Bloc structure 1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
{124}, {789} −1 −5 −1 −1 9 −3 −7 −1 −7
{134}, {789} −1 1 −7 −3 11 −3 −9 −1 −5
{345} 75 77 71 85 −67 −79 −77 −85 −89
{456} −4 −4 −10 6 14 2 −2 −8 −16
{567} −50 −48 −52 −44 −12 16 48 46 44
{4567} −8 −4 −10 −2 6 6 10 0 −8
{34567} −15 −15 −11 7 17 9 11 −15 −23
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